On 18 Apr 2004 21:18:55 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.

Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress.

No one will accuse you of paranoia for that apprehension. Be afraid,
be very afraid.

No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book.

You forced me to pull it off the shelf and do a quick skim. I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.
Titled "Peace is Our Profession" it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s. LeMay and other WW II bomber
generals were in control of a large chunk of the AF. The real
questions of doctrine in an emerging Cold War were driving decisions
and strategic nuclear forces were a major player. Even the tactical
inventory was being developed around bomber intercept for defense and
low-level nuke strike for offense.

I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit.

Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact. All fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE most assuredly
hated the thought of possibly being assigned to SAC. (Can you recall
the vinyl square top baseball caps and polyester dickies of SAC
crews?)

When personnel requirements and the bad personnel policy decision of
"no involuntary second tours" drove the cross-training of loads of
SAC, MAC and ATC crews into fighters, the hatred was reinforced. While
a lot of guys did a great job (and some are described in When Thunder
Rolled), there were some who brought SAC attitudes and lack of
flexibility with them. It wasn't a "team-building" exercise.

What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.

Marshall flew a combat tour in RF-4s, then another in F-4s during
Linebacker and finally wound up as an F-15 driver.

The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?

If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one. (Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?)

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent.

So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?

I think Pliny the Elder did some of that. (And, after ten years
service on the seven-member Board of Trustees of the Pikes Peak
Library District I've got a soft spot in my heart/head for libraries.)


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8