Dweezil Dwarftosser wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote:

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time.

Bull, John. LB I, the mining of the harbors, the stopping of their invasion with heavy
casualties did that. What on the LB II target list, other than Hanoi Radio, hadn't we
struck before?

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

They had already agreed to the same terms in October, but pulled out in November when the
US tried to reopen the talks and negotiate for new conditions which were asked for by
President Thieu, which they refused (as we expected they would). They then agreed in
January to essentially the same terms as in October, when we abandoned our attempts to
try and get the major changes Thieu wanted. What exactly were we going to bomb that we
hadn't already? How were we going to do so, since Nixon knew perfectly well that he
couldn't continue the bombing once Congress came back? See below.

For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

You're sort of right, you've just got the timing wrong. Their attitude shifted after the
failure of the Spring offensive (due to LB I as well as ARVN resistance), not after LB
II. Here's the letter from Nixon to Thieu dated October 16, 1972 (from "The Palace
File"), describing the change in attitude:

The White House
Washington

"Dear President Thieu:

I have asked Dr. Henry Kissinger to convey to you this personal letter regarding our
current negotiations with North Vietnam which now appear to be reaching a final stage.

"As you know, throughout the four years of my Administration the United states has stood
firmly behind your Government and its people in our support for their valiant struggle to
resist aggression and preserve their right to determine their own political future.

"The military measures we have taken and the Vietnamization program, the dramatic steps
that we took in 1970 against the cambodian sanctuaries, the operations in Laos in 1971
and the measures against North Vietnam just this past May have fully attested to the
steadfastness of our support. I need no emphasize that many of these measures were as
unpopular in the U.S. as they were necessary.

"At the negotiating table we have always held firm to the principle that we would never
negotiate with North Vietnam a solution which predetermined the political outcome to the
conflict. We have consistently adhered to positions that would preserve the elected
government and assure the free people of Vietnam the opportunity to determine their
future.

"Until very recently the North Vietnamese negotiatiors have held firmly to their
long-establishedposition that anysettlementofthewarwouldhaveto include your resignation
and the dismantlement of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its institutions.

"It now seems, however, that the combination of the perserverance and heroism of your
Government and its fighting forces, the measures taken by the United States on the 8th of
May, 1972, and our firmness at the conference table have caused a fundamental shift in
Hanoi. In the course of Dr. Kissinger's recent meetings with the North Vietnamese
negotiators in paris, it has become progressively more evident that Hanoi's leadership is
prepared to agree to a ceasefire prior to a resolution of the political problem in South
Vietnam. This is indeed an important reverse in doctrine and must represent a decision
by them which cannot have been taken lightly. They know the weakness of their own
political forces in the South and therefore the risks involved in reaching an agreement
that does not meet their poltical objectives must indeed for them be great.

"The consequence of this change in strategy has resulted in a situation wherein we and
Hanoi's negotiators have reached essential agreement on a text which provides for a
cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of remaining allied forces, the exchange of
prisoners of war, and the continued existence of your Government and its institutions
after the ceasefire takes effect. In addition to the document itself a number of private
assurances have been obtained designed to meet the security concerns of your country and
whose implementation we consider an essential part of this agreement.

"Dr. Kissinger will explain to you in the fullest detail the provisions of the proposed
agreement which he carries with him and I will therefore not provide further elaboration
in this message. I do, however, want you to know that I believe we have no reasonable
alternative but to accept this agreement. It represents major movement by the other
side, and it is my firm conviction that its implementation will leave you and your people
with the ability to defend yourselves and decide the political destiny of South Vietnam.

"As far as I am concerned, the most important provision of this agreement, aside from its
military features, is that your Government, its armed forces and political institutions,
will remain intact after the ceasefire has been observed. In the periodfollowing the
cessation of hostilities you can be completely assured that we will continue to provide
your Government with the fullest support, including continued economic aid and whatever
military assistance is consistent with the ceasefire provisions of this government.

"I recognise that after all these years of war a settlement will present an enormous
challenge to your leadership and your people. We all recognize that theconflict will now
move into a different form, a form of political struggle as opposed to open military
confrontation; but I am of the firm conviction that with wisdom and perserverance your
Government and the people of South Vietnam will meet this new challenge. You will have
my absolute support in this endeavor and I want you to know it is myfirm belief that in
this new phase your continued leadership of the destiny of South Vietnam is
indispensable.

"Finally, I must say that, just as we have taken risks in war, I believe we must take
risks for peace. Our intention is to abide faithfully by the terms of the agreements and
understandings reached with Hanoi, and I know this will be the attitude of your
government as well. We expect reciprocity and have made this unmistakably clearbothto
them and their major allies. I can assure you that we will view any breach of faith on
their part with the utmost gravity; and it would have the most serious consequences.

"Allow me to take this occasion to renew my sentiments of highest personal regard and
admiration for you and your comrades in arms.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon [Nixon then added the hand-written note below on the bottom of the letter]

"Dr. Kissinger, General Haig and I have discussed this proposal at great length. I am
personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get and that it meets my
_absolute_ [emphasis in original] condition that the GVN must survive as a free country.
Dr. Kissinger's comments have my total backing. RN"

Thieu then demanded major changes, but as Nixon clearly writes above he didn't think the
DRVN would agree to them, and they didn't. The letters Nixon sent to Thieu in October
and November describing this process, and reflecting Nixon's growing frustration with
Thieu's intransigence are also available, but you can read the book for yourself to fill
in the blanks.

Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
the actual events that occurred.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

And what does the most powerful direct participant have to say? Nixon again, here's the
verbatim text (again, from "The Palace File") of his ultimatum to Thieu, telling him to
sign the Ceasefire Agreement (without the major changes Thieu demanded in October), or be
prepared for the U.S. to abandon the RVN completely:

The White House
Washington

January 20, 1973

"Dear President Thieu:

"Thank you for your January 20th letter, which I have carefully read.

"No point is served in reviewing the record of our exchanges, regarding the Agreement and
the protocols. While it may be true that the latest texts of the protocols did not reach
Saigon until January 11, it is also true that your representatives in Paris were
continually without instructions during the various negotiating sessions in November and
December. We were thus forced to proceed according to our own best judgement. During
this process we kept your representatives fully informed, while continually asking in
vain for your goverment's suggestions.

"In any event, all these considerations are now beside the point. The essential fact is
that the situation in the United States makes it imperative to put our relationship on a
new basis. It is obvious that we face a situation of most extreme gravity when long-time
friends of South Vietnam such as Senators Goldwater and Stennis, on whom we have relied
for four years to carry our programs of assistance through Congress, make public
declarations that a refusal by your Government of reasonable peace terms would make it
impossible to continue aid. It is in this situation which now threatens everything for
which our two countries have suffered so much.

"Let me now address the specific proposals you have made in your letter. We have made
innumerable attempts to achieve the very provisions you have proposed with respect to
North Vietnamese forces [Thieu's continiuing demand that they be specifically required to
withdraw from the RVN, which had caused the talks to fall apart in October, and which the
US had abandoned trying to get], both in the text of the Agreement and in formal
understandings. We have concluded that the course we have chosen is the best
obtainable. While there is no specific provision in the text, there are so many
collateral clauses with an impact on this question that the continued presence of North
Vietnamese troops could only be based on illegal acts and the introduction of new forces
could only be done in violation of the Agreement. It seems to me that the following
clauses in the Agreement achieve this objective:

-- The affirmation of the independence and sovereignty of South Vietnam in Articles 14,
18(e), and 20.

-- The provision for reunification only by peaceful means, through agreement and without
coercion or annexation, which establishes the illegitimacy of any use or threat of force
in the name of reunification (Article 15).

-- The U.S. and DRV, on an equal basis, pledging themselves to against any outside
interference in the exercise of the South Vietnamese pople's right to self-determination
(Article 9).

-- The legal prohibition of the introduction of of troops, advisers, and war material
into South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam (Article 7).

-- The principle of respect for the demilitarized zone and the provisional military
demarcation line (Article 15).

-- The prohibition of the use of Laotian and Cambodian territory to encroach upon the
sovereignty and security of South Vietnam (Article 20).

-- The fact that all Communist forces in south Vietnam are subject to the obligation
that their reduction and demobilization are to be negotiated as soon as possible (Article
13).

"In addition, we are prepared to give you a unilateral U.S. note which sums up our
understanding on this issue. Ambassador Bunker will show you a draft of a note which we
will deliver in Saigon on the day of signature of January 27.

"With respect to your concern about the protocols, it seems to us that Article 6 in the
ceasefire/joint commission protocol would permit your police forces to continue carrying
carbines and rifles since the continuedpresence of North vietnamese forces obviously
constitutes 'unusual circumstances'. Nevertheless, I shall instruct Dr. Kissinger to
seek a change in this Article in an attempt to remove its ambiguity. I cannot, however,
promise success.

"The key issue is different, however. We have now reached a decisive point. I can no
longer hold up my decision pending the outcome of further exchanges. When Dr. Kissinger
leaves Washington Monday morning, our basic course must be set. As I have told you, we
will initial the Agreement on January 23. I must know now whether you are prepared to
join us on this course, and I must have your answer by 1200 Washington time, January 21,
1973.

"I must meet with key Congressional leaders Sunday evening, January 21, to inform them in
general terms of our course. If you cannot give me a positive answer by then, I shall
inform Dr. Kissinger to initial the Agreement even without the concurrence of your
government. In that case, even if you should decide to join us later, the possibility of
continued Congressional assistance will be severely reduced. In that case I will not be
able to put into my January 23 speech the assurances I have indicated to you, because
they will not then seem to have been a voluntary act on my part. Needless to say, I
would be most reluctant to take this fateful step.

"Let me therefore sum up my position as follows: First, I welcome your decision to send
Foreign Minister Lam to Paris, and I will instruct Dr. Kissinger to to have the fullest
and frankest discussion with him. Dr. Kissinger will see him both before and after his
meeting with the North Vietnamese to make clear your Government's full particpation in in
our actions. Secondly, I have instructed Dr. Kissinger to seek the change in the
protocol regarding police forces. Thirdly, with respect to North Vietnamese forces, I
can go no further than the draft note that I am asking Ambassador Bunker to transmit to
you and which we will hand over to you officially on January 27, the day of signing.
Fourthly, if you join us we shall announce the Vice President's visit to Saigon before
the date of signing though he could not leave Washington until January 28.

"Finally, and most importantly, I must have your assurance now, on the most personal
basis, that when we initial the agreement on Tuesday we will be doing so in the knowledge
that you will proceed to sign the Agreement jointly with us.

"This agreement, I assure you again, will represent the beginning of a new period of
close collaboration and strong mutual support between the Republic of Vietnam and the
United States. You and I will work together in peacetime to protect the independence and
freedom of your country as we have done in war. If we close ranks now and proceed
together, we will prevail."


Sincerely,

Richard Nixon