In message CFomh.8490$tc5.2604@trnddc01, Ski
writes
You all seemd to me to have hit the main issues with the USN right now -
somehow the Navy has thrown away its good sense and started chasing courses
of action that will reduce its ability to deal with the world threats in
only from a defensive nature.

(2) The F/A-18E/F/G has re-written the maintainability and sortie generation
books but it is no more then a more capable A-7 and not even an A-6 and
surely not an F-14 despite the maintenance nightmares.

Some issues there - the Hornet's much more survivable than the A-7 or
A-6, and certainly much more flexible (you couldn't multirole a Corsair
or Intruder airframe, let alone swing-role it - but the Hornet's been
doing that for twenty years).

The Hornet gets you flexibility and affordability, which is what the
Navy needs at the moment.

(3) Since there is not a Naval F-22, hardly can't see the Typhoon working
sensibly, and we do not want to deal with the French for the Rafale (which
is the best Naval fighter around today) - then going back and redesigning a
super-Tomcat is not a bad idea and since now with the F-15E and F-14D we
have the right engines around - go for the digital improved all - electric
Tomcat.

The Tomcat was a very specific answer to a very particular question,
that being "How do we deal with a regiment-plus of Badgers or Backfires
armed with supersonic high-diving carrier-killing ASMs?". Lacking that
threat, there's no urgent requirement for a Tomcat or replacement.

(4) If we drop JSF STOVL and force only one configuration CTOL and then
slide the whole program to include a decade or so development

In half a sentence you lose most of the customers. The STOVL variant was
added because there was a user requirement (US-led and then others
bought in) and if you "slide a decade" then you lose your export sales,
who didn't sign up for an extra ten-year gap.

(5) Now like it or not, the move from battle ship to carrier will have
another shift down the road and that may be sub-surface so the Navy may
really find that under-sea ops will be its big hitters and the whole surface
world may have to look again at what it is and should be.

Trouble there is that submarines are great for sea denial, but hopeless
for sea control. How do you escort oil tankers through the Straits of
Hormuz, or shiploads of evacuees out of Lebanon, with a submarine?

--
The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its
warriors, will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done
by fools.
-Thucydides


Paul J. Adam - mainbox{at}jrwlynch[dot]demon(dot)codotuk