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Old September 8th 03, 10:20 PM
Ed Rasimus
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Juvat wrote:

Ed Rasimus posted:


The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
last statement here.


Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?


No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the
fateful decision to marry my first wife.

I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.


Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.


No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
interceptor force was always deployed.


I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
Saigon.


I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken
them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew
where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it
until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields.

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years
of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main
bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well
within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn,
Ubon or Danang.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038