On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 20:56:37 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.

Ironically they did have to operate heavies from grass strips in
1940-42 with all that that suggests in terms of all-weather
operational effectiveness,

I know they did, and they seem to have abandoned the idea at the first opportunity.

I know, but I was working with an earlier conversion-to-daylight frame
in mind, namely the summer of 1943, ideally before Hamburg gives
Harris some unchallengeable success to rentrench his preferred
night/area bombing strategy.

but in this case 3 Group has a larger
allocation of asphalt runways.

They can have some of 5 Group's more
southerly ones as well, if neccessary. In this case we don't have
Harris fulminating about the USAAF getting a disproportionate
allocation of the all-weather base construction program.

I just don't see the point of converting 2 Gp. to heavies with all the disruption that would
cause, when you still want a day medium bomber force.

Yes, I was talking about 3 Group re-equipping with Liberators there.
Some of their ex-Wellington bases (like Feltwell, Methwold, etc)
weren't concreted by the summer of 1943, and they need bases with
concrete runways for the Libs.

3 Gp. needs to convert from Stirlings in
any case, which are no longer participating in the main offensive, and thus (from Butch's point of
view) are almost completely ineffective.

Again, I think you're working with a later point of departure from the
existing historical timeline than me. In the summer of 1943 the
Stirling force was actually scheduled to expand by another couple of
new squadrons. Now that you've brought them to mind, they might be
useful in shallow-penetration heavily-escorted daylight raids with
their bombload.

[B-25 ops]

Yes, but not a hell of a lot worse than the "Daylight Lanc" fantasy, I
mean, operational evaluation platform. I'm certain the B-25 carried
more than 3,000lbs, but maybe only over shorter distances.

Not internally, it didn't. The B-25 bomb bay was smaller than the B-26's. Allowable loads were 1
x 2,000 lb., or 2 x 1,000/1,600 lb., or 6 x 500 lb. or some larger number (8/10/12? I forget) of
250 lbers.

The figures I have are 15,000ft loaded cruise and a 4,000lb bombload
which 2 Group were using from 1943 into 1944 from the references I've
seen. Obviously, this was for targets in France, so deeper
penetration might reduce the bombload, but it seemed to have the best
range/bombload/defensive armament characteristics of the available
bombers in 2 Group: frankly, intermediate-level penetration raids
with Bostons or Venturas (the alternatives) are a non-starter.

At some point around 1944 they realized that the 2,000 lb. station was essentially
never used, so it was removed and that made enough room for them to carry 1 extra 1,000 lb. bomb.

Bowyer claims the very first Mitchell raid in 2 Group in January 1943
(escorted by Mustang Is, interestingly enough) featured a bombload of
2 x 1,000lb and 4 x 500lb per aircraft. If this is correct, I think
you're underestimating the possible bombload, or I'm underestimating
the impact of increased fuel loading for more distant targets.

The B-26 bomb bay could carry 2 x 2,000 lb. (and occasionally did), or 4 x 1,000 lb., or 8 x 500
lb., etc. Early models (B-26, B-26A and I think some early B-26Bs) had an additional aft bomb bay
usable for small bombs, but this had first been sealed shut as being of more use for other
purposes, and then deleted from production altogether.

The British only got one allocation, initially of about 50 Marauders
in 1942, which were used in the MTO, so we'd need to come up with come
convincing operational justifications to grab those USAAF production
allocations. I'm not sure, if my figures are correct, there's any
need to replace the B-25 which after all is being operated by 2 Group
already with a very low wastage rate. Easier to expand an existing
resource than demand a new one entirely.

[2 Group ops]

I still think hitting Schipol and Alkmaar with regular medium strikes
and sequential fighter sweeps before and during B-17/B24 raids being
routed over them is a good idea, and better than trying to do the same
over the Pas de Calais. Put enough B-25 raids below the higher
heavies, with enough fighter support, and the fighters with the best
opportunity for bouncing the heavies escort and forcing them to drop
external tanks will get sucked into their own private war and divert
attention from the main force.

Pretty much what they were doing, although perhaps not that deep.

Indeed, that's the point. The whole effort would have to be
reoriented from northern France/western Belgium to focus on Holland
and nothern Belgium. With the occasional trip to industrial targets
like Knapsack, except not with unescorted Blenheims this time.
Hitting the closer industrial targets should help diffuse the flak
deployment beyond the targets hit by the 8th.

Woensdrecht (along with Lille,
Poix, Conches etc.) was a common target for B-26s in 1943, escorted by Spits. If the Spits could
get them or B-25s to Eindhoven, Gilze-Rijn, Florennes etc., it would certainly be helpful,
although the Luftwaffe was already pulling back to bases beyond medium bomber (and P-47) range in
late '43.

