Yep, probably. The EH101 is a bad investment on multiple fronts, and
somehow the rules of the game were twisted to arrive at this decision.
The EH101 was grounded during the competition due to a material related
mishap, and the Navy just blew past that like it was no big deal.
Something ain't right here.

My original point was the EH101 was desgined and certificated under
rules written in 1978. That means it lacks the longitudinal crash
strength built into a helicopter designed and built today under later
certification standards. Strengthening the US101 cabin to modern
crashworthiness standards will add cost, risk, and weight. Likewise,
matching the birdstrike, turbine burst, and lightning protection of a
modern aircraft will require redesign - again cost and risk. With the
US101, Presidents for the next 30 years will continue to ride above
aircraft fuel cells - again, if you had your druthers in a modern
helicopter, you'd isolate the fuel system from the passenger cabin.
Again, if you're looking for the safest aircraft to carry the
President, something ain't right here.

Add to that risk the whole question of outsourcing VH work offshore.
Presidential helo work was always subject to the highest security
requirements and performed by cleared US citizens. Now the Navy is
willing to piece out big chunks of the thing to Italy and the UK like
it's no big deal.

The EH101 has three engines 'cause it needs 'em. That means higher
operating and support costs for the life of the aircraft. Is this the
best value for the taxpayers?

I suspect after delays and overruns, the US101 will probably serve fine
in the meticulous maintenance environment of HMX-1. That doesn't mean
it was a smart buy. And if there's an accident, it may be a very
stupid one.

My Comanche comments were based on the fact that the Army validated,
re-validated, and re-re-validated the requirement for more than a
decade after the end of the Cold War. The failure was in the
procurement system, not in the people who built the helicopter. The Air
Force had the bucks to build four and fly four ATF prototypes to see
what it wanted (and they may have screwed that up too.). The Army had
to stop flying the one Comanche it had after 300 hours 'cause the
program ran out of money. Go figure.

Let's see if ARH stays on target.

HW