Sort of painful to read, almost every-other-line is just a word or two.
Here it is with lines rewrapped.

Mike wrote:
(for the figures and tables, I will post the url for the pdf once it
is posted at www.fas.org)

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress CRS Report
for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RL31384

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft

Updated August 23, 2006 Christopher Bolkcom Specialist in National
Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Summary The V-22 Osprey is a
tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short take off and
landing, with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft.
The MV-22 is the Marine Corps' top aviation priority. Marine Corps
leaders believe that the Osprey will provide them an unprecedented
capability to quickly and decisively project power from well over the
horizon. The Air Force's CV-22 version will be used for special
operations. Army officials have testified that the service has no
requirement for the V-22, but the Navy has expressed interest in
purchasing MV-22s for a variety of missions. The V-22 program has
been under development for over 25 years. Safety and maintenance
concerns have arisen during this period (due in large part to three
fatal accidents). The commander of the V-22 maintenance squadron
admitted to falsifying maintenance records to make the aircraft
appear more maintainable than it was, and three Marines were found
guilty of misconduct. The program has maintained support from many in
Congress despite these deficiencies. The program has undergone
restructuring to accommodate congressional direction, budget
constraints, and recommendations from outside experts, and DOD
managers. After a 17 month hiatus, the Osprey embarked on its second
set of flight tests in May of 2002. Tests were completed in June 2005
to the satisfaction of Navy testers, who believe that the V-22 has
resolved all technical and engineering problems identified in
internal and external reviews. On September 28, 2005 the V- 22
program passed a major milestone when the Defense Acquisition Board
approved it for military use and full rate production. Supporters
tout the V-22's potential operational capabilities relative to the
helicopters it will replace. It will fly faster, farther and with
more payload than the CH-46 Sea Knight the Marine Corps currently
operate. They argue that this combination of attributes, coupled with
the ability to take off and land vertically will provide the Marine
Corps with new and potentially transformational capabilities.
Detractors tend to emphasize the V-22's long development schedule,
its three fatal accidents, and its high cost relative to the
helicopters it will replace. V-22 opponents argue that modern
helicopters also offer capabilities superior to the CH-46's and more
cost effectively than the Osprey. Through FY2006, $20 billion had
been provided for the V-22 program. The Defense Department's Selected
Acquisition Report of December 31, 2005, estimated the total
acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5 billion, which
translates into a program acquisition cost of $110 million per
Osprey. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents Introduction 1 Background 2 System Description 2 Early
Development 3 Accidents and Fatalities Worsen 4 Maintenance and Parts
Falsifications 6 Reviews and Restructuring 6 Current Status 10 Key
Issues 11 Should the Defense Department Procure the V-22 Aircraft? 11
Main Arguments of Those Who Say "Yes" 11 Main Arguments of Those Who
Say "No" 12 Congressional Action 13 Appendix: V-22 Block
Configurations 15

List of Figures Figure 1. V-22 Osprey in Flight 3

List of Tables Table 1. Summary of V-22 FY2007 Congressional Action
13 Table 2. Summary of V-22 FY2006 Congressional Action 14

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Introduction The V-22 Osprey is the
Marine Corps' top aviation priority.1 Marine Corps leaders believe
that the Osprey will provide them an unprecedented capability to
quickly and decisively project power from well over the horizon. In
the words of one former leader, its "...combination of increased
payload with vastly improved speed and range make the Osprey the
aircraft that defines the commander's area of influence as it relates
to placing Marines on the ground."2 The aircraft's promise, however,
has been dimmed by a series of challenges to its affordability,
safety, and program management. The V-22 tilt-rotor design combines
the helicopter's operational flexibility of vertical take off and
landing with the greater speed, range, and fuel efficiency of a
turboprop aircraft. The V-22 Osprey takes off and lands vertically
like a helicopter but flies like a fixed-wing aircraft by tilting its
wing-mounted rotors 90 degrees forward to function as propellers. The
V-22 is intended to perform a variety of Marine Corps and Air Force
missions, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious
assault, search and rescue, and special operations. The Marines'
MV-22 version can transport 24 fully-equipped troops some 200
nautical miles (nm) at a speed of 250 knots (288 mph), exceeding the
performance of the CH-46 medium-lift assault helicopters the MV-22
will replace. The Air Force's CV-22 version (with a range of 500 nm)
will be used for special operations. Army officials have testified
that the service has no requirement for the V-22. The Navy has
expressed interest in purchasing MV-22s for a variety of missions,
(e.g., personnel recovery, fleet logistic support, aerial refueling,
special warfare) but has no funds budgeted in the current Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Developed and produced by Bell Helicopter
Textron of Fort Worth, TX, and Boeing Helicopters of Philadelphia,
PA, the aircraft is powered by two T406 turboshaft engines produced
by Allison Engine Company of Indianapolis, IN, a subsidiary of
Rolls-Royce North America. Fuselage assembly will be performed in
Philadelphia, PA. Drive system rotors and composite assembly will be
completed in Fort Worth, TX, and final assembly and delivery will be
completed in Amarillo, TX. Through FY2006, $20 billion had been
appropriated for the V-22 program. The Defense Department's Selected
Acquisition Report of December 31, 2005, estimated the total
acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5 billion, which
translates into a program unit acquisition cost (PUAC) of $110
million per Osprey. The PUAC includes funding for both development
and production of the aircraft and related activities. The average
procurement unit cost (APUC), which, for the Osprey is estimated at
$88.5 million does not include these sunk costs. On June 18, 2005,
the MV-22 program completed its second round of operational
evaluation (OPEVAL) flight tests and Navy testers recommended that
DOD declare it operationally suitable, and effective for military
use. DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must also
endorse the Osprey and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) must
review the program before full-rate production can begin. Background
The V-22 program has been under development for over 25 years. Safety
and maintenance concerns have arisen during this period, but the
program has maintained support from many in Congress nonetheless. The
program has undergone restructuring to accommodate recommendations
from outside experts and DOD managers. System Description The V-22 is
a tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short take off and
landing, with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft.
