ADS-B-The Terrorism Panacea

Despite the ridiculousness of this post, as well pointed out by other
r.a.p-ers, I have also wondered about the potential for spoofing ADS-
B.

On Thu, 01 Nov 2007 10:53:54 -0700, Dave J
wrote in
.com:

I don't really know how these systems are designed, but if there is an
ADS-B transceiver that is connected to a GPS device by a simple serial
connection sending unencrypted NMEA sentences, for example, then
spoofing such a system by cutting that line and injecting false
information into the transceiver would be trivial. With that, a
nefarious person could rather easily put lots of unreliable data into
the system, thus created a kind of "denial of service" attack.
Clearly, the FAA and/or military are going to have to keep at least
their primary radars.

I agree about ADS-B systems being vulnerable to spoofing, and said as
much in this article:
http://groups.google.com/group/rec.a...b?dmode=source
back in August 2006.

When you start thinking about the potential ATC vulnerabilities
satellite-based NextGen will introduce, it's overwhelming.