"Woody Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...

Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little
reason
to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here
goes:

Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you?

Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
it, so you got your answer.


"CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it
SNIP

What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat
"stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external
factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL
aircraft.

'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun.

Better check the ol' dictionary again. It is indeed also a verb; my
handy-dandy Webster's defines it as "to pile up in a stack".

If I'm
in the CAS stack, I'm capping.

Whatever you say, pal. I had assumed you were referring to some
verb-transformed version of CAP, as in "combat air patrol". If so you might
want to clue DoD in on your change to the definition of CAP, which is, "An
aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the
critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose
of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their
targets. Also called CAP. See also airborne alert; barrier combat air
patrol; patrol; rescue combat air patrol." Don't see any reference to CAS
usage there. ( http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/c/01033.html )
Of course, to be completely honest, there is no reference to the term CAS
stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it?


You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
commodity
SNIP
the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? SNIP

You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle,
the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a
place
that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF.

And it was also one where the inability to provide specific weapons loadout
requests in a timely manner was problematic, as witnessed by the Anaconda
fight, where the aircraft were not always optimally loaded out to handle the
requirments of the ground force at that given moment--this is another
advantage of the STOVL platform, which can hit a FARP to load out the
required munitions.


I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your
assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The
decision has been made. I disagree with it.

Fine. Disagreement within our military is, IMO, what makes it great. As
Patton once said, "If everybody is in agreement, then somebody is not
thinking" (or something similarly worded--been a few years since I read that
quote). I'll take the opposite stance, in that I view increasing our
versatility as a key requirement for our future military needs, especially
in view of the environment that we find ourselves in and facing for the
foreseeable future, where a lack of specific threat characterization until
that threat is immediately immenent is the norm.


SNIP
It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make
nice
with the USMC.

No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you
found
it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation.


I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
OK?


Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
SNIP
They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being
more versatile a bit better than you do.

I grasp what's useful and what's not.

If you can't grasp the "usefulness" of versatility in the modern and future
military picture, then I beleive you need to reconsider. Had I told you in
August of 2001 that we needed to be able and ready to go into Afghanistan
with a combination of airpower and landpower, you'd have laughed at me. The
plain fact of the matter is that we don't *know* where, when, how, or what
the next threat will be or its nature. That requires versatility on the part
of the military forces. The USAF has probably been one of the more energetic
proponents of improving the versatility of its units and platforms; the USMC
another. The Army and Navy have been IMO relative late bloomers in this
regard, but now we are seeing some real movement in their camps as well. The
flip-side of this versatility card is that those forces that *don't* become
versatile, or can't become more versatile, become prime fodder for
elimination by being labled as "non-transformational" (the Army, for
example, is *finally* moving towards the concept of the brigade combat team
being its primary unit of action, as opposed to the Cold War
mentality-inspired division; this helps a bit in making their heavy
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
is solely A model equipped.




Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
SNIP
that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I
was on a roll.)

Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to
me.
Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a
different lift system.


You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up
the
same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my
fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap
rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog.

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
more risky than CTOL.



According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
SNIP

So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
the STOVL concept itself.


That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
than their earlier ancestors?

Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?



SNIP

Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL
aircraft.

Brooks


Which you can.

You can't guarantee that. Imagine a scenario where the fight in Afghanistan
had not been able to rely as heavily as it did upon the Northern Alliance in
the ground combat role. When US lives are on the line in that ground
environment, the demand for CAS will inevitably increase. The demand for
tanker support to keep the C-17's flowing into the intermediate staging
base, or even directly into the area of operations' aerial port of
debarkation (APOD), will increase, meaning less available to support the use
of CTOL fighters in the loooong range CAS effort. Or, imagine a scenario
where we are forced to (gasp!) take on two different simulataneous combat
operations in different theaters, one being a more major conflict that
consumes the lions share of the available tanking and bomber (read as
"really long range and high capacity CAS platform, in addition to its BAI
and "strategic" roles") assets. You don't have the option of just saying,
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks


--Woody


Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have
decided not to put an internal gun on their version.

--Woody