Joining this late because I have been gone but if it helps here is a
collection of data I put out years ago ----



An Air Combat Summary for Western Fighters:



Since 1979, American made fighters have been engaged in air combat at
least 214 times and have downed around 214 aircraft. Air Battles that
have occurred were from the Bekaa Valley and Persian Gulf to around the
world during the coup attempt in Venezuela. Engagements and Kills were
recorded throughout more than 3400 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat
sorties. Western aircraft included the F-4E Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15
Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-5E Tiger II, Mirage F-1, and F-18 Hornet
fighter-bombers. These engagements resulted in (with this data base) 214
confirmed Kills with only the two air-to-air combat losses. No direct
correlation is made with those kills offically sanctioned by the
respective air forces; for instance, Israel and Pakistan will make a
determination of "personal kill" versus "squadron kill" based on the
exact way the pilot performed rulling out louck and chance in the
scoring. There we



23 x M-61 gun kills

48 x AIM-7 Sparrow kills from F-15, F-18, & F-14's

04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM kills from the F-16 (4) and F-15 (1)

03 x AIM-54 Phoenix Kills

130 x IR missile kills from all types of aircraft utilizing

either AIM-9 Sidewinder, Magic 550, or Python missiles

2 x maneuvering suicides

1 x bail out

3 x from air-to-ground ordnance while airborne

------

214



During this time, only two Western aircraft were downed by Russian built
aircraft. One South African Mirage F-1 by a Cuban flown Angolian MiG-23
with an AA-8 Aphid and a US Navy F/A-18C by an Iraqi flown MiG-25 Foxbat
with an AA-6 Acrid. There were two Saudi F-15C's that downed 2 x
Iranian F-4E's back in the mid 1980's when they were trying to defect.
Also a Navy F-14 downed a USAF RF-4C in an advertent Sidewinder firing
over the Med. There were other statistics where dedicated attack
aircraft were downed by fighters but the details have not been accounted
for here. The First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) there were well over 300
air-to-air encounters with the Iranian scoring around 135 Kills and the
Iraqi's around 85, but the data is still very confused because there
were not engagements just run downs and encounters during strike
missions. Surprisingly the Iraqi's favored the Super 530 IR version on
the F-1 Mirage because of its range. The Iranians were reported to have
made at least three AIM-54 kills which have been recorded because they
would be F-14 kills and it does represent the only combat use of the
AIM-54.



A Summary of the Gulf War and Bosnian Air-to-Air Kills



06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum's

... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill

... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide's

08 x F-1 Mirages

... 4 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide

04 x MiG-21/F-7 Fishbed's

... 3 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x AIM-7 Kill

08 x MiG-23 Flogger's

... 6 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

03 x MiG-25 Foxbat's

... 2 x AIM-7 Kills

... 1 x AIM-120 Kill

06 x Su-7/17/22

... 3 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x Mk-83 Bomb

02 x Su-25 Frogfoot

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

01 x IL-76 Candid transport

... 1 x AIM-7 Kill

01 x PC-9 Trainer

... pilot bailout

07 x Helo's

... 2 x AIM-7 Kills

... 1 x AIM-9 Kills

... 2 x Gun Kills

... 1 x LGB Kill

... 1 x Walleye Kill

04 x Gastreb Light Attack

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM
Kills

... 3 x AIM-9M Kills

02 x Blackhawk Helicopters (fratricide)

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill

... 1 x AIM-9M Kill

---------------------------------------

..... 24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for
73%)

..... 04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (6 fired)

..... 16 x AIM-9 KIlls (19 launches for
84%)

..... 02 x 30mm Gun Kills

..... 02 x Maneuvering Suicides

..... 01 x Bailout

..... 03 x Air-to-Ground Ordnance

---------------------------------------

52 x Total Gulf/Bosnia Air-to-Air
Victories

Then Add:

04 x USN Kills on Libyan Su-22's

01 x USN Kill on an RF-4C

01 x RSAF Kills on 2 x F-4E's from Iran

03 x AIM-54 Kills from Iranian F-14's

24 x Israeli Air Force Kills From 1979 to
the Bekaa Valley

89 x Israeli Air Force Kills During the
Bekaa Valley War:

13 x Pakistani Air Force Kills During the
Border War:

03 x Venezuelan Air Force Kills During the
2nd Coup Attempt:

18 x South African Air Force Kills During
the Angolian War:

04 x Gastreb's downed over Bosnia

02 x Iraqi Aircraft downed after Gulf War

-----

214



None of these engagements occurred directly against Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Air Forces although almost all were against Soviet manufactured
machines. Some were fourth generation MiG-29 Fulcrums but no Su-27
Flanker fighters. A couple of Su-25 Frogfoot were downed by Pakistani
F-16's and the one Pakstani F-16 lost to fratricide is counted not as a
combat loss but as a missile kill. Sukhoi Su-27's have since seen combat
in the sporadic air war between Ethiopia and Euritrea, no real numbers
available now.



