"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT
is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT
using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with
3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to
Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the
lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out
of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways
in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN
BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space
at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to
an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing
the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).

You might want to read what RAND had to say
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all
professional analysts.

And frequently on-target; but sometimes not.


Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and
rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and
reloading payloads made the C130s.

"made the C-130's" what?

RAND analysed the entire chain of
deployment and determined that established airport with supporting
road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields.
Can you prove different?

Whoah. You just told me that the ramp space was the limiting factor,
and when presented with an option that overcomes that problem, all of
a sudden the "ad hoc airfields" are worthless? While cross loading the
cargo to the C-130's would be less efficient than direct throughput,
if the limiting factor really *is* ramp space, then the loss of
efficiency involved in the crossload would be more than made up for by
the increased in total tonnage delivered to the destination. And BTW,
crossloading might not even be required--note that the C-17 is also
capable of using austere FLS's (neat picture out there somewhere of
one landing on Bicycle Lake at Ft Irwin.


As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF
(remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself.
In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one.

Sorry, but when a contingency operation that requires major airlift of
this nature arises, the airframes are diverted from lower priority
missions. Take that as gospel from a guy who saw his milk-run C-141
flight from Charleston to Honduras cancelled when Golden Pheasant went
down in '88. And yes, I remember the USAF; they are the guys fielding
the 210 or so C-17's, of which you and Rand apparently think only
about 20% of which would be tasked to support a high priority
contingency op (not to mention that there are also quite a few
C-5A/B's still out there...). I just see that as another manner of
weighting the data to suit a desired outcome--it does not make it
accurate.



I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force
that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win,
but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.

And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light
forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the
spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne
cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way
of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could
not but there are_lots_of places that could.

And if it is a theater that the SBCT is outguned in, then other TTP,
forces, etc., will have to be used, granted. But yes, I do think that
it would be darned nice of us to give our early entry forces another
tool for their bag. Rapidly deployable light armor can greatly enhance
the joint force commander's options, and can mean the difference
between sustaining higher casualties to accomplish the mission. I
think those are *good* things.


I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more
dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs
to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be
inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of
such a slender thread hasn't been addressed.

And just how the hell do you think FCS is going to magically address
that logistics concern? Snap your fingers and have FCS fielded
*today*, and it faces the same logistical challenges. Not to mention
that our *current* early entry force faces the same challenegs--in the
ansence of Stryker, the only way you are going to acheive decent
ground mobility for those guys is to either bring in a bunch of trucks
(which use about the same fuel as Stryker, take up a goodly portion of
the haul assets that Stryker would, and don't offer 8any* degree of
protection or enhanced firepower), or haul helos in to allow air
assault operations--do you *really* think that either of those options
results in a significantly reduced log chain in comparison to the
SBCT?


Traditionally, the
tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage.

See above.

Given
that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary
operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to
change.

Never heard of substituting greater mobility for fires *and* force
size? Stryker can, in comparison to current capabilities, do that for
the grunts in the early entry force.


You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals.
Can you support that?

No, I have not. But, unlike you, I realize that the SBCT is not the
*only* force structure design that requires log support. In order for
the current LI force to acheive the same mobility on/over the ground
that Stryker offers, you have to either send in a boatload of soft,
less useful trucks to haul them around in, or helos--care to guess how
much POL those helos will burn? The difference between the two forces,
if you force both to acheive significant ground mobility, will be
insignificant in terms of log requirements. The *only* way the current
force wins in this regard is if you send them in with *no* transport
capability--in which case congrats, you just forced us back to the
same rate of movement that we enjoyed during the Civil War (if that
much, since those poor grunts are going to be carrying about five
times the load that their 1860's counterparts were burdened with).

Now, one more time--given that urban combat scenario that you snipped,
do you want to go in as a naked grunt, or with light armor support?
You *really* don't want to answer that question, do you???

Brooks