Boeing Niner Zero Niner AwwwYEAH!

In article pm56d059pv74ax.com, wrote:

Like most legends, the accuracy of the Norden bombsight has been
hugely overblown.

But it was an exquisite piece of machine work. The gyroscopes were
things of beauty, that could run for half an hour after the power
was disconnected.

That did not stop the AAF not only from claiming that they exclusively
targeted factories and war related industries only, not city centers,
even though that was patently false. They also claimed that strategic
bombing effectively shortened the war. This despite the fact that
Germany's wartime military production ramped up throughout the war and
actually peaked in late 1944 at the absolute height of daylight and
nightime bombing.

They did what they could to target factories, but the technology to
do this accurately just wasn't there. American bombing was certainly
"precision bombing" compared to the British, nighttime bombing that
aimed for easily located targets like large cities.

The leaders of the Air Force believed in the fallacy of strategic
bombing throughout the 50's and 60's and a case I think could be made
that they continue to overbelieve in the effectiveness of bombing even
today.

When the man who jumped naked into a cactus patch was asked why he would
do such a thing, he answered, "it seemed like a good idea at the time."
It wasn't until after WWII, when the bomb damage could be accurately
assessed, that the shortcomings of bombing became apparent. In the
fifties, strategic bombing meant nuking whole cities, and the horror of
that just might have kept the Cold War cold, so it may have been quite
successful indeed. By the sixties, "smart bombs" were coming into
existence, and nowadays armies can hit individual buildings from the other
side of the world, so it's not anywhere near the same as it was in
the forties.

"No Such User" wrote in message news:cavvec$7g6t7

Zillions of them were sold as surplus
around the world.

That is true. Here in Portland there was a guy who bought one to use as the
roof of his gas station. He bought one as surplus for $5000, flew it into
Portland and wrecked in on landing. The government felt bad for him, and
gave him a second one at no cost. It's still there, except they took the
nose off to restore it, so now there's a nose-less B-17 sitting over what
used to be gas station pump islands.

-c

On 19 Jun 2004 00:08:13 GMT, (No Such User) wrote:

They did what they could to target factories, but the technology to
do this accurately just wasn't there. American bombing was certainly
"precision bombing" compared to the British, nighttime bombing that
aimed for easily located targets like large cities.

There's a lot of irony he The British, by the end of the war, could
actually target precision targets with greater accuracy at night than
the US bombers could while bombing during daylight from high altitude,
but they did not, except for a very few missions, do so.

Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

He was mistaken. For instance, when Hamburg was bombed in late 1943,
Bomber Command managed to create the worlds first "firestorm" with
it's bombing tactics. The blaze wiped out the center of Hamburg and
killed many thousands of people. Gale force winds feeding the raging
fire were so powerful they literally ripped babies from mothers arms
and wafted them into the blaze.

But did the damage halt Hamburg from producing war materials? Maybe
for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,
but they were for the most part not producing war materials. The
survivors now turned to the factories which were barely touched, and
worked there instead. For the remainder of the war, Hamburg continued
to contribute mightily to the war machine.

Harris thought the decimation of Hamburg was a great victory. He'd
show visitors stereo pictures of gutted German cities, implying that
the roofless buildings indicated how effective his force of bombers
was. He called this type of bombing "dehousing" the German workers
and thought that they'd have to leave the cities to survive. Most of
the people who lost their homes did not die, they survived and turned
to the factories for work and shelter regardless Harris's conjecture.

The British bomber pilots and crew suffered enormously for their
effort. Too bad the concept was so flawed.

Corky Scott

In article , wrote:

Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

The really sad part was he had the example of the London Blitz right in
front of him. Bombing London did nothing to shake civilian resolve, and
probably had the opposite result.

for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,

The British called this 'Baedeker Bombing,' i.e., targeting city centers
where all the tourist attractions were located.

but they were for the most part not producing war materials. The
survivors now turned to the factories which were barely touched, and

I talked to survivors of the war in Berlin who told me the homeless would
pick the longest subway route (between Spandau and Gruenau) and ride all
night for a few pennies.

The British bomber pilots and crew suffered enormously for their
effort. Too bad the concept was so flawed.

The blame for those deaths should include the blunder of sending out the
bombers with no fighter protection. Had the allies invested a little
more in creating long-range fighters, this would have been quite different.

wrote in message
...
On 19 Jun 2004 00:08:13 GMT, (No Such User) wrote:
Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

He was mistaken. For instance, when Hamburg was bombed in late 1943,
Bomber Command managed to create the worlds first "firestorm" with
it's bombing tactics. The blaze wiped out the center of Hamburg and
killed many thousands of people. Gale force winds feeding the raging
fire were so powerful they literally ripped babies from mothers arms
and wafted them into the blaze.

But did the damage halt Hamburg from producing war materials? Maybe
for a week or two.

http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Strategic_bombing

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
at night, the Americans in the day. German survivors said it had a
huge affect on them...the couldn't work effectively and were constantly
tired and weary. There was a huge diversion of resources.

