On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.


B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.


C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the USAF
seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios. I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.


D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.


F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.