Ed Rasimus posted:

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.

Indeed, and it is still amazes me that later issues of the FWR
contained comments by the editor that Fuild Four (with the concomitant
Fighting Wing formation) is "the way" it's to be done.

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

No argument with the first part, but the last four words I'd quibble
with. It wasn't that air to air was so different (AIM-9B were serevely
limited, no?) but the USAF was concentrating on the nuke aspect and
TAC needed a piece of the pie, so air to air was passe in the "bucket
of sunshine" era.

And...by the mid-70s even the FWR in those "Anythig Else is Rubbish"
articles was telling F-4 guys that closing for guns was the desired
tactic (assuming you're hauling a gun, C/D or E)...the desired way for
an engagement to culminate.

Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Oh yeah...clearly thru the end of the SEA war. FWR articles come right
out and say [paraphrasing], "first MASTER fluid four...then perhaps
you can attempt something like Double Attack...but mid-air collisions
are a very high threat."

Second, the concept was well established even through the Korean war
that "fighting wing" was the way to employ. Senior pilots, as flight
and element leads did the shooting, while junior pilots were supposed
to fly fighting wing and "clear lead's six." Really they merely
occupied the potential shooter's position, thereby becoming the
alternative target for the attacker and thus protecting the lead.

Amen...Blesse's "No Guts No Glory" article published in FWN and ISTR
his confirmation in his book that fighting wing worked even in the
F-4. When everybody else in the F-4 recognized that the wingman was
simply holding on for life trying to "match" fuselages and not to get
"sucked' to the 6 o'clock...lots of checking six going on during hard
maneuvering.

Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

Except the first F-105s shot down by MiG-17s (unobserved entry ISTR)
guys hovering near a bridge waiting their turn to attack.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

What was Korat's guidance WRT to pickling pylons and suspension
equipment in an escape maneuver?

Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training.

Which is another less critical way of conveying my question, "why the
**** didn't the FWS get behind ACM/ACT?"

Juvat