The mission - armed reconaissance - is still there.

The enemy right now is an insurgency with handheld weapons. Don't
assume all future wars will throw Army Aviation against enemies armed
only with MANPADS and RPGs.

Apaches were closed out of Kosovo in part by radar-directed threats,
and RF MANPADS in the future are not out of the question. A decade
from now, helicopters may face integrated air defenses -- probably not
the massed Soviet threat, but mobile RF and IR threats that justify
signature reduction.

The Comanche flyaway cost is another story - and that's a program
management failure. Stretching development while reducing numbers
increases unit price. That's where freezing a requirement and starting
a line helps.

The Army could have relaxed its LO requirements on the Comanche and
saved a bit. But that very highly integrated Mission Equipment Package
meant you didn't save much by just leaving things off. That in itself
may be a real lesson for future systems designers.

All of this brings us back to the original topic - the Presidential
Helicopter. What's so nutty about this is that Lockheed Martin didn't
win with the best Mission Equipment Package. The Navy just chose the
biggest box for whatever the systems will be. In the process, they
ignored 10+ years of helicopter safety advances. Given the mission,
that is truly nuts.

HW