The real battle would soon displace beyond Spitfire range, then beyond
LR Spit and Thunderbolt range, and then the Lightnings and Mustangs
would have to carry the brunt. But this is a complementary approach.
Extending the range of the shorter-ranged fighters is an essential
force-multiplier, and will still do valuable work even when the main
Luftwaffe fighter resistance has been pushed back from the coastal and
inland belts into Germany itself.

I'm not sure that the flak threat in '45 _was_ higher. Even the heavies average bombing altitude
decreased considerably in 1945, down to the mid teens.

Not over the big targets, though. Hitting smaller towns with rail
junctions as part of the transport plan, or smaller factories in
semi-rural areas wasn't the same as tackling the Ruhr or Leipzig.

Some of that is likely due to a shift to
more tactical (and thus less well-defended) targets, but not all of it. I imagine the disruption
in production and more especially transport was affecting ammo supply, C2 was failing/being
seriously degraded, and morale was undoubtedly collapsing as well. While the percentage of damage
to flak compared to fighters was increasing, I haven't seen any evidence that it was due to
increased effectiveness of the former; rather, it seems to be due to the ever-decreasing
effectiveness of the latter.

My impression is that the overall flak threat on major target
complexes increased.

I see them hitting targets in Belgium, Holland and on the fringe of
the German Bight and the Ruhr. I think that's credible: the
Luftwaffe in 1943 could have given them a hard time, but only at the
expense of ignoring the heavies which would be right behind them.

Fine by me. The B-26s were hitting targets there (not the Bight or the Ruhr); weren't the
Mitchells?

Not often enough accordng to me, but then you're the man in charge of
Fighter ops administration.

I know they were bombing the same targets in France (and presumably coastal Belgium)
as the B-26s were. As you can see, my knowledge of 2 Gp. ops is limited.

They and the 9th hit the same kind of targets: mostly western
Holland, western Belgium and northern France, going deeper as time
progressed and the invasion period began. I want them bombing
airfields like Jever and Rheine, attempting to hit the fighter force
which will come up to dispute the path of the 8th AF. Even if the
Luftwaffe response concentrates on the tactical raids, the potential
bombing damage they can inflict will be too significant for the
experten to amble around, only looking to engage with the tactical
advantage and avoiding combat if they can't get up-sun and above in
time, like they did over the Pas de Calais. This time there will be
irate Luftwaffe brass demanding that the bombers be short down, and
never mind their attritional exchange with the enemy fighters
meanwhile. And while they were knocking down those Spitfire Vs from
the close escort, the airfield was bombed by thirty Mitchells and
another two hundred B-17s passed overhead unmolested.

Hitting more significant targets than the Circus ops will compell a
less attritionally-advantageous (for the Germans) Luftwaffe response,
and thus increase the effectiveness of the supporting raids beyond
what a couple of Typhoon squadrons bombing Poix could do.

I thought we were resorting to ridiculously hyperbolic stereotypes for
comic effect. I can't see anybody disputing this*. Which reminds me,
time for a large wet.

That will give me just enough time to slip out and get an ice cream cone then, and drink a couple
of bottles of coke on the way back. This silk underwear certainly does keep the thighs from
chafing -- What, you thought we wanted the stuff for some vicarious sexual thrill? ;-)

J. Edgar Hoover, eat your heart out.

I have to add that the critical importance of tea to the British war
effort was well-understood at the time.

******
"We're out of tea - you know what that means - the men won't put up
with it and we'll come to a grinding halt."

I sent a suitably worded signal to the Commanding General of 12th TAC:
"Out of tea period the war is about to stop period".

Within six hours a Dakota landed with enough tea on board to satisfy
us for months. Attached to one of the chests was a personal message
to me: "Keep the war going we are right behind you period."
*********

From "Spitfire into Battle" by Wilfred Duncan-Smith. Interestingly,
he also claimed a Tiger by strafing in the same campaign (south of
France, 1944):

"Continuing past Vienne, and on the open road, I spotted a Tiger tank
going as hard as it could towards Lyons. More in hope than anger I
gave it all my remaining ammunition. To my utter amazement it belched
smoke and caught fire. When I gave my report to Tim Lucas, the senior
Army Liaison Officer, he did not believe me, shaking his head and
muttering that a Tiger was too tough for the shells of a Spitfire. I
got my own back when I took him to the spot in my jeep, after we got
to Lyons on 7 September, and showed him the tank. I was there, I am
pleased to say, burnt out, with 'Bravo RAF' painted on its blackened
hull. To me the sight was worth a couple of Me109s. Apparently some
armour-piercing incendiary shells had ricohetted off the tarmac road
into the oil tank and engine - pure luck, but very satisfying."

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell