Some snipping ...

Actually I believe that if we hadn't used Atomic weapons at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki then they would have been used at some point in past history most
likely with far greater death and destruction. Hiroshima and Nagasaki
taught the world how horrible atomic weapons are.

A good point worthy of debate. It can be speculated that had the two
weapons not been employed, a more grisly later scenario might have
developed. Or, perhaps the cold war might have never progressed beyond a
mild detente. At any rate, the brink was seriously approached in October
1962. (There were several folks in high places that would happily have gone
to defcon 1.)

Post WWII we launched ouselves into a nuclear-centric defense policy at the
expense of conventional forces. There were high human costs associated with
that decision.

I wonder how many destroyed cities Stalin would have considered
unacceptable? I know the answer for the United States: ZERO. So did we
really need 2500 bombers to create a sufficient deterrent? Perhaps if we
needed to assure ourselves the rubble would bounce ... many times over.

Perhaps the world DID learn how horrible nuclear weapons are. OTOH, the US
and Soviet Union deployed several 10's of thousands of the things. And a
number of folks who hardly need them for their national security have
deployed them or are working hard to develope/acquire them.

Similarly, the urgency to
strike the Norwegian heavy water facilities seemed an imperative, but
there's little doubt that Germany's nuclear program was not (and could
not
be) supported adequately to produce a weapon in time for use.

Not something known at the time of the attack

"Seemed an imperative" is the operative phrase. Yes it was not known at the
time. The tricky part of the original question is the definition of
greatness. The war did not turn on this. Had Germany thrown all its
resources at a nuclear weapons program, it might have been more significant
(albeit heavy water was hardly a key ingredient to the Manhattan project).

Paul Doumer bridge LGB

That and the Thahn Hoa raids introduced precision weapons to the
tactical
air power game, but did either raid accomplish significant alterations
in
the strategic picture?

How long were the bridges out of action compared to previous missions?


Much longer for sure, but how important were they to the overall war
strategy? Perhaps the best answer is, "What strategy?" The military
leadership was never allowed to implement a meaningful winning strategy.

Midway

In terms of fleet placement and combat orders, I'd have to agree.
Tactical
execution defined "luck" for the dive bombers (Luck = when preparation
meets
opportunity). When gamed by the Naval War College, the US loses Midway
just
about every time.

I thought you said "Yamamoto brought the flawed Midway campaign?" ;-)

By subdividing his force into four separate entities, three of which were
beyond his tactical control (because of radio silence requirements), he
created a scenario which made it barely possible for a US success. Given
that scenario, it still gamed in favor of the Japanese, but there was this
seam in his plan which could be exploited ...

A little less subtlety (AKA concentration of combat forces) plus elimination
of the meaningless Alutian feint, and he would have truly been unstoppable.
Oh yes, and don't give your (perhaps indecisive) CarGru commander
conflicting orders: Attack Midway and OBTW draw out and kill the US fleet.

The point is that while Yamamoto was regarded as the resident genius within
the Japanese Navy, he made key mistakes in at least two campaigns. At Pearl
Harbor, he was so fixated upon the US Fleet, he overlooked the value of the
SRF and oil storage facilities. (Yet he readily admitted any success would
be short lived as "the sleeping giant" awoke. Prioritizing Pearl's logistic
capability vice its combat capability would have had more permanent impact
vis a vis Japan's interests in securing its defensive perimeter around the
Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere.)

R / John