Enemy fighters have fired 19 to 22 missiles and made five gun passes
with only three hits and two kills. It is interesting to note that over
half of the attacks were considered out-of-envelope attempts due to the
fact that the enemy pilots could not achieve a better position or did
not understand how to. So the pilot-factor in these engagements had a
significant impact on the outcome.



During the dynamics of these engagements the average radar first
contacts were under 20 NM until the Gulf War and then the average
appeared to slip out to 28 NM, even though some individual pilots
acquired contacts as far as 50 NM. This is surprising for many
considering that the F-15 was employed by the Israelis, but the Bekaa
Valley was characterized by very short range radar contacts. The lack of
an average longer range radar contact was primarily due to the complex
and sophisticated nature of the operational environment that required
pilot compensation for formations, terrain, weather, surface-to-air
threats, and the presence of enemy aircraft. The demands for the
positive ID (identification) of targets also effected the nature of the
air battles.



The Soviets employed, by themselves or through numerous surrogate
pilots, tactical "experiments", as Soviet analyst Col Babich would say,
that were not yet addressed in the literature from the Warsaw Pact Air
Forces. Only recently have these more exotic evaluations been identified
in the writings by Soviet tacticians. With a better understanding of the
capabilities of modern Western weapon systems, the Soviets have
attempted to produce tactical geometry's and intercept dynamics that
utilize larger numbers of aircraft with the objective of exceeding the
technical capabilities of the radar such as scan and track rate, search
volume, and overall pilot task loading. Ultimately these factors would
try to reduce "situation awareness" (SA) and "mutual support" (MS)
bringing the friendly formations into "killing zones" or "ambush
points". "Decoy" or "monkey" formations would serve as obvious "bait" in
an attempt to set up the more tactically experienced Western pilots for
an unobserved entry by a MiG element or trapped into one or more of
these "killing zones" for demise by the whole enemy formation. Because
of this, most targets were not "cooperative" and therefore the actual
engagement setups were basically short ranged and radar lock-ups were
discouraged due to the numbers of targets at many different bearings.



There was also a basic "timing" problem, that directly relates to the
skill level of the engaged pilots. In many cases, the Soviet advisory
technicians and their brothers in arms thought that they had properly
"pincered" or "enveloped" the formation of US built fighters. In other
words, they were satisfied from a C3I standpoint that the enemy
formation was properly countered and engaged by their fighters who were
given an entry advantage. Why their pilots never came home was a big
mystery, especially since it looked so good on the GCI radar scopes.
What of course happened was that the US built fighters, through superior
onboard systems, system mechanization, air-to-air weapons, maneuver
performance, pilot skills, and overall realistic training, were able to
correct for a bad start and quickly kill the attackers inside the
resolution cell of their command and control system. Despite the fact
that the Soviets are now saying all of the "right things" when it comes
to appreciating these kinds of air battles, but they are far from
realizing any wide spread benefits from changing the emphasis of their
training.



The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events. The
pilot's ability to keep his eyes and attention outside the aircraft and
still monitor his sensors and weapon system carried the day. During the
approximately 30 Middle East engagements, situation awareness was lost
only three times, according to unofficial pilot debriefs. That means the
pilots and their flight members lost track of events only 1% of the
time. Most of us couldn't do that well driving home from work. To make
that remarkable fact happen took exactly what is called "Western
Technology". The sad thing is, considering all of what we said, that we
can abuse this incredible edge over the Soviets by over-doing it on the
"technology" and system "pet rock" side without a corresponding balance
in requirements. The keep it simple stupid (KISS) principle has never
been more important.



Exchange ratios from the major air conflicts since the Korean War. The
air-to-air exchange ratio is straight forward but the campaign exchange
reflects the simple ratio of aircraft lost to all causes divided by the
number destroyed from all causes. We have a tendency to dwell on the
successes and not examine the failures. The Soviets just look at the
bottom line, aircraft invested versus aircraft expended. In the Korean
War, despite our great air-to-air success rate over the MiG-15 by the
F-86, the Soviets praise the North Koreans for "a draw" with the US
Superpower since in the overall "campaign" the US lost around the same
2000 machines that they did. That is also why they have looked so
seriously at the Middle East Wars, their "campaign" averages were mush
worse.



A best guess determination at what it took to get a missile kill
throughout the conflicts since South East Asia. Together they give a
fairly interesting picture of how the various air wars went and they all
agree on the fact that the Soviet equipment didn't carry the day.
Technology was clearly in the favor of the West, but there was such an
excessive amount of it with little regards to the support side of the
weapons, success was hit or miss and sometimes actually overlooked. The
US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli
Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more
time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on
Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it. Despite
limited F-8 experiences, it was the USAF that became the Vietnam War's
"gun fighters", simply because Navy Phantoms (F-4B/N/J/S) had none by
choice, despite later regrets. Perhaps the best success story has been
that of the Sidewinder "L" (AIM-9L) version that has been so