Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:

Certainly the EM work of Boyd was being tested, and Featherduster
proved that his concepts were correct. The thinking that most fighter
types take for granted today was revolutionary at the time.

Indeed, and it is still amazes me that later issues of the FWR
contained comments by the editor that Fuild Four (with the concomitant
Fighting Wing formation) is "the way" it's to be done.

Purely a reflection of the ingrained training. Taught by WW II and
Korean War vets, the Fluid Four concept was what was done. When you
went to FWS, you had a 1000 hours, so you were going to be a leader,
not a fighting wing hanger-on. You were going to be the shooter, not
the shootee. The mere idea that a Lt could be capable of maneuvering
on his own and then being authorized to pull the trigger was anathema.

The USAF at that time was led by senior generals who were
predominantly from the bomber force. SAC controlled. The senior
fighter leadership was secondary overall and most dated back to WW II
when the fight was considerably different.

No argument with the first part, but the last four words I'd quibble
with. It wasn't that air to air was so different (AIM-9B were serevely
limited, no?) but the USAF was concentrating on the nuke aspect and
TAC needed a piece of the pie, so air to air was passe in the "bucket
of sunshine" era.

What I meant by "the fight was considerably different" was the large
number engagements that quickly devolved into 1-v-1s, all at guns
range. It was either that or the slashing, unseen blow-throughs for
high angle deflection shots.

And, of course, you're spot-on with the nuke delivery mentality of the
TAC forces. That was also a single-ship mission in which the A/A
defense was low, fast and straight ahead.

And...by the mid-70s even the FWR in those "Anythig Else is Rubbish"
articles was telling F-4 guys that closing for guns was the desired
tactic (assuming you're hauling a gun, C/D or E)...the desired way for
an engagement to culminate.

By mid-70's, the thinking had evolved. We ended Vietnam hostilities by
'73. We introduced Aggressor squadrons in '75 and had operational F-15
units dedicated exclusively to A/A in '75 as well.

In my squadron at Torrejon (F-4C), we were doing exclusively fluid
attack/loose deuce, with lots of "hook/eyeball" or shooter-cover stuff
to allow for VID by one partner while the other employs the stand-off
ordinance. Lag pursuit to AIM-9J employment was the answer for low
aspect kills. We had no plans for A/A carriage of the SUU-23.


Worst of all was the reluctance to accept an element of risk in
training. Air/air requires max performance maneuvering, close to
another aircraft that is trying to be unpredictable. That smack of
mid-air potential.

Oh yeah...clearly thru the end of the SEA war. FWR articles come right
out and say [paraphrasing], "first MASTER fluid four...then perhaps
you can attempt something like Double Attack...but mid-air collisions
are a very high threat."

A reflection undoubtedly of the '60s thinking regarding "jack of all
trades" training for TAC types. Everyone did everything and
specialization was looked down upon. Introduction of the F-15 with an
exclusive A/A mission changed that.


Whoa---ain't no F-105 that ever went anywhere at 360. If you needed to
save gas, you might hump along at 420, but if you were in a threat
envrionment, even with wall-to-wall ordinance, you were doing 540
KIAS.

Except the first F-105s shot down by MiG-17s (unobserved entry ISTR)
guys hovering near a bridge waiting their turn to attack.

There's always 10% that don't get the word.

The "clean" configuration minimizes over-G, but may not be
representative of real-world combat situations. Probably pros and cons
to both sides of the issue here.

What was Korat's guidance WRT to pickling pylons and suspension
equipment in an escape maneuver?

We jettisoned ordinance, not suspension gear. That was easier and
quicker, since you were probably already "green" to drop and it simply
meant punching the pickle button. Tanks had integral pylons. The
outboard pylons were low drag and we never paid much attention to
them.

Probably the most critical aspect of Featherduster, but largely
ignored until the '70s was the identification of the value of
dissimilar training.

Which is another less critical way of conveying my question, "why the
**** didn't the FWS get behind ACM/ACT?"

Combat losses are acceptable, training losses aren't. It was a huge
uphill fight to get Red Flag training tolerated when the tall dogs
discovered there would be losses there.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038