About 65% of the airframe is made of graphite-epoxy composite
materials. The Marine Corps's MV-22 version will have the following
characteristics:

Propulsion: 2 T406 turboshaft engines Crew: 3 Passengers: 24 combat
troops Max. vertical take off weight: 47,500 lb Max. short take off
weight: 55,000 lb Speed at max. weight: 250 knots/hour Combat radius:
200+ nm

The airframes of the Marine Corps MV-22 and the Air Force CV-22
variant for Special Operations Command will have some 90%
commonality; the primary differences being in avionics. The CV-22
will carry 18 troops, with auxiliary fuel tanks increasing combat
radius to about 500 miles. This variant may carry a 50-cal GAU-19
nosegun for self defense.

DOD plans to field V-22s in four blocks: Blocks B and C for the
Marine Corps, and Blocks 10 and 20 for the Air Force. Block B
aircraft were produced first in FY2004 and will be the aircraft with
which the Marine Corps will achieve initial operational capability
(IOC). Block B aircraft will improve upon those used in EMD testing
(Block A aircraft) with upgrades to avionics, communications,
navigation. It will also feature a retractable fuel probe, a ramp gun
(for self defense), a joist, and an improved position for the
"fastrope" (a method for personnel to quickly exit the aircraft while
in hover). The Air Force will achieve IOC with the Block 10 variant,
which will be based on the Block B, but feature advanced avionics,
such as terrainfollowing radar, and directed infrared
countermeasures, that will allow special operations forces to
penetrate hostile areas in all weather and terrain. The Marine Corps
and Air Force plan to begin developing the most capable V-22 variants
- the Block C and Block 20 respectively - in FY2006, and begin
producing them in FY2009 and FY2012 respectively. See the appendix
for a complete list of V-22 features by Block.

Early Development The V-22 is based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype
which was developed by Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977. The
Department of Defense began the V-22 program in 1981, first under
Army leadership, but with the Navy/Marine Corps later taking the lead
in developing what was then known as the JVX (joint-service vertical
take-off/landing experimental aircraft). Full-scale development of
the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft began in 1986. Like some other tactical
aviation programs (such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F/A-22 Raptor
and Joint Strike Fighter), the total number of V-22 aircraft planned
for procurement has decreased over time. In 1989 the Defense
Department projected a 663-aircraft program with six prototypes and
657 production aircraft (552 MV-22s, 55 CV-22s, and 50 HV-22s). As
projected in 1994, however, the program comprised 523 production
aircraft (425 MV-22s, 50 CV-22s, and 48 HV-22s). Procurement of these
523 aircraft was to continue into the 2020s, since the Defense
Acquisition Board limited annual expenditures for Marine MV-22s to $1
billion (FY1994 dollars) when it approved entry into engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD) in September 1994. The Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), released May 19, 1997, recommended accelerated
procurement of 458 production aircraft (360 MV-22s for the Marines;
50 Air Force CV-22s; and 48 Navy HV-22s). Such a 458-aircraft program
is now projected. On March 19, 1989, the first of six MV-22
prototypes was flown in the helicopter mode and on September 14,
1989, as a fixed-wing plane. Two of these aircraft were destroyed in
crashes. Prototype aircraft numbers three and four successfully
completed the Osprey's first Sea Trials on the USS Wasp (LHD-1) in
December 1990. The fifth prototype crashed on its first flight (June
11, 1991), because of incorrect wiring in a flight-control system;
the fourth prototype crashed on July 20, 1992, while landing at
Quantico Marine Corps Air Station, VA, killing seven people and
destroying the aircraft. This accident was caused by a fire resulting
from hydraulic component failures and design problems in the engine
nacelles.3 Flight tests were resumed in August 1993 after changes
were incorporated in the prototypes. Flight testing of four
full-scale development V-22s began in early 1997 when the first
pre-production V-22 was delivered to the Naval Air Warfare Test
Center in Patuxent River, MD. The first EMD Flight took place on
February 5, 1997. The first of four low-rate initial production
aircraft, ordered on April 28, 1997, was delivered on May 27, 1999.
