On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 19:04:27 GMT,
(Drazen Kramaric) wrote:

Sure. But then let's throw in all the other pilots and let's also
include the Italians who provided the majority of Axis aircrew in the
theatre until Torch, not that they figure in the
Luftwaffe-exceptionalist appreciation of the North African air war
which reduces the totality of that conflict to the inanity of the
fighter superheroes *to the exclusion of all else* .

What was the contribution of Regia Aeronautica to the air war over the
Western Desert prior to appearance of Luftwaffe?

The RA *was* the air war over the Western Desert prior to the arrival
of the Luftwaffe and remained the major contributor into 1942. If the
British performance against the Axis in the air is going to be judged,
it needs to be done against the whole context involved, not just
against one component of the Axis air effort in isolation, no matter
what qualitative qualifications might be required between the
different national efforts. Marseille and his colleagues shot down a
lot of fighters while they were attacking Axis bombers or other Axis
fighters: removing the Italians from the equation simply distorts the
reality in favour of Luftwaffe performance, just like various posters
who like to exclude German bomber losses from the BoB loss figures to
inflate Bf109 success. Why is this kind of distortion required in the
first place?

By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.

There is very little in English (and not a lot in French until
recently, I gather) about the French in 1940. Nevertheless, the
French - no matter how good they were - were not in a position to
directly contribute to the air war against Germany after June 1940
(except those exiles who fought in the RAF, ironically), whereas the
RAF was. When it comes to it, the Dutch destroyed and damaged a lot
of Luftwaffe aircraft in 1940 and don't get much credit, while
disproportionate focus on RAF operations is more than matched by the
successively disproportionate focus on USAAF operations after Pearl
Harbor in English language works. So I don't think the RAF is
benefitting from this kind of approach in isolation. The Soviets have
a real grievance here, as well, in terms of having their contribution
recognised in English sources.

Indeed, but his death, along with the loss of other experten at the
same time, was a watershed for that unit.

Well, it got rotated, like German divisions of fighter groups, it was
a different system than Allied.

It wasn't rotated until it had its most effective members gutted.
This certainly happened to allied units on occasion, but the minority
"stars" didn't seem to account for the same critical proportion of
their unit combat effectiveness, although this is just a personal
opinion on my part.

That's precidely my point. Marseille did not exist in isolation, but
the impact of his death (and the other experten in the same unit lost
in the summer of 1942) was disproportionate.

Had Luftwaffe had the numbers to contest the skies over Egypt, his
death wouldn't have been so important (if it actually was). But
Germans did not have the pilots, nor the aircraft nor the fuel to keep
adequate air force in the air.

Their own fault, I'm afraid. The British, and then Americans, and
even the Soviets, faced and overcame the problems of logistical
overstretch over large geographical areas and swingeing operational
attrition while generally improving the size and quality of their air
force. The Luftwaffe did not.

Whether it was Marseille who shot down
130 aircraft, or four Fritzes with 30 victories each, the outcome
would have been the same.

The Germans and Italians still had to be beaten: a pile of aircraft
sitting around in factory depots doesn't defeat the enemy by itself.
Any material superiority (and this wasn't by any margin decisively in
the British favour in 1941-42 in North Africa) has to be translated
into operational success, and that requires the efforts of the aircrew
and air force organisation involved.

The British had similar problems of overstretch at that time
(deploying fighter units from the UK, Malta, Middle East across Asia
to India and Burma). They managed an air force in an attritional
conflict more effectively, primarily by recognising the extent of
aircrew training and development demanded by an attritional conflict
in a manner the Luftwaffe didn't.

British could afford to have such air force by having Red Army to
engage German army.

The British had their own problems of overstretch in the air, quite
seperate from any ground operations against the mass of the German
army. You might not agree, but I know for a fact from relevant
planning documents in 1941-42 than aircraft and aircrew availability
against their various commitments were a critical issue for them at
the time. The British aircraft production effort was predicated by
the need to fight and win the next Batlle of Britain, and had little
to do with facing the German army direct. These dynamics can be seen
long before Barbarossa.

If it were one-on-one, I doubt RAF by itself would
have ever won the air supremacy in Europe.

And I can say the same about every national air force, but this
doesn't do much other than conclude an argument oriented around
nationalistic posturing.

Granted, war is not a sport
event, but Luftwaffe should not be blamed for failing to prepare for
war it could never win.

The potential enemies were well-known, and the war was launched on a
German timetable, as Adolf certainly wasn't responding to external
agression. Meanwhile the British, Americans and Soviets had war
imposed on them, including the attrition endured in several major
defeats (especially in the Russian case) yet still managed to beat the
people who set the agenda. While I'm sure the individual Luftwaffe
pilots, groundstaff and aircrew did everything that could reasonably
expected, the higher direction and staff work of the Luftwaffe was
observably inferior to that achieved by their enemies. I agree with
Mr Dillard amout this issue, I'm afraid. They controlled the
development of hostilities in every case, and they lost in the end.

The heroic Siegfried myth of the Wagnerian hero facing insurmountable
hordes of untermenschen in inferior machines doesn't account for their
failure, while that failure clearly exists and needs to be accounted
for.

Gavin Bailey


--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003