"Emmanuel Gustin" wrote in message
...
"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
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As for the question of war, the single greatest factor that most
commentators are overlooking is that the paradigm of war has changed
dramatically.

Has it? It is easy to claim a "paradigm shift" and use it as
an excuse to throw the rules overboard, but irregular warfare
and terrorism are nothing fundamentally new, and even the
idea of a network across national boundaries can be traced
back at least to the religious wars of the 16th century.

Scale and scope have changed dramatically. Further, there is no real
argument to the fact that for the past few centuries warfare has been
dominated by the clash of nations, not sub-national actors. This has changed
dramatically over the past few years.


Besides, there was little about the conflict with Iraq that
can be put in such a cadre. This was essentially a traditional
conflict between two governments. The Iraqi regime aimed to
remain in power; the US government aimed to overthrow the
Iraqi regime and convert the country in an US-held stronghold
in the oil-rich Middle East. There is nothing about the political
aspects of such a conflict that is particularly novel.

"The US government aimed to...convert the country in (sic) an US-held
stronghold..."? Please point to any statement by US officials that indicates
we have the aim of "holding" onto Iraq. On the contrary, we have repeatedly
indicated we'd much rather get our forces out of Iraq as soon as we possibly
can--but we also have recognized that we are obligated to remain there long
enough to ensure a stable, democratic government is firmly in place. Not a
day longer than that, however. Feel free to point to authoritative official
sources that indicate otherwise.


And the invasion of Iraq itself amounted to a fairly traditional
form of warfare, on both sides. The USA used conventional
tactics of mobile warfare with some modern refinements of
intelligence gathering and targeting thrown in.

Did we? In fact, this campaign substituted speed and agility for mass on a
scale never before seen in modern warfare, coupled with innovative targeting
and a special operations contribution that outweighs that from any previous
major conflict. It was "blitzkreig on methamphetamines", so to speak.

And, strangely
enough, Iraq also tried to fight a conventional war, avoiding
the urban guerilla warfare that had been feared by commentators,
and of course failing to use WMD.

Not so sure about that Iraq trying to avoid urban warfare bit. Franks
indicated one of their major fears was that Saddam would redeploy his
northern forces into the Baghdad/Sunni Triangle environs in force to acheive
that urban nightmare, but our deception plans were successful in keeping
those forces fixed until it was too late. So maybe it was more of a case of
them not being *able* to implement an urban warfare strategy, as much as it
was not their desire to do so.

Despite the buzzword-speak
of Pentagon press briefings, this was a conventional war between
traditional armies; the biggest question about it is whether it will
be the last of its kind.

We took the old "relative force ratio" guidelines and tossed them out the
window for this campaign, and you think it was just "business as usual"?


The post-invasion occupation phase was again traditional enough,
and predictable. It may look strange in the eyes of the US public
because the nation has little experience in conquering and occupying
foreign countries, but there are enough precedents, for example the
US occupation of the Philippines. Politicians have been fooling
themselves by invoking the misguided and misleading precedent
of the occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII, but these
were the exceptions, not the rule.

Has it been so traditional? The use of companies like Blackwater to provide
security in the post-major conflict stage is "traditional"? Getting their
power grids back up and surpassing the prewar generating capacity within a
few months of invasion, and nearly doubling their telecommunications links
within a year or so of the invasion is "traditional"? Exactly what
"traditions" are you citing?


The enemy is not a traditional national actor any more,
but rather a far-reaching network of terrorist agencies that don't
wear uniforms, muster under a national flag or operate within the
constraints of international law or conventional diplomacy. Once that
fact is appreciated, then it becomes a bit more difficult to apply the
conventional rules of justification for war and definition of combat
areas.

As for "far-reaching networks", let us be realistic. In a situation
like this people usually imagine one big conspiracy to be their
enemy, but the reality is always far more diffuse.

None of what you present below disproves Ed's assertion of "far-reaching
networks" (note the plural).

