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Old November 18th 03, 06:43 PM
Mike Rapoport
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Since the author (and his boss) undoubtedly measure success by the volume of
response, don't encourage them by emailing.

Mike
MU-2



"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Tue, 18 Nov 2003 08:51:22 -0700, "Scott Schluer"
wrote in Message-Id:
Udrub.6903$Ue4.3752@fed1read01:

http://msnbc.com/news/993760.asp?0cv=CB10

Seems to be a little more well written and objective than most articles

on
this subject. They mentioned AOPA's Airport Watch program among other
things. They also have a picture of that C-172 hanging from that building

in
Florida (it was Florida, right)? Just seems to prove that a light

aircraft
can't do much damage to a building.


The author of this article is doing his best to paint general aviation
as a security threat to satisfy his need for sensational headlines.

Here's the author's e-mail address:


Article excerpts with comments:

Big holes seen in aviation security

The above headline says more about the misapprehension of its author
than the security of general aviation operations.

"The January 2002 theft of a plane from a Florida airport that
resulted in this crash shows how vulnerable such general aviation
airports are to potential terrorist use, the GAO says."

While the implication is ominous, the fact is, that the aircraft in
the picture failed to hurt anyone but its pilot. It isn't clear why
that wasn't mentioned by the author, but it vividly demonstrates that
the public have little to fear from little airplanes.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 - Federal workers at the nation's largest
commercial airports screen everything from toddlers to tennis
shoes, but there are few such requirements in place for the more
than 200,000 privately owned planes located at more than 19,000
airports in the U.S. that make up the country's general aviation
sector. That fact was noted in recent congressional testimony by a
General Accounting Office official to underscore findings that
general aviation is "far more open and potentially vulnerable than
commercial aviation."

While the implication of not screening general aviation baggage and
passengers will doubtless elicit a twinge of shock among the airline
flying public, it is completely appropriate for general aviation
flights. Or is the author attempting to imply, that federal screeners
and their ancillary equipment need to be installed at 19,000 airports?
Either way, it's a blatant and erroneous attempt to incite public
opinion against general aviation.

THE TRANSPORTATION Security Administration has "taken limited
action to improve general aviation security," since Sept. 11,
2001, GAO's Cathleen Berrick, director of Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, told the Senate Commerce Committee during a Nov. 5
hearing on aviation security

Another ominous quote calculated to elicit visceral response from the
lay public. "Limited action is more than appropriate, it's
reasonable, prudent and cost effective. (Incidently, Ms. Cathleen
Berrick is only one of the six HS directors, not a Managing Director.)

The vulnerability of general aviation stems, in large part,
Berrick said, from the fact that "pilots and passengers are not
screened before takeoff and the contents of general aviation
planes are not screened at any point."

Ms. Barric's failure to mention, that there has never been a single
reported incident of general aviation aircraft used for terrorist
purposes, unlike heavily fuel laden airline aircraft used in the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, speaks volumes regarding her
apparent lack of knowledge and personal agenda.

That's true for the vast majority of flights in the general
aviation, which is broadly defined as "all aviation other than
commercial airlines and military aviation" that includes "small,
single-engine pistons to mid-size turboprops to large turbofans
capable of flying non-stop from New York to Tokyo," according to
the General Aviation Manufacturers Association.

While the Mr. Meeks's hasty research of the definition of general
aviation is commendable, his attempt to imply that general aviation
aircraft might be useful to terrorists is laughable, and reveals his
attempt at sensationalism.

About 4 percent of all general aviation flights, those planes
weighing 12,500 pounds or more, must adhere to the security
regulations laid out in a federal law known as the "twelve-five"
rule. Crews on these aircraft must undergo criminal history
checks. Operators of "twelve-five" aircraft "must adopt and carry
out a security program approved by TSA to ensure that passengers
and their accessible property are screened prior to boarding,"
says an entry in the Federal Register noting the implementation of
the rule.

While Mr. Meeks's research is again admirable, and it appears that he
is attempting to provide a balanced viewpoint, his next paragraph
reveals his sensational motivation once again.

But implementation of those rules is spotty; there's no routine
federal inspection to ensure adherence with them, though a TSA
spokesman said the agency does conduct regular inspections to
[sic] "to ensure that the rules are being implemented."

So Mr. Meeks personally feels, that although the TSA conducts regular
inspections, they are inadequate to insure adherence to the rules.
Such journalistic hubris begs the question, "what are Mr. Meeks
qualifications to make such an assertion?" Does he possess security
training? Does he possess general aviation experience? Or is he just
another sensationalistic journalist seeking to use general aviation as
a whipping boy to sell his drek? Has he considered the fact, that the
personnel who operate the 12,500+ pound aircraft may be more than just
a little motivated to insure their flights are not hijacked or
detonated?

According to the GAO, which is the investigative arm of Congress,
about 70 percent of all general aviation planes are four- to
six-seat, single-engine, piston-driven propeller planes. These
types of planes, like a Cessna 172, cruise about 145 mph and fully
loaded weigh less than a Honda Civic.