Osprey number 10 completed the program's second Sea Trials, this time
from the USS Saipan (LHA-2) in January 1999. Operational evaluation
(OPEVAL) testing of the MV-22 began in October 1999 and concluded in
August 2000. On October 13, 2000, the Department of the Navy
announced that the MV-22 had been judged operationally effective and
suitable for land-based operations. On November 15, 2000, the Marine
Corps announced that the Osprey had successfully completed sea trials
and had been deemed operationally effective and suitable for both
land- and sea-based operations. Successfully completing OPEVAL should
have cleared the way for full rate production. This decision was to
have been made in December 2000, but was postponed indefinitely, due
a mixed report from DOD's director of operational test and
evaluation, and to two fatal accidents. Accidents and Fatalities
Worsen On April 8, 2000, another Osprey crashed near Tucson, Arizona
during an exercise simulating a noncombatant evacuation operation.
All four crew members and 15 passengers died in the crash. An
investigation of the accident found that the pilot was descending in
excess of the recommended flight envelope which may have caused the
aircraft to experience an environmental condition known as "power
settling" or "vortex ring state." According to Lt. Gen. Fred
McCorkle, the pilot was descending more than a thousand feet per
minute. The recommended descent rate is 800 feet per minute."
Following a two-month suspension of flight testing, the Osprey
recommenced OPEVAL in June 2000, with pilots flying a slightly
tighter flight envelope. A July 27, 2000 report by the Marine Corps
Judge Advocate General (JAG) (which had access to all non-privileged
information from the safety investigation) confirmed that a
combination of "human factors" caused the crash. This mishap appears
not to be the result of any design, material or maintenance factor
specific to tilt-rotors. Its primary cause, that of a MV-22 entering
a Vortex Ring State (Power Settling) and/or blade stall condition is
not peculiar to tilt rotors. The contributing factors to the mishap,
a steep approach with a high rate of descent and slow airspeed, poor
aircrew coordination and diminished situational awareness are also
not particular to tilt rotors.4 A DOD Inspector General study
concluded that the V-22 would not successfully demonstrate 23 major
operational effectiveness and suitability requirements prior to the
December 2000 OPEVAL Milestone III decision to enter full rate
production in June 20015. The Marine Corps agreed with DOD's
assessment of the deficiencies, but said that they had been aware of
these deficiencies before the beginning of OPEVAL. Furthermore, the
Marine Corps said that they had an approved plan designed to resolve
the deficiencies prior to the Milestone III decision. On November 17,
2000, DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation issued a
mixed report on the Osprey; saying although "operationally effective"
the V-22 was not "operationally suitable, primarily because of
reliability, maintainability, availability, human factors and
interoperability issues." The report recommended that more research
should be conducted into the V-22's susceptibility to the vortex ring
state blamed for the April 8, 2000 crash. On December 11, 2000, a
MV-22 Osprey crashed near Jacksonville, NC, killing all four Marines
on board. This was the fourth Osprey crash since 1991 and the third
lethal accident. The aircraft's pilot, Lt. Col. Keith M. Sweeney was
the program's most experienced pilot and was in line to command the
first squadron of Ospreys. The aircraft's copilot, Maj. Michael
Murphy was second only to Sweeney in flying time on the Osprey.6 The
Marine Corps grounded the Osprey fleet pending a mishap board
investigation. On April 5, 2001, the Marine Corps reported that the
crash was caused by a burst hydraulic line in one of the Osprey's two
engine casings, and a software malfunction that caused the aircraft
to accelerate and decelerate unpredictably and violently when the
pilots tried to compensate for the hydraulic failure.7 The Marine
Corps report called for a redesign of both the hydraulics and
software systems involved.8 Maintenance and Parts Falsifications In
December 2000, an anonymous letter was mailed to the media by someone
claiming to be a mechanic in the Osprey program. The letter claimed
that V-22 maintenance records had been falsified for two years, at
the explicit direction of the squadron commander. Enclosed in the
letter was an audio tape that the letter's author claimed was a
surreptitious recording of the squadron commander directing
maintenance personnel to lie about the aircraft until the V-22 LRIP
decision was made. On January 20, 2001, it was reported that the V-22
squadron commander admitted to falsifying maintenance records. The
Marine Corps subsequently relieved him of command and reassigned him
to a different position. At a May 1, 2001 hearing, members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee expressed their concern that false
data might impede DOD's ability to accurately evaluate the V-22
program and identify problem areas and potential improvements. The
Department of Defense's Inspector General (IG) conducted an
investigation. On September 15, 2001, it was reported that three
Marines were found guilty of misconduct and two were reprimanded for
their actions. In June 2005 a U.S. grand jury indicted a company that
had supplied titanium tubing for the V-22 program. The indictment
charged the company with falsely certifying the quality of the tubes.