This enemy is
less a network than a scattering of radical groups, each with their
own purposes, methods and presumably theology, who maintain
informal contact; they may cooperate but they may also be hostile
to one another. Specialists in conventional warfare always tend
to think that if they can destroy the enemy's command-and-control
structure, the war is half won; but this enemy shows few indications
of having such a structure, and even less of actually needing one.

Not so sure about that. The disruption and in some cases dismantling of AQ's
command and control capabilities is no doubt largely responsible for the
fact that they have not been able to conduct further major attacks against
US interests to date.

The fight against it will require numerous small-scale operations,
more on the pattern of a fight against organized crime (which often
is organized in parallel to gather funds -- remember that the mafia
started out as a resistance organisation, and drugs money from
Afghanistan supported this generation of radicals) than of
large-scale warfare.

"Large scale warfare" can indeed be made up of "small-scale operations".


Anyway, giving support to terrorist groups, or using them
for your own purposes, is traditionally accepted as a good
/casus belli/. (Remember Sarajevo, 1914.) There is no need
to invent any new rules. In the case of Afghanistan this was
an entirely valid reason. In the case of Iraq it was never more
than a transparently flawed excuse. Before the USA invaded
the radicals had to remain in parts of the country that Bagdad
did not control -- and under US air cover. To use such presence
as excuse for an invasion of Iraq is cynical.

How do you think Al Zarqawi got from Baghdad, where he received medical
treatment, up to his buddies operating with Anser Al Islam? For that matter,
how do you think he came to be in Baghdad receiving that treatment in the
first place?


The reality, even in the Middle East, is that primary goal
of the radical islamist groups is to grab power in their own
country, and for this reason they are usually being (brutally)
suppressed by their own governments.

AQ, while it has conducted attacks inside saudi Arabia and is no friend of
the Saudi government, has made its primary focus operations against US
targets, so your theory appears to be a bit lacking in terms of
completeness.

Iraq was no exception.
This US government has managed to play in the hands of both
Arab dictatorships and islamist radicals by uniting them both
against itself --- no mean achievement, but its heavy-handed
approach is also succeeding in alienating even those
governments that did maintain good relations with the USA.

Really? Jordan seems to be sticking with us, as does Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar,
etc. Which ones of those that we previously had good relations with have we
alienated?

If the purpose was to create an ideal breeding ground for new
terrorist organizations, George W. Bush could hardly do any
better.

Please present evidence that our actions in Iraq have yielded any new
terrorist organizations?


The fundamental dishonesty of this US government is in its
refusal to discuss means. It identifies itself with the end goal
of defeating terrorism; and it implies that this end will justify
whatever means it chooses to use, while denying that there are
any alternatives.

First you say we won't discuss means, then you say wedeny the existance of
alternatives to those means--which way do you want it? You can't really have
it both ways, you know. was there ever any real doubt as to the means we
would use in Iraq? We plainly stated what we were going to do, and in
general how we were going to do it--and then, unlike the UN, we actually
*did* it. We did the same in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, we are also doing the
same thing, often in concert with other nations (i.e., the Horn of Africa
with the French), in other locales, albeit with a lot less fanfare and
attention from the media. All in all, your claim that we refuse to discuss
"means" just does not hold water.


But in fact, so far the methods it has adopted
have been counterproductive; even the state department had to
admit that terrorist activities are on the increase. Meanwhile
the USA is losing its allies and its credibility and running out
of the resources it needs to fight this war with.

The only allies we have lost, like Spain, are of little value--what value is
an ally who cuts and runs when the temperature goes up a few degees in the
kitchen? It is the ones that stick with you when times are tough that are
true allies. The Italians come to mind in that regard.



Add to the changed paradigm the incredible potential for destruction
of WMD and the removal of the foundation of one of the basic
principles of deterrence, that of rational leadership on both sides of
the deterrent equation, and you've provided a strong justification for
a policy of pre-emption.

