On 10/28/2011 3:29 PM, brianDG303 wrote:

On Oct 28, 10:23 am, wrote:

Major snip of another's excellent 'possible accident contributors' analysis...


This is precisely the problem with NTSB reports, they don't provide
enough facts to make any conclusion.

Additional valid grousing snipped...


Ramy


Ramy,
Being very close to this and in the information stream has not been a
lot of fun. The first glider I ever flew in was this DG1000 and the
pilot was this pilot, Lynn, who became my primary CFIG. I have 50
flights in the glider and soloed in it and my logbook is full of sign-
offs from Lynn who was a very careful pilot and seemed very risk
adverse. As the current president of the club he was part of (and a
CFIG for) I have been copied on most of the information and if there
is a smoking gun I am not aware of it. If this occurred because of a
defect or problem with the glider we won't know until the final NTSB
report comes out. Even when you are close to the details there is a
lot of confusion. I was told several times that the tow row was 1"
nylon 200' long, the NTSB says it was 230' and 5/16". From
eyewitnesses to the accident and to the 4 video feeds that the NTSB
has the rope broke before it released (or was released) from the
glider. Multiple accounts also describe a complete cycle prior to the
accident where the glider was launched and landed ahead of the SUV and
that this was another take. The information from the witness on the
youtube video appears to be describing the previous days shooting in
which the glider was areo-towed so it could be filmed with a
helicopter, and the idea that there was a plan to turn around and land
back I have only seen or heard about here on RAS, although there could
have been such a plan.

This weekend I was talking to a glider pilot who was there that day
and his comment was that this probably will not be an accident where
some mysterious aerodynamic factor or aircraft defect is discovered.
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Or, maybe it will turn out that something in the glider broke at the
worst possible moment. In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. That was just too much workload. There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

I hope this doesn't come off as trying to lecture or pontificate, but
after this year and all the accidents, maybe all it comes down to is
trying to increase the margin of safety of every part of flying.

Please fly safe,
Brian

Thank you for this (and all your) post(s) on this sad and painful accident,
Brian. By way of psychological preparation...IME, future exposure to (fatal or
otherwise) accidents involving your soaring friends and acquaintances won't
get any easier...

FWIW, I think you've touched above upon a couple of fundamental and crucial
points worth bearing continually in mind (and - hopefully - presumably in
related action) by all practicing soaring pilots, regardless of experience,
currency or anything else:

1) (referencing your thoughts...)
The lesson will most likely be found in so many examples where complex
human factors having nothing to do with aviation influenced highly
skilled and trained professionals to start cutting the margins closer
and closer. The book "Into Thin Air" comes to mind. When I first got
into gliding I was surprised by how many accidents involved high time
pilots, but it seems that at some point pilots stop being scared and
start accepting more risks. Sort of like russian roulette where you
pull the trigger 5 times and start to feel like it isn't very
dangerous after all.

Indeed the acceptance of increasing risks is 'the natural progression' of
increasing soaring pilot knowledge and activity. IMO, the "trick" (if there is
one) is for Joe Growing Pilot to always/continually/actively remain *aware*
that such a process and progression is occurring, and to recognize and act in
ways respecting his/her ever-changing margins. Be vary aware/wary of any
thoughts touching upon 'my growing experience is my protection.'

Which leads to...

2) (also referencing your thoughts...)
In any case, one thing I would change about
the set up going in is: Lynn should not have been the one to get all
the credit, take all the blame, make all the decisions, and fly all
the tasks. That was just too much workload. There should have been
one or two other people making the go/nogo decisions free of ego and
careless of blame or any outcome other than a living pilot at the end
of the day. There was no shortage of people with vast auto tow and
aerodynamic knowledge to choose from.

"Spot on!" (I'd *still* say the same thing even had everything turned out
as-planned.) Knowing nothing of the particulars, but also knowing very few
people (much less soaring pilots) with direct 'film industry experience,' I'd
be statistically astounded if 'all of this situation' was NOT essentially new
ground for the pilot involved. It sure would've been for me. If proposed to
me, the whole 'dynamic' of a situation as this would have instantly raised
multiple alarm bells in my mind, entirely for 'newness' - and therefore safety
- reasons. Clint Eastwood was right: "A man's got to know his limitations." I
like to imagine that - as a minimum - I'd've done as you suggest. Soaring is
sufficiently demanding an activity withOUT complicating the situation with
hopes and desires of folks experienced enough in their own fields, but (almost
certainly) 100% ignorant about the things they'll be requesting of Joe Pilot.

Respectfully and Sadly,
Bob W.