(Kevin Brooks) wrote:



So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.

Please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about this unit or
their activities.

Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty?

When?

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi

What the heck does that treaty have to do with the service of the
102's? This is like saying that the F-102 was taken out of service
after the 1973 Fords were announced. It's an absolutely true
statement but also absolutely meaningless.

If you look at my other post, I give better dates of when it went out
of service.

(source:
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
line" service.

I guess it all depends on what you mean by front line service. I
think that suggesting that it was a front line aircraft past the mid
sixties is more accurate.

It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
fighter, as he would call it, no?

Well, in Korea when the war broke out, some of the first aircraft
deployed were P-51's, not jets. Not because they were the best, but
because they were close. As far as remaining in theatre, it was
pointed out that the total deployment was a total of 24 aircraft. Do
you know the numbers for similar aircraft? For all we know, it may
simply have been more trouble to return them than it was worth.....I
don't know.



No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap.

Wasn't it? That's certainly the way I remember it....and I knew a
quite a few people who were in it for exactly that reason.

My brother served in
the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
stroke, does it not?

More power to him. There were a lot of personnel that came into the
guard that way. In fact, to bring it back on subject, that was one of
the few career paths for many of the F-102 pilots that were considered
excess as the number of F-102 squadrons was reduced. Many of them
were not going to be retrained on a newer aircraft. If they could
find a NG unit that would take them, they could keep flying.


ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.

Again, not what I said.

Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
their AC counterparts.

OK. ....and a list of their major accomplishments while there would
be?????? # missions, troops killed, planes shot down, missiles
fired.


I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

I don't know if that's really a fair comparison. After all, that was
less than 2 1/2 years after WWII ended.


OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
manifested?

Good question. I thought that through the 1980's the chain of command
for the NG went to the Governor unless the unless the units had been
federalized.

The example that comes to mind was Eisenhower doing this to keep NG
troops from being used by segratationist governors in the school
integration efforts in the mid-1950's.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

It's a good question. In all seriousness, maybe it was simply easier
to keep them there than return them. I've seen pictures of
Davis-Monahan in this time frame, it was covered with little delta
dots. There was no shortage of low-hour 102 airframes.

Anyway, I did a quick search and apparently at least some of them were
on alert sitting armed with the cockpits open. So someone expected
some trouble and wanted them there. Apparently they also escorted some
B-52 missions according to the SAC Museum.

http://www.dposs.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm


Scott Peterson


Don't accept your dog's admiration
as conclusive evidence that you're
wonderful.