The V-22 test program was halted for 11 days in 2003 due to faulty
tubes. Replacing deficient tubes cost the V-22 program $4 million.
Navy officials do not believe that these deficient tubes caused fatal
mishaps.9 Reviews and Restructuring On April 19, 2001, a Blue Ribbon
panel formed by then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen to review all
aspects of the V-22 program, reported its findings and
recommendations.10 These findings and recommendations were also
discussed during congressional testimony on May 1, 2001. The panel
recommended that the program continue, albeit in a restructured
format. The panel concluded that there were numerous problems with
the V-22 program - including safety, training and reliability
problems - but nothing inherently flawed in basic tilt-rotor
technology. Because of numerous safety, training, and reliability
problems, the V-22 was not maintainable, or ready for operational
use. The panel recommended cutting production to the "bare minimum"
while an array of tests were carried out to fix a long list of
problems they identified with hardware, software and performance.
Cutting near term production was hoped to free up funds to pay for
fixes and modifications. Once the changes had been made and the
aircraft was ready for operational use, the Panel suggested that V-22
out year purchases could be made in large lots using multi year
contracts to lower acquisition costs. Program officials estimated
that the minimal sustainable production rate is 12 aircraft per year,
which would be less than half the Ospreys once planned for FY2002.11
In P.L.107-107 Sec.123, Congressional authorizers codified the Blue
Ribbon Panel's recommendation to produce V-22's at the minimum
sustainable rate until the Secretary of Defense can certify that the
Osprey is safe, reliable, maintainable, and operationally effective.
DOD appears to have taken managerial and budgetary steps to
incorporate the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations. For example,
DOD's FY2001 supplemental funding request asked for a reduction of
$475 million in procurement and an increase of $80 million in R&D
funds. The additional R&D funding was to be used to support initial
redesign and testing efforts to address deficiencies, logistics,
flight test, and flight test support for V-22 aircraft. The reduction
in procurement funding reflected the need to reduce production to the
minimum rate while the aircraft design changes are being developed
and tested. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's FY2002 budget amendment,
unveiled June 27, 2001, included a request for the procurement of 12
Ospreys. DOD comptroller Dov Zakheim and Marine Corps Commandant Gen.
James Jones both stated that the procurement of 12 aircraft in FY2002
would allow them to sustain the V-22 subcontractor base while
simultaneously addressing the Osprey program's needs.12 V-22s were
procured at a rate of 11 per year from FY2002 to FY2006. Following
the Blue Ribbon panel's recommendations, former DOD Undersecretary
for Acquisition Edward "Pete" Aldridge assumed acquisition authority
for the V-22 program. Undersecretary Aldridge changed the V-22
program's status from an ACAT 1C program - which gives the Department
of the Navy the highest required authority for production decisions -
to an ACAT 1D program. Under the latter category, the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) will decide if and when the program is ready
to enter full rate production. Other ACAT 1D programs, for example,
include the F-22 Raptor and the now-cancelled RAH-66 Comanche
helicopter.13 A NASA-led review of the V-22 program, released
November 6, 2001, concluded that there were no known aero-mechanical
phenomena that would stop the tilt rotor aircraft's development and
deployment. The study focused on several aeromechanics issues,
including Vortex Ring State, power problems, auto-rotation, and hover
performance.14 In a December 21, 2001 memo to the Secretaries of the
Air Force and the Navy, and the Commander, Special Operations
Command, Undersecretary of Defense Aldridge gave his authorization
for the V-22 to resume flight testing in the April 2002 time frame.
Secretary Aldridge expressed support for range, speed, and
survivability goals of the V-22. He noted, however that the program
still had numerous technical challenges to overcome, and emphasized
that the V-22 must demonstrate that "1) it can meet the needs of the
warfighter better than any other alternative, 2) it can be made to be
reliable, safe, and operationally suitable, and 3) it is worth its
costs in contributing to the combat capability of U.S. forces."