The potential for destruction of WMD is routinely overrated,
especially for biological and chemical weapons, by people
who ignore the problem of distributing such agents over the
intended victims. Wolfowitz probably did so intentionally, others
may have done so out of simple ignorance. The same applies
for 'dirty bombs'. Nevertheless, I agree that there is a very serious
threat.

While I deplore the rabid "sky is falling" approach many take when WMD is
mentioned, it is a fact that used against an unprepared population they pose
a tremendous threat. That threat is two-fold; first, the actual physical
casualty count, which could indeed be horrendous (imagine the deathtoll from
a single crop duster releasing a load of sarin over a football or soccer
stadium filled to capacity with maybe 100K people), and even more dangerous,
its ability to inspire the terrorists main objective, which is to
*terrorize* innocents.


However, I do not see how a policy of 'pre-emption' by attacking
countries that do not actually have WMD, while carefully avoiding
a conflict with those that do, will help.

You are making a logic error here. Preemption has been used against one
nation that we indeed *did* think had a significant WMD capability, so your
hypothesis is already destroyed. But your logic error is in assuming that we
have to treat all naions in the exact same manner, using the same by-rote
formula to handle the problem. That is not the case; each situation is
different and requires differing measures to control it.

To the terrorist groups
themselves it makes very little difference: If they want chemical
or biological weapons they can make them themselves,

Luckily for us, you apparently think it is a more trivial task than it
actually is. The Japanese subway sarin attack is a case in point. Merely
whipping up a batch of something nasty is indeed within the capabilities of
many nefarious groups--whipping up a batch that actually works effectively
is another matter, and requires some form of weaponization if it is to
acheive its goals.

and any
sensible terrorist group will produce them in the targeted country
itself anyway, to avoid the problem of bringing them across the
border. Aung San has already demonstrated that this is perfectly
feasible.

And despite it being as simple as you state, they ultimately failed,
creating the chemical equivalent of a "fizzle yield".

To the governments of "rogue states" the message is that
they need to develop WMD urgently if they want to avoid an US
invasion,

LOL! We went into Iraq *despite* our fears that we would indeed be
subjecting ourselves to battlefield chemical and maybe biological attacks,
and you *still* cling to this ridiculous idea?

and the two other nominees for the "axis of evil" have
already geared up their efforts. The result of the Bushiite policy
will be a further proliferation of WMD, in areas with unstable
governments.

You conveniently left Libya out of your machinations here--wonder why?


So, please Messr. Gustin, avoid making broad generalizations regarding
the quality of the USA's elected government.

I don't remember who it was that, at the time of the US
independence, expressed his amazement that the British
government of the time had never done anything right --
not even by mistake.

That is about how I feel about the elected (well, more or
less) US government. How do these people manage to
squeeze an inept foreign policy, a foolish economic policy,
a dangerous environmental policy, and an immoral judicial
policy, to mention the most obvious elements, all in one
term and one team? You would expect an elected government
to have at least some areas of competence.

My, what animus you do bear us! And you wonder why your ilk is not taken
seriously by most of us over here?


Believe me, if it turns out in November that somehow we will
have to survive another four years of Bush, I will be deeply
depressed and despairing indeed.

Better start stocking up on that Prozac, then.


And, I won't have to resort to discussing the pros and cons
of Belgium's contributions to the modern world.

Last time I checked, Guy Verhofstadt had somewhat less impact
on world affairs to George Bush. In fact Guy Verhofstadt
probably has less impact on events in Belgium than George
Bush, but that's not entirely Bush's fault. Anyway, there is no
need to suspect me of excessive sympathy for our PM; he is
so full of hot air that you would expect him to fly.

I don't believe Ed referred to your PM's contributions--he was referring to
your entire *nation's* contributions, or lack thereof.

Brooks


--
Emmanuel Gustin
Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be