"Chip Jones" wrote in message link.net...
"Snowbird" wrote in message
om...
[snipped]
One thing I haven't seen mentioned on this thread (maybe it has been
and I missed it) is that a visual approach explicitly has no missed
approach segment and IMO the pilot has to consider this carefully when
making a decision as to whether or not to accept a visual approach.
If one isn't able to complete the visual, instructions are "remain
clear of clouds and contact ATC". There are plenty of places we've
met where this can put the pilot in a cleft stick, if he accepts the
visual and in fact can't make it in -- stuck at an altitude where
radio reception is tenuous or where a long wait may be necessary in
order to clear the pilot under non-radar rules.

Sydney, to me this paragraph of yours illustrates why it is legally
important for the pilot to first report sighting the airfield (or aircraft
to follow etc) before ATC issues a visual apprach clearance. A remote
Visual Approach clearance issued way before you see the airport, followed by
lost comm and lost radar as you descend trying to find it, just doesn't
sound like positive IFR air traffic control to me. At ZTL, the controller
(if caught, which is a big IF) would be credited with an operational error.
Sadly, an FAA controller OE investigation would likely come only after the
NTSB crash site investigation was completed... too late to do the pilot any
good.

Chip, excellent points. However, I'm not sure to what extent the
legally correct alternative (a 'cruise clearance') provides more
positive IFR traffic control in the situation I'm considering
(plane flying into rural airport with no IAP, pilot planning to
conduct visual approach procedure). In both cases I would assume
the prudent controller is going to maintain IFR separation until
the flight plan has been cancelled through FSS.

In both cases, as far as I can tell, the burden of safe operation
really remains with the pilot -- to be jolly darn sure there really
is a safe margin to operate in visual conditions at the MIA for
the area and to have a good procedure worked out to climb back to
the MIA and resume communications with ATC if for any reason the
landing can not be made (fog forming over the airport, say).

If the pilot crashed, the real operational error IMO would be the
pilot's, for using a visual approach as an excuse to operate in
marginal conditions and for not flight-planning the "alternative
if the flight can not be completed as planned". (I don't want
to incite a scud-running vs. IFR debate here, but I think everyone
will agree that scud-running is something which requires
a much higher degree of planning and situational awareness to
conduct with any margin of safety -- not something to blunder
into without planning at the end of a flight in the clear-blue
over a layer).

Best,
Sydney