Secretary Aldridge approved the flight test program under the
condition that the production rate be slowed to the minimum
sustaining level, that it be comprehensive and rigorous, and that the
restructured program is fully funded in accordance with current
estimates.15 Undersecretary Aldridge estimated that the V-22 would
require at least two years of flight testing before DOD could
conclude that the aircraft is safe, effective, and "worth the
cost."16 Mechanical adjustments slowed the V-22 test schedule, and
the MV-22 took its first test flight on May 29, 2002. The Air Force
CV-22 resumed flight tests on September 11, 2002. Flight tests were
designed to explore both technical and operational concerns.
Technical concerns include flight control software and the
reliability and robustness of hydraulic lines. Operational concerns
explored included whether the Osprey is too prone to Vortex Ring
State to make it a safe or effective aircraft, whether this potential
problem is further exacerbated by multiple Osprey's flying in
formation, and how well the V-22 handles at sea.17 The principal
differences between the aircraft that were grounded in 2000 and the
aircraft that began testing 17 months later (called "Block A"
aircraft) are re routed hydraulic lines, and an improved caution and
warning system.18 Technical glitches were experienced during tests.
Hydraulic failures, for example, continued during the reinstated
flight test program, once on August 4, 2003, (due to a misinstalled
clamp) and again on September 5, 2003. In June 2004 a V-22 was forced
twice to make an emergency landing. During one landing, the aircraft
suffered a "Class B" mishap (one causing between $200,000 and $1
million in damage).19 An investigation revealed that the V-22
suffered from widespread problems with an engine component that
required replacement every 100 flight hours.20 In conjunction with
resuming flight testing, the Navy Department modified certain V-22
requirements. For instance, the V-22 is no longer required to land in
helicopter mode without power (also known as "autorotation"),
protection from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been
eliminated. The V-22 is no longer required to have an "air combat
maneuvering" capability; instead it must demonstrate "defensive
maneuvering." Also, the requirement that troops be able to use a rope
or rope ladder to exit the cabin at low altitudes has been
eliminated.21 Also concurrent with the resumption of V-22 flight
testing, DOD began an in-depth study of alternatives to pursue in
case the aircraft does not pass muster. Options reportedly include
purchasing the S-92, or upgrading CH-53, or EH101 helicopters.22
After one calendar year and 466 hours of flight testing, DOD reviewed
the Osprey's progress. On May 15, 2003, Thomas Christie, DOD's
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) graded
Bell-Boeing's improvements to the Osprey's hydraulics as "reasonable
and appropriate" and "effective."23 Christie also at that time
approved of the testing that had been completed and was satisfied
with what had been learned about the V-22's susceptibility to Vortex
Ring State. On May 20, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board also
reviewed the program and approved of the flight test program's
progress. Marine Corps officials recommended increasing the
production rate in FY2006 from the minimum sustainable rate of 11 to
20 aircraft. However, in a August 8, 2003, memorandum, Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition Michael Wynne announced that this
acceleration "presents more risk than I am willing to accept."
Instead, Wynne restructured the planned procurement, reducing the
FY2006 purchase to 11 aircraft. "For subsequent years' procurement
planning, production rates should increase by about 50% per year for
a total of 152 aircraft through FY09," according to the August 8th
memo. Wynne directed that the savings resulting from the reduced
procurement (estimated at $231 million) be invested in improving the
V-22's interoperability, by funding the Joint Tactical Radio System,
Link 16 and Variable Message Format communication. Wynne also
directed that a multi-year procurement (MYP) of the V-22 be
accelerated. While some suggest that this restructuring will more
quickly deliver high-quality aircraft to the Marines and Special
Operations Forces, others fear that slowing procurement will
inevitably raise the platform's cost. In December 2004 the V-22
budget and schedule were restructured again. Program Budget Decision
753 (PBD-753) cut 22 aircraft from the V-22's production schedule and
$1.3 billion from the budget between FY2006 and FY2009 Current Status
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) flight. The test program was marked
by two emergency landings, a Class B mishap, a small fire in an
engine compartment, and problems with the prop-rotor gear box.
