Paul has good comments and I would just add a few remarks....



"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message CFomh.8490$tc5.2604@trnddc01, Ski
writes
You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
only from a defensive nature.

(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.

Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
Navy needs at the moment.

In my opinion, the Hornet gets you all that and to its lasting credit - but had it been mixed with a "like" maintainable "high-far-fast" fighter the modern CVN would be at its peek in potential, without it there is nothing but adjustments. At first the so-called "outer-air battle" would shift to escort ships with many naval SAM's - then the ship numbers dropped, the enemy employed lots of ECM and the cruise missiles became lower and faster and more numerous. So now the air wing can't do the outer battle despite higher sortie generation and the support ships can't cover the real estate, so in the end ther are vulnerabilities and we have endemic "soft" ships still way too vulnerable to hits, especially from cruise missiles - so lacking the manned high-far-fast fighter at the outer air battle means that the battlegroups remain vulnerable and must stay deep and surface fast.


(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
Tomcat.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

Unfortunately that is not the case but it was the Navy's position when it trashed the Tomcat, and like Iraq intelligence it was a political position not facts. We still have a growing threat from all kinds of cruise missiles (sliders, high-divers, skimmers, combos, etc.) from ships, subs, tactical aircraft, UAV's, ballistic missiles and bombers - it did not suddenly stop, it only got worse. The slow demise of the Tomcat was as much forced by Navy policy as it was due to use and age - that is it also can parallel many strategies to remove the old and bring in the new (could be shared by the A-7 and A-6 also, definately the F-111 in Australia). The budget for spares was cut, the depots were diverted in effort, the Pheonix missile was pronounced "dead", little mod things here and there were stopped, and even though the Tomcat evolved to a multi-role 'Bombcat" totally outclass'ing the Hornet in range, payload and precision strike systems (F-14D) that given new engines and a digital refit could have been the right mix machine for the F/A-18E/F - but to do that would have been to hard to justify and would have added cost to the Hornet. Decisions had to be made - but were they the right ones. I contend that there was and remains an urgent need for a modern Tomcat to combat cruise missiles and platfoirms at the outer ring of the fleet and it would fill the gap in reduced numbers of support ships and the overall vulnerability of the force. Adding submarines to this outer defense ring is the necessary next step.

(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
slide the whole program to include a decade or so development

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was
added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

The customers are leaving anyway - what is needed are some new ideas that will revigerate the JSF into something needed by everybody - it is clearly not needed now. If the JSF is slid a decade and joined by other critical technology driven add-ons the key customers will remain. The small participants simply want to share in what's there, there is no co-production potential and at best a group of coutries will buy a few aircraft and share them which is a good idea - but given how things are stretching now anyway - a decade is a breather for everyone.

(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
world may have to look again at what it is and should be.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

Mahen would faint - that's showing no faith in the future. Believe me the sub-surface world will take over, the question is not will it, but just when. If you can communicate to surface ships a virtual support or escort ship then you are there are you not; the sub can be anywhere but the invisible support ship could direct weapons if attacked just as well as a real boat could. And to remove evacuees there are smaller ships and if necessary a large inflatable used by SOF may suffice or in the end surface.

We are in a time of great change in the very nature of warfare itself, the actual character of conflict - not whether one technology or thing is superior or inferior. We are dealing with a profound debate over just what war is and what it is not. The time of counting chips and comparing force structures is well gone and it is very hard to comprehend. We elude to it think about "effects based" concepts, but in the end it reduces all hierachies of power to issues of national will and values. Clauswitz is stressed at this juncture in the purpose of conflict.

The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk