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James Robinson wrote:

That was only part of the overall problem, however, since there were
many procedural and technical problems at the control center, which
tends to turn the focus of the investigation on the controller's
employer. The controller was probably put into the position where he
couldn't adequately handle the traffic being offered, which led to his
mistakes.

It's funny that this came up now. I recently looked at the NTSB report on
the Nov, 2002 mid-air near KCDW. Since I was in that very same traffic
pattern shortly before this accident (and many times since), I was quite
interested.

The URL for this report is:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...20X05496&key=2

As you can see, there were "errors" on the part of the controllers which,
loosely, mimic the errors at Skyguide. I write "loosely" because Skyguide
handles a different type of traffic and has more automation available.

But in both cases, there was a controller working alone which brought about
an overload condition.

Yet in the CDW case, you'll note, the pilots were listed as being at fault
(with the controller being a "factor"). Given that we're supposed to "see
& avoid", this is a reasonable conclusion in my opinion.

Now, "see & avoid" may not have applied in the Skyguide case. But if
pilot's are - by regulation - supposed to follow the RA instead of a
controller's instructions, then I can see a similar conclusion being drawn
there.

- Andrew

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