However, Navy testers recommended that DOD declare the V-22
operationally suitable, and effective for military use. This
recommendation was based, in part, on observations that the MV-22 had
complied with the objectives of P.L.107-107 Sec.123: hydraulic
components and flight control software performed satisfactorily, the
aircraft was reliable and maintainable, the MV- 22 operated
effectively when employed with other aircraft, and the aircraft's
downwash did not inhibit ground operations.24 On September 28, 2005
the V-22 program passed a major milestone when the Defense
Acquisition Board approved it for military use and full rate
production.25 The MV-22 continues testing to assess survivability and
to develop tactics. The CV- 22 is in developmental test and
evaluation. The program continues to experience technical and
operational challenges, and mishaps. For example, an inadvertent
takeoff in March 2006 caused wing and engine damage in excess of $1
million. An engine component has been replaced because its failure in
flight has caused seven unexpected flight terminations. In October
2005 a V-22 experienced engine damage during flight due to icing. An
engine compressor failure during the V-22's first overseas deployment
(July 2006) forced the aircraft to make a precautionary landing
before reaching its destination. MV-22 Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) is anticipated for May 2007. The May 2005 flight test schedule
for CV-22 has been extended by more than a year. Developmental
testing is scheduled to be completed in September 2007 and OPEVAL in
November 2007. The Department of the Navy would like to negotiate a
multiyear procurement (MYP) IOC is anticipated in February 2009. DoD
anticipates the following procurement V-22 procurement schedule: FY07
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 MV-22 14 19 31 35 37 37 CV-22 2 5 6 5 5 5
Total 16 24 37 40 42 42 Key Issues Should the Defense Department
Procure the V-22 Aircraft? Main Arguments of Those Who Say "Yes". The
Defense Department should accelerate procurement of the V-22, which
the Marine Corps considers its most important aviation program, in
order to obtain these aircraft sooner and at more economical
production rates. The V-22 is needed to replace aging military
helicopters in all the services, which are costly to maintain and
operate safely and effectively. The Army should reconsider its
decision not to buy the V-22, which the Air Force wants to procure
for its Special Operations missions and combat search and rescue. The
Osprey represents a truly joint capability, as evidenced by the
Navy's desire to purchase MV-22s for search and rescue, and other
missions. This tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the operational
flexibility of a helicopter without the helicopter's inherent
limitations of speed, range, and altitude. While there may be new
helicopters that could replace and improve on today's military
helicopters, V-22 proponents say that none of them would match the
Osprey's capabilities. When landing on hostile shores in a
third-world conflict (typically lacking important infrastructure such
as airfields and roads), the V-22 would be critical for the transport
of Marines from ship to shore. Senior DOD officials have testified
that the V-22 would have, for example, made a significant
contribution the to war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The Osprey has
been rigorously tested and its accident rate is consistent with other
aircraft development programs, supporters say. While some technical
problems have been encountered, leading experts have testified that
there are no technological barriers to the employment of tilt-rotor
technology. Engineering-level modifications have, put the Osprey
program back on track. The recently complete OPEVAL demonstrates that
the V-22 program has resolved all of the concerns expressed by the
Blue Ribbon Panel and by Congress. Supporters of the V-22 also cite
the tilt-rotor's potential value for civil aviation, law enforcement,
and foreign sales by the U.S. aerospace industry.26 The development
of tilt-rotor aircraft for the armed services could have significant
spin-off effects for civil aviation and U.S. technology, giving the
U.S. aerospace industry a major competitive advantage in the
international market.27 Main Arguments of Those Who Say "No". The
V-22 is unaffordable in the present budgetary environment, when the
cost of buying large numbers of these transport/cargo aircraft would
most likely be at the expense of more critical defense needs.
Ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less
expensive helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which
the Marines are likely to be involved, where the V-22's greater speed
and range would not be needed. Moreover, Marine assault missions in
an opposed landing would involve ship-to-shore movement of troops and
equipment, which would require coordination with aircraft having less
speed and range than the V-22. Others have argued that the Osprey's
hypothetical contribution to the war in Afghanistan is questionable
due to the high altitude of that country, and the Osprey's inability
to improve greatly over helicopter performance in this area.
Opponents cast doubt on the Osprey's operational capabilities and
operational concepts. A January 12, 2001 presentation by the GAO to
the V-22 Blue Ribbon Panel for instance said that the V-22's cabin
may not be large enough to carry 24 combat-equipped Marines, and that
the severe rotor down wash might impede the ability of troops to exit
the aircraft and move into combat positions. Also, to avoid entering
Vortex Ring State, Osprey's will have to descend slowly, which will
make them vulnerable to ground fire in combat situations. Critics
also challenge comparison's that are made between the Osprey and
conventional helicopters. The Osprey can, they concede, lift three
times more dead weight than can the CH-46. But the Osprey is also
three times heavier and five times more expensive than the Sea
Knight. Also, the CH-46 is a 1970s-era helicopter. Critics argue that
the V-22's performance should be compared to contemporary aircraft
(such as the EH-101), not one that is 30 year's old. When compared to
contemporary helicopters, critics argue, the V-22's capabilities
don't appear nearly as impressive.28 In light of several V-22
crashes, three involving fatalities, many argue that the tilt-rotor
technology is not sufficiently mature to merit the Osprey's
production and fielding. Studies suggest that tilt-rotor aircraft are
more susceptible to airflow instabilities that can cause Vortex Ring
State than are traditional helicopters.29 And our understanding of
the kinds of airflow anomalies that have caused numerous deaths in
V-22 flight testing are still very immature. Whatever commercial
value a tilt-rotor aircraft might some day have for civil aviation,
the V-22's value as a military system is insufficient to justify its
high cost ($110 million per aircraft) in these times of budgetary
constraints and higher priority defense needs. Finally, critics also
argue that the Navy is "dumbing down" the V-22's requirements and
making it a less effective aircraft. Congressional Action Throughout
the program, supporters have called for accelerating procurement
beyond the levels projected in the Administration's plan, arguing
that this would reduce program costs over the long term and would get
more aircraft in service sooner. In a potentially contrary
development, on December 23, 2004, an internal DOD Program Budget
Decision (PBD 753) was leaked to the press. PBD 753 recommended
cutting 22 aircraft from the V-22 production plan between FY2006 and
FY2009. The administration's FY2007 request included $2.2 billion in
procurement and RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as
congressional action, is summarized in Table 1, below. Table 1.