It's obvious why Mr. Meeks failed to mention, that the 70% of the GA
fleet he mentions, have a fuel capacity of about 50 gallons compared
to the thousands of gallons of fuel contained in airliners. It's also
obvious why he fails to mention the Cessna 172's ~600 pound useful
load limit in comparison to that of airliners. Directly comparing the
fuel and load capacity of a C-172 to an airliner would make it look
impotent as a terrorist weapon.

In May, the Department of Homeland Security issued a warning to
the general aviation community that terrorists were interested in
using small planes packed with explosives to attack U.S. targets.
The basis of the warning came on the heels of a foiled plot to fly
[sic] "obtain a small fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter [loaded
with] with explosives" and crash it into the U.S. Consulate in
Karachi, Pakistan, the warning said. The warning noted that such a
plot demonstrated "al-Qaida's continued fixation with using
explosives-laden small aircraft in attacks."

The author's error contained in the second sentence of that paragraph
reveals the care he employed in crafting his propaganda.

The warning noted that the impact from such an explosion would be
akin to "a medium-sized truck bomb."

That explosion estimate presumes that the explosives could be
effectively detonated by the impact of the collision. Doubtful.

Because of lax security measures, such planes could easily be
rented with just a credit card or simply stolen, the warning
suggests. In Berrick's testimony, she notes that 70 general
aviation aircraft have been stolen in the last five years,
"indicating a potential weakness that could be exploited by
terrorists."

What qualifications does Mr. Meeks possess that permit him to
characterize GA security as lax? Isn't it possible, and even more
likely, that a terrorist might steal or rent a light truck than an
airplane? Would Mr. Meeks characterize automotive security as even
more lax? Or wouldn't that be adequately sensational and misleading
for his journalistic style?

Such vulnerability "was demonstrated" in January of 2002, Berrick
said, "when a teenage flight student stole and crashed a
single-engine airplane into a Tampa, Fla., skyscraper."

Why has Mr. Meeks chosen to omit the fact that the airplane involved
in the Tampa incident failed to do any meaningful damage?

But such statements and examples are viewed with skepticism by
those with vested interests in general aviation.

No their not. We fully acknowledge what happened in that Tampa
incident, unlike Mr. Meeks.

"We basically feel that the whole premise that the typical
[general aviation] aircraft can be used as a terrorist weapon is
flawed," said Chris Dancy, a spokesman for the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association. "These small planes just don't have the
kinetic energy, don't have the carrying capacity to be an
effective weapon," Dancy said. In addition, there's never been a
verified episode of a small plane actually being used in a
terrorist incident, the association says.

Who is a better judge of how effective a weapon a C-172 can be, a
sensationalism seeking journalist or an aviation organization?

RISK MANAGEMENT
There are no overarching federal guidelines for security at
general aviation airports despite the fact that some of these
airports rank among the nation's Top 20 in terms of overall
traffic.

First Mr. Meeks reports that "planes weighing 12,500 pounds or more,
must adhere to the security regulations laid out in a federal law
known as the "twelve-five" rule," then he laments a lack of federal
guidelines for security at GA airports. His failure to suggest a
workable security policy for GA airports reveals his lack of knowledge
of such matters.

Part of the problem is that general aviation airports cover a
wide-range of facilities, from rural to urban. "The 2,000-foot,
grass strip, public use airport that's privately owned, does not
have the same needs as a large general aviation airport like
Manassas in Washington, and TSA has sort of set up the machinery
to let those airports assess their needs and act accordingly,"
Dancy said.

So now Mr. Meeks implies that he knows better than the TSA how to
secure GA airports.

[...]

Despite general aviation's best efforts, small planes continue to
be seen as a major risk.

What leads Mr. Meeks to this erroneous conclusion. If GA were a major
risk, it would be grounded.

Just last week, a single-engine plane
"punctured the bubble" of the flight-restricted zone surrounding
the White House; an errant pilot had simply wandered off course.

Unfortunately, Mr. Meeks fails to fault the FAA for not depicting the
boundaries of the "bubble" to which he refers on aeronautical charts.
His failure to mention the FAA's culpability in such incidents further
reveals his lack of knowledge and understanding of the true situation.
He's not qualified to write on this subject.

Far from being a "non-event," the incident caused NORAD to
scramble a couple of F-16 fighters to intercept the perceived
threat.

Such a flight was not a "perceived threat" prior to September 11,
2001. It's only the TSA (and duplicitous journalists) who perceive it
as a threat now. The facts fail to support that perception, and the
incident demonstrates that there was no REAL threat.

Although the president and first lady weren't in the White
House at the time, the vice president and other senior members of
the White House staff were immediately moved to a secure location
by the Secret Service until the threat was gone.

Now Mr. Meeks, in his quest for sensationalism, has elevated the
incident to a real threat by failing to qualify it as perceived. Mr.
Meeks duplicitous attempt to stir public sentiment against GA is as
nauseating as the monopolistic practices of Microsoft, his employer.