As usual most of my words have been deleted.

For what it is worth Washington, the GY-1 code breaking section,
was not working on JN-25B in real time in 1940/41, intercepts would
be forwarded by mail from the Pacific. There were also not enough
staff in late 1941 (22 men including 10 enlisted men) to do a proper
7 x 24 arrangement. The unit was doing the real time "Purple"
Japanese diplomatic code breaking on odd numbered days, the
army did even numbered days. The unit was also doing real time
work on the Kriegsmarine given the USN participation in the battle
of the Atlantic.

The IJN task force sent to Pearl Harbor did not transmit any radio
messages on its voyage to Hawaii. So say the surviving logs, the IJN
1942 after action report and the key people in the post war interviews.
Attempts to claim otherwise so far have used messages sent to the
task force, messages sent before they left Japan and the dummy
traffic known to have been sent.

The final pre war USN plans had between 2 and 3 battleships per
aircraft carrier as the right fleet mix. The change in priority can
be seen by the way the USS Kentucky (an Iowa class) was broken
up on the slip in 1942 to allow an Essex class carrier (Lake
Champlain) to be built instead, Kentucky was laid down for a second
time in December 1944.

The USS Enterprise was due back from Wake on the evening of 6
December but rough weather caused a delay, the new time was
7.30 am 7 December, they wanted their Sunday in port, but the
weather was against them. In order for the conspiracy to keep Enterprise
out of Pearl Harbor the conspirators needed to have a better long
range weather forecast than can currently be done. USS Lexington
was near Midway and was very exposed should the IJN make a direct
course back to Japan. In order for the conspiracy to keep Enterprise
out of Pearl Harbor the conspirators needed to have a better long
range weather forecast than can currently be done. Washington
ordered the two ferry missions, exact timings up to Hawaii.

The famed order to sail message was never sent by radio, so says all
the IJN evidence. Stinnett in his attempt to claim otherwise uses two
US sources, one of which simply references the other, so one source,
which is the USSBS post war interviews with IJN personnel. This is
the fun thing with Stinnett, his footnotes rarely support the claims in the
text they are supposed to support.

In 1945 and 1946 the USN, as an exercise, using the intelligence system
built up over the war went back to the 1941 messages to see what could
have been learnt, the answer is there was no smoking gun message, the
US would have needed to put together a large number of inferences to
come up with the right answer.

Oh yes, anybody who says the message said "Pearl Harbor" should
note it had a geographic designator, AK, in JN-25, just like AF = Midway,
and the US was still cracking those designators in 1942, see the famed
fresh water message sent by Midway.

Denyav wrote in message ...
Churchill, all the decoded messages placed in the public arena.
Stimson, the Japanese must fire first. Dulles a claimed quote,
Hoover no quote at all presente

Churchill:"..from the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanase
ciphers and were decoding large numbers of their Military and diplomatic
telegrams"

So of all the names mentioned we receive 1 quote.

yes folks, when trapped Denyav will simply retreat, failing to mention
the rest of Churchill's words,

The quote is above is on page 532 of the edition I have access to,
on page 535 comes the quote,

"A prodigious Congressional Inquiry published its findings in
1946 in which every detail was exposed of the events leading
up to the war between the United States and Japan and of
the failure to send positive "alert" orders through the military
departments to their fleets and garrisons in exposed situations.
Every detail, including the decoding of secret Japanese
telegrams and their actual texts, has been displayed to the
world in forty volumes. The strength of the United States was
sufficient to enable them to sustain this hard ordeal required
by the spirit of the American Constitution."

Simple really, fail to mention Churchill noted what the allies
had read they put into the public arena in 1946. Otherwise
the conspiracy requires Churchill to be alternatively the truth
bringer and telling lies.

And remember the IJN had more than 1 code in service, as
did the IJA, but just pretend Churchill's first quote has an
extra line with JN-25B in it.


FDR:"The war starts tomorrow" Dec.6,1941

So please give us the verified source of this wonder quote and
note "the war" does not equal "the war with the US".

As I said before being a custodian of conspiracies is a tough job nowadays.

Someone has to do it of course, Denyav is applying for the job
and wondering why his tourist trip of various conspiracy web
sites does not seem to work as a good recommendation.

See any Pearl Harbor conspiracies there?

Yeah right,nobody sees anything.

Denyav basically has to wear a blindfold to avoid seeing the truth.

Translation if a person in public life tells a lie about being given
a speeding ticket, they must be clearly responsible for mass murder.

Translation if a public person or official tells a capital lie about Pearl
Harbor,there is no reason to believe that they are telling truth about other
similar incidents,for example 9/11.

Yes folks, apparently FDR, Stimson, Marshall, etc, were running
the USA in 1941 and 2001. Simple really.

Denyav is having trouble coping with the idea the work on the A code
stopped after it went out of service while work picked up on the B code.

Congrulations you have finally accepted that recovery work did not stop in
March or April 1941 but actually accelerated.

Yes folks, Denyav has to put words into other people's mouths
in order to lie his way out of another mess. As usual no proof of
what I said has been presented.

1) It was not Safford.
2) It appears the quote is about a specific case in 1943.

It was Safford it refers to whole JN25B decoding process.

Ah I like this, Denyav lifted the quote, which he keeps deleting,
from a conspiracy web site. The trouble is the document was
written in 1944 or later and Safford was put out of code breaking
in 1942, and the quote itself appears to be the usual conspiracy
quote idea, take an example about a specific case and pretend
it applies generally, or claim that is what the document supports.
The document itself does not give an author.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/...ea/Biblio.html

History of OP-20-GYP-1 (Cryptanalysis-Pacific). This history was
written after the war, probably by Stuart McClintock. It concerns the
activities of the Pacific cryptanalysis unit in Washington. It contains
information concerning the steps leading to success against the
Jap Navy General-Purpose Code, JN 25. history Collection IV
W I.5.12 and 5.13. This history is classified TS.

Yes folks, Denyav needs a fact so he creates one, the number
of groups recovered was around 3,800 to 1 December 1941.

Just add up your own monthly recovery numbers after April 41
without trying to hide the numbers behind some definition walls,
you will find a totally different number,and this number will be
very close to 10000.

Yes folks, Denyav will keep ignoring the facts, here are the totals
I keep presenting.

If you would like to know the exact code groups recovered it was
"Unfinished or Continuous" [i.e., a running tally]
April 1, 1941: "approximately 300 values recovered"
May 1, 1941: "approximately 400 values recovered"
June 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
July 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered"
August 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
Sept 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered"
Oct 1, 1941: "approximately 2400 values recovered"

"Completed during October 1941"
Nov 1, 1941: "600 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,000 values as of
this date]

"Completed during November 1941"
Dec 1, 1941: "800 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,800 values as of
this date]

"Unfinished or continuous"
Jan 1, 1942: "Approximately 6,180 values recovered"

Remembering some previously assigned values could be changed
by later discoveries.

So by the end of December 1941 the allied thought they had around 7%
of the code book recovered.


Denyav is of course, simply adding the numbers together, rather
than admitting they are the cumulative totals known at the end of
the relevant month.

Yes folks Denyav now needs to invent a whole new history. Apparently
the fact the contribution allied intercepts and code breaking made has
been known for decades has to be rewritten.

You are excellent in contradicting yourself.

Denyav is so funny.

How the Allies that,according to your own statements,were so incapable of
reading JN25B messages prior to Pearl Harbor,became so sophisticated
and efficient code breakers right after Pearl Harbor.

Yes folks, Denyav tries to announce that the code was compromised
in 2 months in December 1940 and January 1941, but now has to
turn around and say the allies, with more resources, starting from a
much higher level of knowledge, could not compromise the code in
6 months. You see for Denyav to be right the allies went backwards
in 1942 when it came to reading JN-25. Simple really, just invent facts
and delete the problems.

Deleted text,

"So tell us all please what A code values did the US recover in say
the second half of 1941?

How did this miracle happen,with the help of Mr.Willshaws outer space aliens
maybe?

Yes folks, Denyav tells us the allies could break the code in the first
2 months of its introduction but then tells us they could not break it
a year after its introduction, even though the allies then started with
7% of the code book and knew about things like the double meanings
and auxiliary tables.

Then we are apparently supposed to ignore the major increases in
manpower devoted to cracking the code. Hawaii was brought in,
and the Australians. Furthermore after discovering the lack of
trustable Japanese speakers in the US the USN had started language
classes and in late 1941 and early 1942 were receiving the first
graduates.

Simply in the first half of 1942 the allies had 5 to 10 times the
resources devoted to cracking JN-25 than a year previously.

The Washington code unit,

In the first quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 10 personnel, 7 officers and 3
enlisted men.
In the second quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 16 personnel, 9 officers, 5 enlisted
men and 2 civilian men.
In the third quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 20 personnel, 8 officers, 10 enlisted
men and 2 civilian men.
In the final quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 22 personnel, 9 officers, 10 enlisted
men and 3 civilian men.
In the first quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 41 personnel, 9 officers, 30 enlisted
men, 1 civilian man and 1 civilian woman.
In the second quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 98 personnel, 12 officers, 70
Enlisted men, 1 civilian man and 15 civilian woman.
In the third quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 207 personnel, 17 officers, 125
Enlisted men, 15 civilian man and 50 civilian woman.

Note the difference in available personnel and note there was less
Japanese diplomatic traffic to handle in 1942, which was a major
drain in 1941.

The ability of the USN to read the IJN codes gave them the best
chance yet to ambush the IJN.

Heck,wasn't it the SAME USN that was unable to read any JN25B
messages only a few months ago?
I guess USN recruited outer space aliens as code breakers right after Pearl
Harbor

Yes folks, Denyav is going to tell us all how the code was simple,
even obsolete and cracked in the 2 months he wants it cracked in
but then announces it could not be cracked in 1942 with far more
knowledge and resources.

Yes folks Denyav does not have a clue, and needs to debate himself
to avoid the facts. Reality says the allies knew how JN-25B worked
in December 1941 but lacked enough code group meanings to

deleted text,

"the messages. That changed in 1942 when the allies threw more
resources at the problem, using the techniques developed in 1941
to crack the code.

"Secondly ignoring the fact the "5" version of the code stopped being
used in January 1941 and the USN stopped working on the A version
in around March 1941, since the IJN decided to stop using the A code
in December 1940. Just try and pretend I am running some sort of
line the USN stopped work at that time. Above all do not even begin
to understand that Washington was weeks behind current intercepts
because they were mailed in from the Pacific.

Thirdly changing the subject. Move away from the fact that if the
failure to change additive books compromised the B code it
must have compromised the A code, since the US had only 5%
of the A code book when work ended on it around March 1941."

Nice use of detractors,Allies knew how JN25B worked already in
December 1940,not in December 1941.

Yes folks, apparently the allies knew within a few days of the first
messages the double meanings, the auxiliary tables and so on,
but of course, according to Denyav, these could not be found in
1942 with many times the resources and 3 times the amount of
available time.

There is one full year difference and Allies did go to hibernating in December
1940.

Yes folks, JN-25 is a code that can only be broken when Denyav
wants it broken. Then it is put back to uncracked when Denyav
wants it the other way.

to figure out Midway and Coral Sea? Or that the all knowing intelligence
system missed the IJN battleships coming out at Midway and the way
the IJN carriers came [into the Coral Sea behind the US carriers.]

Wasn't Midway a victory of superior intelligence gathering?

Yes folks, just ignore the reality the allied intelligence was not
perfect, but try and pretend it was 6 months earlier.


I will leave off the majority of my previous post this time, Denyav's
deleting of it is clear proof of inability to answer it. I must admit the
claim the New York Times published on 8 December 1941 that the
Pearl Harbor raid was no surprise but it seems no one noticed, at
the time, during the war or after the war is very funny.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.