Summary of V-22 FY2007 Congressional Action (millions of dollars) USN
USAF SOCOM Budget Request Procurement · FY2007 · Advance Procurement
· Mods RDT&E (14 aircraft) 1,304 194.1 85.8 268.4 (2 aircraft) 208.6
34.4 .5 26.6 00 168.8 0 Authorization, House H.R. 5122 (109-452)
Matched requests Authorization, Senate S. 2766 (109-254) Matched
requests Appropriations, House H.R. 5631 (109-504) Matched requests
Appropriations, Senate H.R. 5631 (109-292) Procurement · FY2007 ·
Advance Procurement · Mods RDT&E -10 Matched requests Matched
requests The administration's FY2006 request included $1.8 billion in
procurement and RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as
congressional action, is summarized in Table 2, below. Table 2.
Summary of V-22 FY2006 Congressional Action (millions of dollars) USN
USAF SOCOM Budget Request Procurement · FY2006 · Advance Procurement
· Mods RDT&E (9 Aircraft) 993.3 67.3 81.0 206.3 (2 Aircraft) 233.8
10.5 .1 39.5 00 117.9 29.9 Authorization, House H.R. 1815 (109-89)
Matched request + 2 RDT&E Matched request Authorization, Senate S.
1042 (109-69) Matched requests Authorization Conference H.R. 1815
(109-360) Matched request + 2 RDT&E Matched request Appropriations,
House H.R. 2863 (109-119) Matched request -11.5 FY06 proc. +3.5 mods
+2 RDT&E Matched request Appropriations, Senate H.R. 2863 (109-141)
Matched requests Appropriations, Conference H.R. 2863 (109-359)
Matched request -11.5 FY06 proc. +3.5 mods +1 RDT&E Matched request
Appendix: V-22 Block Configurations MV-22 Block A (OPEVAL and
Training configuration) ! Improvements to hydraulic line clearances !
Flight Control software improvements MV-22 Block B ! Improved Nacelle
maintenance ! Retractable fuel probe ! Avionics, communications,
navigation upgrades ! Production icing system ! Ramp gun ! Hoist !
Improved fastrope location MV-22 Block C ! Flight incident recorder !
Radar altimeter sling load modification ! Fuel dump modification !
Weather radar ! Wheel well fire suppression ! Oil cooler inlet screen
! Main Landing Gear brake redesign ! Mid wing gear box indicator !
Slip ring ! Cargo hook door upgrade CV-22 Block 10 ! SIRFC ! DIRCM !
Multi mode radar ! "Silent Shield" ! Flight engineer's data display !
Flight engineer's seat ! Low probability of intercept/detection radar
altimeter ! TCAS (terrain collision avoidance system) ! Troop
commander's situational awareness ! ALE-47 decoy ! Navigation
improvements ! Lower antenna ! Dual digital map ! GATM (global air
traffic management) CV-22 Block 20 ! Geo-reference coupled approach
to hover ! Terrain Following below 50 kts corrections ! CV-22 Heads
up Display (HUD) ! Digital Map System upgrades ! Great Circle
Navigation corrections ! Performance calculator ! Passenger Oxygen !
JTRS cluster 1 with Link 16 ! Emergency power ! Fuel dump corrections


1 For example, February 17, 2005, Marine Corps Commandant Gen.
Michael Hagee testified that "The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps
number one aviation acquisition priority." Testimony available on
House Armed Services Committee website, at
[http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/]. 2 Lt. Gen. Frederick
McCorkle, "Transforming Marine Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette, May
2000, p.26. 3 Former Secretary of Defense Cheney tried to terminate
the program in 1989-92, but Congress continued to provide funds for
development of the V-22. The George H. Bush Administration's FY1990
budget requested no funds for the program. In submitting that budget
to Congress on April 25, 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the
House Armed Services Committee that he "could not justify spending
the amount of money ... proposed ... when we were just getting ready
to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission
that I think can be performed ... by using helicopters instead of the
V-22." 4 V-22 JAGMAN Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps,
Division of Public Affairs, July 27, 2000, p.1. 5 Audit Report: V-22
Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft. Report No. D-2000-174.
