This came along a few days ago.
Unverified (like most Internet gossip)
Reputedly form a retired Boeing engineer.
The merge between Boeing and MD did happen - 1997.
But I can't confirm or deny the internal workings.



For one thing the problem may not be with the batteries
themselves, but with the control system that keeps the charge on them at
a given level. And the 'battery problem" is just one problem in many.
Last week I had my regular monthly lunch with 5 fellow Boeing engineers
(all but one retired) and we talked at length about what we call the
"nightmare liner". We all agreed we will not book a flight on one. The
one engineer still working (at age 74) says the news from inside is not
good, and that there are no quick fixes for the multitude of problems
that the 787 has.

The disaster began with the merger with McDonnell-Douglas
in the mid 90s. The M-D people completely took over the Board and
installed their own people. They had no experience with commercial
airplanes, having done only"cost-plus" military contracting; and there
are worlds of difference between military and commercial airplane design.

Alan Mulally, a life-long Boeing guy and President of
Boeing Commercial Division was against outsourcing. But instead of
making him CEO after he almost single-handedly saved the company in the
early 90s, the Board brought in Harry Stonecipher from
McDonnell-Douglas, who was big on outsourcing. Stonecipher was later
fired for ethics violations. Then the Board brought in Jim McNerney, a
glorified scotch tape salesman from 3M and big proponent of outsourcing,
to develop the 787. (Alan Mulally left to become CEO of Ford and
completely rejuvenated that company.)

McNerney and his bean-counting MBAs thought that instead of
developing the 787 in-house for about $11 billion, they could outsource
the design and building of the airplane for about $6 billion. Right now
they are at $23 billion and counting, three year behind in deliveries,
with a grounded fleet. That's typical for military contracting, so
McNerney and the Board probably think they are doing just fine. But it
will destroy Boeing's commercial business in the same way
McDonnell wrecked Douglas when they took over that company
decades ago.

Boeing had a wonderfully experienced team of designers and
builders who had successfully created the 707, 727, 737, 747, 757, 767,
and 777 in-house, always on-time, and mostly within budget, and with few
problems at introduction. That team is gone, either retired or employed
elsewhere. (I took early retirement after the McD takeover of Boeing
because I knew the new upper management team was clueless.)

The 787 was designed in Russia, India, Japan, and Italy.
The majority of the airplane is built outside the
US in parts and shipped to Seattle or Charleston for assembly.

Gee, what could possibly go wrong? Answer: just about
everything. Because the M-D people that now run Boeing don't believe in
R&D, the structure of the airplane will be tested “in service.”

Commercial airplanes in their lifetime typically make ten
times as many flights and fly ten times as many flight hours as military
airplanes, so the argument that composite structure has been "tested"
because of the experience of composite military airplanes is just so
much BS. So structure is a big issue. The 787 is very overweight. The
all-electric controls have the same lack-of-experience issue that the
structure has.

The good news for me is that the Boeing pension plan is
currently fully funded, although it may not stay that way as the 787
catastrophe develops.