OK, what the hell has happened to the Brits?

"Jens Krueger" wrote in message
...

But what puzzles me is, that the DHS now REQUIRES all planes to have
ARMED passengers (Air Marshals are just that: non-rev Pax.) on Board.


Only those that wish to fly to the US.

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...
Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

Please explain how having an armed marshal aboard is a "weak point".
How
do the terrorists get the weapon away from the marshal?

Picture two terrorists, one walking to the restroom and one walking back
from. They meet where the marshal is seated. One grabs the guy around
the
throat while the other goes for the weapon.

AAAAHAAAA

How did the terrorists identify who the air marshal was?
--
Jim in NC

In article et,
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
What's better, explosive decompression or a fuel-loaded airplane being
slammed into a busy downtown area by a terrorist who is able to gain
control of the airplane?


Fuel-loaded? The effected flights would be departing foreign airports bound
for the US. In the case of the British we're talking about trans-Atlantic
flights. Wouldn't the fuel load be rather light by the time they're able to
strike a US target?


So Britain isn't a terrorist target anymore?


JKG

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

Sigh In you pop up this thread a few messages, you'll see that I wrote:

Yes. They'd also need to identify the marshal amongst the passengers, as
you noted. However, relying upon these "secrets" is relying upon
something
called "security through obscurity". It doesn't work in the long term.


So what? You never did explain how the terrorists identify the marshals.



If nothing else, it's yet another "weak point" against which an "attack"
can
be attempted. It means that the terrorist doesn't need to get a weapon on
board, but just get access to the marshal's identity on a flight.


But how does the terrorist get access to the marshal's identity on a flight?
It's not enough to just state that's all he has to do, you have to explain
how he does it.



That is,
there are now two different ways to acquire a weapon on board, whereas
before there was just one.


How does the terrorist get the gun from the marshal?



So you're depending upon the terrorists not learning a secret.


How would they learn it?



That's fine...until/unless they do learn the secret.


How would they learn it?



In that
case, security is actually *reduced* as they now have access to
a weapon on board (assuming, again, that it's not easier to simply
smuggle something on board than it is to discern this secret).


But if they don't know who the marshal is security is *increased*.

In article et,
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
What's better, explosive decompression or a fuel-loaded airplane being
slammed into a busy downtown area by a terrorist who is able to gain
control of the airplane?


Fuel-loaded? The effected flights would be departing foreign airports bound
for the US. In the case of the British we're talking about trans-Atlantic
flights. Wouldn't the fuel load be rather light by the time they're able to
strike a US target?


And, the bottom line is I don't think it matters if the airplanes are
are fuel full or empty, a jumbo jet is going to make a big mess if it's
crashed into a populated area. That's the real point.


JKG

"Jonathan Goodish" wrote in message
...

So Britain isn't a terrorist target anymore?


Britain is not part of the US.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


While they're doing that the other marshal shoots and kills them.

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.

How did the terrorists identify the marshal?

The usual ways: security leak, observation, information intercept, etc.
These are all the usual ways that generic secrets may be compromised. I'm
sure that someone with knowledge of how the program works would have more
specific ideas.

But *my* knowing how to do this isn't important. What's important is that
nobody with security experience would assume that the secret would stay
secret. They don't.

You keep trusting the secrecy of the secret for your security. Worse, you
ask questions which indicate that someone needs to prove to you that the
secret can be compromised. Security starts by assuming a "failure" (ie.
the secret is out, someone smuggles a weapon aboard, etc.) and addressing
it.

After all, that's precisely the point of the air marshal program: to handle
the case where the perimeter security fails. So what handles the case
where the air marshal program fails?

- Andrew

"Jonathan Goodish" wrote in message
...

And, the bottom line is I don't think it matters if the airplanes are
are fuel full or empty, a jumbo jet is going to make a big mess if it's
crashed into a populated area. That's the real point.


But not nearly the damage that a fully fueled jumbo jet would make.
Remember, the WTC towers withstood the impact, they were brought down by the
fire.

"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.


You're assuming they don't.



But *my* knowing how to do this isn't important.


It is if you want your messages to be taken seriously.



What's important is that
nobody with security experience would assume that the secret would stay
secret. They don't.


How do you know?



You keep trusting the secrecy of the secret for your security. Worse, you
ask questions which indicate that someone needs to prove to you that the
secret can be compromised.


Well, if nobody can explain how the secret can be compromised, and nobody
has, then the secret appears to be pretty safe.



After all, that's precisely the point of the air marshal program: to
handle
the case where the perimeter security fails. So what handles the case
where the air marshal program fails?


Well, if all programs fail, there's nothing we can do.

But you're not saying the marshal program MIGHT fail, you're saying the
,arshal program WILL fail. It's clear you're against armed marshals on
airplanes, but it appears to be just an emotional issue with you. You have
not presented a cogent argument against them.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

Sigh In you pop up this thread a few messages, you'll see that I wrote:

Yes. They'd also need to identify the marshal amongst the passengers, as
you noted. However, relying upon these "secrets" is relying upon
something
called "security through obscurity". It doesn't work in the long term.


So what? You never did explain how the terrorists identify the marshals.

Yes, I did. I provided a few common examples of how a secret can be exposed
which would work in this case. I also pointed out that my ability to
explain this has no bearing on whether or not they can do this.

You can ask questions about what I've written, or even disagree. But you
look silly claiming I never wrote it.



If nothing else, it's yet another "weak point" against which an "attack"
can
be attempted. It means that the terrorist doesn't need to get a weapon
on board, but just get access to the marshal's identity on a flight.


But how does the terrorist get access to the marshal's identity on a
flight? It's not enough to just state that's all he has to do, you have to
explain how he does it.

I don't have to do this any more than I have to explain how a weapon would
be smuggled on board. The TSA doesn't wait for someone to demonstrate that
it is possible. They assume it is possible, and try to counter that
failure mode.

[Well...in fact I don't think the TSA is actually working this well. The
above is what they should do. It occurs to me to wonder why the TSA is run
by a politician as opposed to (for example) an intelligence specialist (or
some other person with a security background).]

Knowing the details of how a layer will fail is remarkably unimportant when
determining how to deal with that failure.




That is,
there are now two different ways to acquire a weapon on board, whereas
before there was just one.


How does the terrorist get the gun from the marshal?

Exactly as I described before, or in some other way.



So you're depending upon the terrorists not learning a secret.


How would they learn it?

Exactly as secrets are always broken, or in some other way.


That's fine...until/unless they do learn the secret.


How would they learn it?

You sound remarkably like a toddler.


In that
case, security is actually *reduced* as they now have access to
a weapon on board (assuming, again, that it's not easier to simply
smuggle something on board than it is to discern this secret).


But if they don't know who the marshal is security is *increased*.

As long as the secret is safe, you're right. Nobody would ever assume so,
however, any more than they'd assume no weapon could be smuggled on board.
Instead, they assume that the secret will be broken, and create yet another
layer.

- Andrew