December 6,1941

I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
alert? What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
dogfight scenario?

Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?

What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
Was there better way to position them against air attack?

What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
at this point in the war?

Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
advanced warning and defensive attack ?

Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?


It would make an interesting movie.....


BOB




-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
-----== Over 100,000 Newsgroups - 19 Different Servers! =-----

"BOB URZ" wrote in message
...
I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
getting dirty - no kidding)

The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'

The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
of enjoying a sunday morning lie in

They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
nets.


Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
alert?

The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
80 fighters could have been in the air.

What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
dogfight scenario?

Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?


They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
Was there better way to position them against air attack?


The BB's could have been sent back to the West Coast.

What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
at this point in the war?


There really wasnt an effective strike force available.

Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
advanced warning and defensive attack ?


The land based radar detected the incoming attack very succesfully,
trouble is the information center couldnt handle the data and
simply assumed the aircraft were friendly, no IFF was available.

Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?


Safer halfway to San Francisco, sortieing against the carriers
was a hopeless task, they were too slow to catch them and
would likley have lost more men as ships were sunk in the
deep ocean and would not have been salvageable.

Keith

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were launched to
find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a 24h
advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position to
attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
"firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?

Tks in advance,

Vicente

"Vicente Vazquez" wrote in message
...

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were launched
to
find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a 24h
advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position to
attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
"firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?


I think the likely outcome would have been the loss of the Enterprise
and her air crews, a far more valuable asset than the old battleships
that were lost.

Keith

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

"Vicente Vazquez" wrote in message
...

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some
of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were
launched
to
find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a
24h
advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position
to
attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
"firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?


I think the likely outcome would have been the loss of the Enterprise
and her air crews, a far more valuable asset than the old battleships
that were lost.

I suspect the demonstrated Japanese inclination of the historic
event to withdraw and husband resources would have prevailed
and they would have declined a prolonged fleet battle. After
their attack, how were their av-gas and munitions supplies looking?

Vicente Vazquez wrote:

"Keith Willshaw" escreveu na mensagem
...
Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. ...

In "The Big 'E'" by Comdr. Edward P. Stafford, USN; published 1962,
Scouting Six was engaged by the Japanese as they attempted to land at Ford
Island, Pearl Harbor, 8:20-8:35 am 12/7/41.

Bill Jameson

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

"Keith Willshaw" wrote:

"BOB URZ" wrote in message
...
I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
getting dirty - no kidding)

The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'

The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
of enjoying a sunday morning lie in

They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
nets.


Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there,
then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached.

Subs may have also have been able to intercept.

--

Reply to sans two @@, or your reply won't reach me.

"An election is nothing more than an advance auction of stolen goods."
-- Ambrose Bierce

"Mike1" wrote in message
...

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to
anyone in power.


James Linn

"James Linn" wrote in message
...

"Mike1" wrote in message
...

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to
Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been
on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got
to
anyone in power.


********

There was no definite signals information pointing to
Pearl Harbor for the simple and adequate reason that
the Japanese never transmitted any. Not only did
the fleet maintain radio silence but fake messages
were transmitted from the region around Japan
to make people belive it was still in home waters.

Furthermore Bletchley Park was NOT reading the
Japanese Naval cipher at the time.

I recommend the book "The Emperors Codes"
by Michael Smith for the true story of British
work on Japanese ciphers and codes.

That said there was an expectation that war with Japan
was imminent and Pearl Harbor in common with
all other commands had been issued a war warning.

Keith

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 10:09:50 -0500, "James Linn" wrote:


"Mike1" wrote in message
...

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to
anyone in power.


James Linn

We knew that *something* was in the works, but everyone (including the Brits)
thought that the attack would come in the PI, the Dutch East Indies, etc. No
one foresaw the attack on Pearl.

Al Minyard