Juvat wrote:

Couple years ago I tried to find whatever declassified documents I
could at Maxwell AFB (for Ed...maintaining my card catalog and photo
copying currency).

Commendable. I'll drop some opinions in at relevant places below:

The only thing I brought home was five pages I photo-copied from a
March 1966 Fighter Weapons Newsletter (published by the Fighter
Weapons School at Nellis AFB). I'm looking at it right now...

FYI, in 1966, the FWS was a fragmented school. There were three
separate divisions, with three separate curricula: F-100, F-105 and a
newly developing F-4C section. Criteria for attendance was 1000 hours
in type.

The final report (at the time) was classified SECRET NOFORN, if
sombody wants to do the FOIA request, the report was titled "TAC
Mission FF-857, Air Combat Tactics Evaluation F-100, F-104, F-105 and
F-4C versus MiG-15/17 type aircraft (F-86H)." It was published May
1965 by the USAF Fighter Weapons School.

An interesting paragraph in the FWN article says..."In testing and
analyzing air combat tactics against aircraft of unlike performance,
the Featherduster [ed--one word] tests, like most of our recent air
combat tactics analyses and future aircraft development evaluations,
have capitalized on the energy maneuverability theory deveoped by
Major John Boyd and Mr Tom Christie and Staff, of Systems Command APGC
PGTOS, Eglin AFB, Florida."

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.
Understanding that energy was both potential and kinetic, that the two
were interchangeable, that the vertical offered some advantages, and
that there were chartable corners of the performance envelope that
revealed strengths and weaknesses were all new ideas.

What smacks me in the forehead is simply remembering this article was
from March 1966, then you read Michel's "Clashes" and ask, "why in the
world didn't the FWS get behind this issue?" or informally, "what the
**** were they thinking they accomplished by ignoring ACM/ACT?"

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Second, the concept was well established even through the Korean war
that "fighting wing" was the way to employ. Senior pilots, as flight
and element leads did the shooting, while junior pilots were supposed
to fly fighting wing and "clear lead's six." Really they merely
occupied the potential shooter's position, thereby becoming the
alternative target for the attacker and thus protecting the lead.



Were also other USAF fighters participating on this program?

From the FWN article...about Featherduster 1 Part 1..."The Mission
FF-857 was accomplished during the period 26 April-7 May 1965 .

1. F-100, F-104, F-105 and F-4C were alternated in "attacker" and
defender" positions.

2. F-86H were similarly alternated in "attacker" and "defender"
positions.

[paraphrasing now]

Mostly 1-v-1 with a limited number of 2-v-2 engagements, to check the
defensive-split capability of a defending unit.

A reflection of the limited training available at the time to
operational crews in 2-v-2 engagement. Might as well do 1-v-1, since
the two-ship will rapidly lose mutual support, the wingman would only
be dragged along in fighting wing anyway, and we can save training
sorties by going 1-v-1.

Profiles were either defender at 35,000' and defender at typical
combat patrol speed (adjusted back to .9 mach so the F-86H could make
an attack), or defender at 20,000 feet and typical ordnance loaded
airspeed for the type fighter involved (360 knots for the F-105).

Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

A total of 128 sorties were flown, lasting approx 45 minutes each,
including two to four engagements, all jets were "clean" (no tanks or
suspension equipment) so about 180 engagements total.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

Featherduster 1 Part 2 was conducted 28 Jun-2 Jul 1965 and it involved
two F-5A from the 4441 CCTS at Williams AFB and the prototype F-5N
(with uprated J-85-15 motors, 4300# thrust each eng) versus ANG
F-86Hs, the profiles were the same as Part 1. A total of 62 sorties
were flown, the F-5 fought 35 engagements as the defender and 47 as
the attacker. F-5 agility was impressive says the FWN article.

The 4441st was the training squadron for Foreign Military Sales
support of the F-5A. They trained the customers who were buying the
airplane. The cadre was mostly high experience F-100 and F-86 pilots
at that time. Because a lot of the customers were interested in air
defense, they did a lot of air-to-air training in their syllabus.

The F-104 bunch that did so well was predominantly from the 435th TFS
"Black Eagles" of the 479th TFW at Homestead. They were one of few
"day fighter" units in the USAF at the time and were leaders in the
development of "fluid attack" tactics in which, rather than fighting
wing, the element flew as a mutually supporting team, not chasing the
leader's tail but maneuvering counter-plane and positioning to deny
counters and swap roles to maintain pressure on the defender. They
were leaders in vertical maneuver application. (Former 435th Black
Eagle--but not in F-104s).


Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training. Rather than fighting your own type, which
inevitably lead to a "I can fly slower than you" contest, the
dissimilar battle requires understanding of both aircraft's potential
and maximizing your own while minimizing your opponent's.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038