"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 14:53:47 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Alan Minyard" wrote in message
news
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun
range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch,
desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Yeah, a terrible tradeoff...right up to the point where you (or, more
accurately those you are supporting below who are locked in a very nasty
"knife" fight that precludes use of JDAM or an LGB) need it, as was found
during Anaconda.

Brooks

The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

It's great for SAR and can be effective on close-in CAS, but it's
better done with an A-10 type system than an A/A optimized platform
(which was what the thread has been talking about.)

As to "what this thread has been talking about", this thread has also the
comment, "Air-to-ground, guns pull you into IR-SAM range and even for A-10s
that isn't healthy." And the fact is that the majority of CAS missions are
being flown by F-15E's, F-16's, F/A-18's, and most likely in the future by
platforms like the F-35 and even (gasp!) the F/A-22, not by A-10's. See
below for the types of aircraft flying strafe during Anaconda.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

"Then F-15s were overhead and the combat controller was directing them to
the enemy according to my
instructions. I told the combat controller to have the F-15s to strafe the
bunker and have them come in from our right to our left....I told him to
clear them and the rounds hit right by the bunker. I told him to have them
do that over and over again. I think the gun runs were made by both F-15s
and F-16s." (globalspecops.com/sts.html )

Go to Google and search based upon "Operation Anaconda strafe" and you can
find quite a few specific reports.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Brooks


At least, those are some of my impressions on the argument.