John Halliwell wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Which is why they needed two pilots to switch off flying formation, as stated.

Two pilots was obviously better than a single pilot when flying
formations, however that does not mean the RAF would have gone down that
route for daylight ops. Bomber Command pilots were already flying 8 hour
sorties, some as long as 12 hours (in the Hampden the pilot could not
move from the seat - no access to the rest of the aircraft).

Bomber Command a/c at night were able to fly much of the cruise part of the mission
on the automatic pilot, with no need to jockey throttles or make constant fine
corrections to stay in formation. 12 hour missions were certainly the exception,
and even 8 hours would be over the median. I have a copy of Walter Hughes
self-published "A Bomber Pilot in World War II." In it, he includes his
navigator's logs for each of his 35 missions (the counters) in a B-24 in '44-'45
(Note: B-24 missions were generally somewhat shorter than B-17 missions, as the
B-24 cruised faster).

Ignoring missions to targets outside of Germany, the shortest mission he flew was 5
hours 25 minutes (an airfield at Paderborn), the longest 12 hours 30 minutes
("Russian Troop Support, Ships and Docks, Swinemunde near Poland"). I'd say the
average mission ran about 7-7 1/2 hours, with quite a few around 6-6 1/2. A
_minimum_ of 45 minutes was spent in forming up the squadrons, group and combat
wing before setting off, something that night bombers didn't have to do (although
they usually did climb to a considerable height while circling their base). More
typically, it took 1-2 hours, and the longest he recorded was 3 hours from Take off
time to form up time, plus another twenty minutes before "Zero hour," the time when
they set off.



It is more than likely that Bomber Command would have retained the single pilot

(with the increased workload) faced with the need to modify aircraft and
a pilot shortage.

We assumed that they'd do so at first, while the necessary mods were studied.

It is not correct to assume that since the USAAF had two pilot aircraft
and used two pilots on daylight ops, that you _need_ two pilots when
flying similar ops.

Of course not. Actually, at least one B-26 Group (I think it was either the 323rd
or 386th) in the ETO was given the B-26C-6 model, with only a single pilot and
controls, as a test. The opinions in the group seem to have be uniformly negative,
and they were fairly quickly re-equipped with dual control a/c. Of course, the 3
US groups of A-20s in the ETO were flying almost identical missions as the B-26s
with a single pilot, and suffering similar (slightly higher) loss rates, but those
missions were a lot shorter than the heavies, at lower altitudes and, as mentioned
elsewhere, generally facing fewer fighters.

Also, it is not correct to assume that since the
USAAF used large, tight combat boxes, that you _need_ to use such
tactics.

Obviously. However, if you want to have a reasonable chance of surviving during
the period before the Jagdwaffe has lost the air superiority battle, then you'd
better be in those tight combat boxes. Bomber Command was able to operate by day
in relatively loose formations (compared to the 8th) from mid-'44 on because the
fighter threat had been seriously reduced, so that such formations (along with lots
of escort fighters, many now based on the continent) were able to survive. Prior
to that period, flying loose formation just made you a magnet for the fighters,
because you lose much of the formation firepower (and the RAF was already seriously
down on that compared to the US heavies, owing to fewer MGs of much less effective
caliber). Fly loose formation and the fighters are faced with a bunch of single
targets that they can concentrate on and overwhelm one at a time.

There's even a suggestion that daylight ops may not be the only
answer when you take cloud cover into account.

If you're going to bomb by radar the accuracy isn't all that much better by day
than by night, but it's still better (about 2 vs. 3 mile CEPs at that time). and
Oboe, Gee-H and Micro-H were all limited in range and required forward deployed
transmitters on the continent to reach the deeper German targets. That's the main
reason RAF Bomber Command accuracy was so much better on deep penetration targets
after the invasion. Here's the 8th AF blind bombing accuracy figures:

H2X only: 10/10 clouds; % within 1,000 feet, 0.2%; % over 5 miles, 41%.

H2X plus visual: 8-9/10 clouds; 1.0%; 18%.

H2X plus visual: 6-7/10 clouds; 2.0%; 9%.

H2X plus visual: 4-5/10 clouds; 4.4%; 4%.

Gee-H: various weather; 5.0%; 6%.

Micro-H: various Wx; 5.0%; 11%.

Visual: good Wx; 30.0%; 8%.

Visual: poor Wx; 9.4%; 9%.

(Source: "Eighth Air Force -- Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945," Aug.
1942 - June 1945, file 520.057-1, HRA, quoted in "America's Pursuit of Precision
Bombing, 1910-1945" by Stephen L. McFarland)

Guy