In short, Cooper says that the Iranian pilots told him it didn't happen.
Instead, he says that at least one F-14 and one or more F-4s was flown out
of Iran to Egypt or another pro-US country, where they were destroyed. This
was the result of a CIA operation.

Cooper already discussed this years ago in "Iran Iraq, War in the Air"
- one of the Iranian RIO's wasn't in on the defection plan and opted to
spend the rest of the war as a prisoner. Cooper further described (I
haven't read the book since the summer of '04) a high-level conference
in the US to inspect parts of one of the defecting Iranian fighters to
determine whether Iran had had access to spare parts despite attrition
and the purported arms embargo. It's an interesting account, dampened
by the lack of details, follow-up or attirbution by footnoting. As a
Schiffer book, "Iran Iraq" is unsurprisingly sloppy, so I won't get
into the nitty-gritty as to who bears the fault for the books numerous
structural and stylistic flaws. Suffice it to say that the account of
the defection's aftermath is one of many found in the book which lacks
much in the way of demonstrable corroboration.

Such an operation actually seems plausible, because many of the F-14 pilots
during the 1980s had actually been trained in the US and would have been
easier to approach. They also could have been bribed. What is easier to
believe--that the Iranians willingly sold a valuable aircraft to the
Russians and delivered it, or that an Iranian pilot was encouraged to defect
with his aircraft and rewarded by the CIA?

They both seem pretty much equally plausible. While many pilots had
been trained in the US, and likely bore the stigma of this at the rise
of the Islamic regime, the Iraqi invasion raised the issue of
patriotism. Whether for or against the Ayatollah's, I doubt that there
was ever much issue in their mind over their loyalty to Iran itself. I
just find it difficult to make the leap from disloyalty to the Islamic
state to disloyalty to Iran as a whole, which defection would require.
On the other side of the equation, haven't satifactorily discounted the
possible sale of American hardware to the Soviets - the biggest piece
of evidence I've heard discounting such a transaction was the
secretiveness of the Iranians when it came time approach the Soviets.
They would not allow the Russians to get a really good luck at their
hardware - that's actually quite convincing, and it would be
dispositive of the issue were consistent policy the rule and not the
exception in governance.

One of many things I found interesting about that article is that it
explained that the Iranians and the Russians do not get along well when it
comes to military sales. The reason is that the Russians will sell the
Iranians aircraft, but they will not allow them to manufacture spare parts.

Doesn't surprise me - why foster any degree in self-sufficiency in your
clients? According to "Iran Iraq" this was typical of the Soviets'
supply practice with Iraq as well - with aircraft having to be sent
back to Russia for maintenance.

The Iranians do not like having to pay the Russians every time they need to
replace a part. If true, this answers a question that I have long had,
which is why the Iranians choose to keep flying 30+ year old American
aircraft instead of simply buying the latest MiG-29s and Su-27 variants.

Simple - because there's still life in those old airplanes, not to
mention a vast body of technical information and experience as to their
effective use. There's actually a none-too-small school of opinion
here in the US advocating for the continued use of 30+ year old
hardware against buying anything new from anybody, even from other
Americans.