Office of the Inspector General. Department of Defense. August 15,
2000. 6 James Dao, "Marines Ground Osprey Fleet After Crash Kills
Four," New York Times, Dec. 12, 2000. 7 An un-redacted version of JAG
investigation into the April 2000 V-22 crash indicates that
investigators found three "noteworthy" maintenance "areas of
concern", including the Osprey's hydraulics system. A Naval Safety
Center presentation to the Blue Ribbon Panel brought to light several
previously unreported maintenance problems - including hydraulics
failures - that caused engine fires or other problems during the
Osprey's operational testing. 8 Mary Pat Flaherty, "Osprey Crash
Blamed on Leak, Software," Washington Post, Apr. 6, 2001. 9 Louise
Story. "Maker of Tubes for Osprey Aircraft is Indicted." New York
Times. June 8, 2005. Christopher J. Castelli. "Former Supplier of
Hydraulic Tubing for V-22 Osprey Faces Indictment." Inside the Navy.
June 13, 2005. 10 This panel was chaired by retired Marine General
John R. Dailey and included retired Air Force General James B. Davis,
Norman Augustine, and MIT professor Eugene Covert. 11 Adam Hebert,
"Minimal Sustainable Rate Will Dramatically Cut Near-Term V-22 Buys,"
Inside the Air Force, Apr. 20, 2001. 12 DOD News Briefing, Wed. June
27, 2001, 1:30PM and Kerry Gildea, "New V-22 Plan Sustains Lower Tier
Contractors, Jones Reports," Defense Daily, May 15, 2001. 13 "Navy
Loses Osprey Authority," Washington Post, May 22, 2001 and Hunter
Keeter, "Aldridge Maneuvers V-22 Acquisition Authority Away from
Navy," Defense Daily, May 22, 2001 and Linda de France, "V-22 Osprey
Production Authority Transferred from Navy to DoD," Aerospace Daily,
May 22, 2001. 14 Christopher Castelli, " NASA Review Panel Endorses
Resumption of V-22 Flight Tests," InsideDefense.com,. Nov. 14, 2001.
15 "Text: Aldridge Memo on V-22," Inside the Navy, Jan. 7, 2002. 16
Tony Capaccio, "Textron-Boeing V-22 Needs Two years of Testing,
Aldridge Says," Bloomberg.com, Oct. 16, 2001. 17 Thomas Ricks, "V-22
Osprey to Face Make or Break Tests," Washington Post, Dec. 25, 2002,
p.14. 18 Jefferson Morris, "Pilot: Resumption of V-22 Testing To Be
Treated Like First Flight," Aerospace Daily, Apr. 29, 2002. 19
Christopher Castelli. "Navy Convenes Mishap Board to Investigate
Latest V-22 Incident." Inside the Navy. July 5, 2004. 20 Christian
Lowe. "V-22 Ospreys Require New Engine Component Every 100 Hours."
Navy Times. July 16, 2004. 21 Joseph Neff, "Eased Standards 'Fix'
Osprey," Raleigh News & Observer, May 19, 2002, p.1. 22 "Aldridge
Makes Progress Check on MV-22 at NAS Patuxent River," Defense Daily,
Feb. 11, 2003. 23 Tony Capaccio, "Boeing-Textron B-22 Gets Favorable
Review From Pentagon Tester," Bloomberg.com, May 19, 2003. 24 "Letter
of Observation in Support of MV-22 Program Compliance with Section
123 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002."
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Department of the
Navy. February 18, 2005. 25 Andy Pasztor. "Pentagon Clears Full
Production for Osprey Aircraft." Wall Street Journal. September 29,
2005. 26 Sen. Ted Stevens et al., "Continuation of the V-22 Aircraft
Program," remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition,
Apr. 19, 1989, pp. S4507-S4509. 27 The potential civil application of
tilt-rotor technology is also considered by some a good reason to
pursue the V-22 program. A February 1988 study by the FAA and NASA
concluded that tilt-rotors could help relieve airport congestion by
diverting commuters and short-distance passengers to vertiports in
urban centers. The importance of U.S. production of a tilt-rotor
aircraft for civilian purposes was the subject of a hearing on July
17, 1990, by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's
Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. In 1992,
Congress enacted legislation (H.R. 6168) directing the Secretary of
Transportation to establish a "civil tilt-rotor development advisory
committee" to evaluate the feasibility and viability of developing
civil tilt-rotor aircraft and infrastructure necessary to incorporate
tilt-rotor aircraft into the national transportation system. 28 See,
for example, Everest Riccioni, "Osprey or Albatross?," Defense News,
Jan. 27, 2004. 29 Michael Dornheim, "Tiltrotor Wake 'More Complex'
Than Classic Vortex Ring State," Aviation Week & Space Technology,
July 15, 2002.