Production may have increased, but the bombing ensured that the "new"
German weapons of mass destruction didn't come on-line or were
severely limited. One of the aircraft under development allegedly went to
South America (or the plans did) after the war only to be copied (allegedly)
by the Soviets. This became the Mig 15.

The relentless bombing was all part of the "total war" that was being
unleashed upon Germany.

http://makeashorterlink.com/?F30934F98

This makes interesting reading if anyone has the time to read it!

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

Paul

"No Such User" wrote in message
...
In article ,
wrote:

Arthur Harris insisted right up to the end of the war that his bombers
bomb city centers as the most effective method of bringing the war to
the Germans and shorten it, if not cause them to surrender.

The really sad part was he had the example of the London Blitz right in
front of him. Bombing London did nothing to shake civilian resolve, and
probably had the opposite result.

for a week or two. A lot of people lost their jobs and their homes
because what got destroyed was center city businesses and residences,

The British called this 'Baedeker Bombing,' i.e., targeting city centers
where all the tourist attractions were located.

This was the German tactic:
http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionar...edeker%20Blitz
http://modena.intergate.ca/business/boport/cbctv/

Quote:
By 1941 cities throughout Europe had been bombed by the Luftwaffe,

and helpless refugees had been machine-gunned from the air. These missions

were flown with the sole objective of terrorising the civilian population,
and

breaking any will to resist. In 1940-42 the Luftwaffe devastated London,

Coventry, Southampton, Bristol, Plymouth, Sheffield, Liverpool,Cardiff,

Glasgow and many other British cities. From April 1942 its raids on Britain

were specifically redirected against cities distinguished by three stars in
the

Baedeker guidebook as being "of outstanding historic or artistic interest."



The "three stars" thing is a quote from Nazi propagandist Baron Gustav

Braun von Sturm who said: "We shall go out and bomb every building in

Britain marked with three stars in the Baedeker Guide."



http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1892714.stm



Paul

Paul Sengupta wrote:

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) ....

And, as Bert Harris pointed out (with tongue firmly in cheek), the Americans also
opted for area bombing just as soon as they had a big enough bomb.

George Patterson
None of us is as dumb as all of us.

wrote in message
news
On Fri, 18 Jun 2004 08:40:18 -0500, "Bill Denton"
wrote:
PS, the Germans had no need for something as complicated as the Norden
bombsight because they did not bomb from great heights nor did they
posses a heavy bomber. Their bombers were for the most part, medium
battlefield support aircraft and dive bombers.

This may have been how they started out, but it wasn't how
they came to be used. The only reason that Germany didn't
produce heavy 4 engined bombers was their thought that it
was more beneficial to produce twice the number of twin
engined ones, the limiting factor at the time being engines.

Oh, just a quick reference, the inaccuracy of the bombing
was detailed in the Butt report of August 1941.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com...uttreport.aspx
The report was criticised at the time for potentially lowering
morale within Bomber Command, but it turned out to be what
was needed. As well as switching to area bombardment, new
ways were found to increase bomb accuracy, and some great
technological achievents came about.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwt...mbers_02.shtml

Another quote from:
http://modena.intergate.ca/business/boport/cbctv/

Bomber Command's attacks, initially a mere nuisance, became what Hitler's
armaments minister, Albert Speer, called "the greatest battle that we lost."
On May 15, 1940, 93 bombers set out for the Krupp works at Essen. In a later
asssessment it was calculated that the proportion of bombs that actually it
the vast factories was 3 percent. In contrast, in a massive attack by 705
"heavies" on July 25, 1943, marked by Oboe-equipped Pathfinders, the
proportion was assessed at 96 percent.



Paul

"Paul Sengupta" wrote in message

Read the bit under "Effectiveness". While the bombing was wildly
inaccurate (this was known at the time, that's why tactics were
switched to area bombing) it was relentless, with the British bombing
at night, the Americans in the day.

It's also relevant to point out that the allies DID aim for and strike
specific targets such as sub pens, shipyards and heavy water plants that
would have, in fact, impaired the german war machine more than bombing an
oilfield, railyard or even a ball bearing factory. U-boats didn't get built
overnight, and the strikes on the heavy water facilities would be more
historically noteworthy, perhaps, had they not happened, allowing that
technology to develop.

The 96th sent half its group out looking for the battleship Scharnhorst, but
couldn't find it through the overcast so IIRC they bombed Gdynia, Poland
instead.

-c

On Tue, 22 Jun 2004 16:28:07 +0100, "Paul Sengupta"
wrote:

Inhuman? Yes. Ineffective? No.

If it was effective, why did Germany manage to produce the greatest
amount of war related materials late in the war when the Allied
bombing was at it's greatest effectiveness? Shouldn't things have
been the other way around?

Corky Scott