In article , The
Enlightenment writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote in message
news:s9BISHBVA3GAFw82
...
In article , WaltBJ
writes
Slightly off track - the Germans did not seem to place the same level
of importance on recce that the Brits and USAF did. Me109s could (some
did) carry a camera in the aft fuselage like the recce P51s (F6?). A
lightened waxed Me109F or G would have a very good chance of
completing a recce pass on an in-and-out basis flown at max speed on a
curving descent or in-and-out at naught feet (prop tips above the wave
tips). It appears to me that the 86R was declared a 'clay pigeon' when
the LW found out Spits and Mosquitoes, appropriately modifed, could
get up that high. Why the LW didn't use 'hot-rodded' photofighters is
beyond me. Maybe they swallowed the 'XX' turned spies' reports as
gospel.
Walt BJ

Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
German High Command was remarkable.

Without wanting to go wildly off-topic, there was a programme on UK TV a
few nights ago ('Spitfire Ace') that had some very useful stuff on the
mentality of the RAF versus the that of Luftwaffe in 1940. The RAF
(through the vision and efforts of Dowding) had created a parless air
defence system, while the Luftwaffe had concentrated overmuch on the
lionisation of its individual pilots.

Honestly this sounds like Brits patting themselves on the back while
not looking at the strategic and tactical issues the Germans faced.
(sadly this is a sort of anasthetic as the UK goes down a sewer)

While I agree that we, as a nation, should be organising our lives
better these days, there is no doubt that the British air defence system
of 1940 was unmatched anywhere else in the world, and no-one, not even
the Germans, dare to claim that Goering's boasts of 1940 held water.

I think that by 1944 the Allies
had developed a war machine that was thorough enough to filter out most
flakey thinking and to concentrate on the real issues. If the Luftwaffe
in 1944 was still relying on the whims of 'gifted individuals' (Hitler,
Goering), who would have prided their own (uncriticised) judgement then
a lot of bad ideas would have good through and a lot of good ideas would
have been turned away.


German thinking was predicated on the need to fight a short and sharp
war as a nation sourunded by hostile countries. Avoiding a war of
attrition was essential and avoiding a war on German territory was
also essential.

The surrounding countries were only hostile because of Hitler's
belligerence - he could have been a peaceful leader had he so chosen.
As for laying odds on a short war - having contingency plans in case
your lightning strike does not work is fundamental to military planning.

The nation was physically to small and to devoid of
materials to handle a war in any other way and not loose thus
substantial offensive capability was emphasised but it was all up
front: resources were not devoted to reinforcements. This was the
thinking even before the Nazis came to power.

Germany had many resources to spare in the early years of the war.
Their industry was still working single shifts until things got really
bad. While Hitler was telling the German people about how well things
were going, Churchill was telling the British that we had to get a
wiggle on or lose - and our industry went to 100 percent from 1940
onwards.

Much of the German work on Microwaves and Proximity fuses (which
inspired British research)

Um...they told us about their work in these fields?

was suspended because the anything that
could not be ready in 2 years would be a waste.

Not a waste, a strategic error - no-one to blame but themselves.

It seems that at
this point that many of the German might have beens got caned.
Examination of this period is perhaps where it might be said that
Germany's technical may be said to lie. It migh also just lay in the
fact that Germany lacked the resources to develop them.

Poor prioritization - no-one to blame but themselves. The proximity
fuse was a small printed circuit that any small group of radio men could
have taken forward - there was no great industrial effort needed here.

The Tiazard
commision handed the proximity fuse and magnetron on a platter for the
USA to develop. The Germans just culled.

Good prioritisation on Tizard's part - hand the designs over to the
people who can mass produce immediately.

The excelent Freya and Wurzburg Radars were not integrated into a
defensive system because the bomber naviagation aids were considered
more important.

Integration was a matter laying telephone connections and training a
limited number of staff. If you have started a war, and it has gone
pear-shaped, and your efforts have simply created a hostile world around
you, air defence should then be recognised as a priority. After 1942
the allies were no longer fighting a war dictated by German initiatives
- they were fighting according to their own.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth