Scared of mid-airs

On Thu, 3 Aug 2006 06:54:23 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
wrote:

As for KCAS versus KIAS in displays, I have no time in
F-16s, so I can't answer that categorically. But since
KCAS corrects for system error, it is more accurate than
KIAS, so why not? It would not surprise me if what's
displayed on the HUD, for example, and therefore
recorded by the tapes, is KCAS, since data displayed
there has been massaged by the aircraft's air data
computer (or some analogous system)...

Just a refresher for those who have been out of pilot training for a
long time:

ICE-T is the mnemonic for remembering the calculations involving going
from airspeed on the pitot-static gauge (Where's Tarver these days?)
to real, honest-to-God speed through the air.

Indicated airspeed is the uncorrected number of the pitot instrument.

Calibrated AS is corrected for "position error"--in the early days
pitot tubes often were placed conveniently for designers but that
resulted in either boundary layer distortions or plumbing errors along
the tubing to the diaphragm of the gauge. Modern aircraft (since the
'50s) minimize this error and for all practical considerations
Indicated is equal to Calibrated. As Jeff states, data processing
through the air data computer makes this computation.

Equivalent airspeed correct calibrated for "compressibility
error"--the fact that air is an elastic substance and at transonic
speeds creates molecule buildup at the pitot tube that distorts the
reading of the gauge. Typically Equivalent will be slightly lower than
Calibrated. At trans-sonic speeds the error spikes in a narrow regime
but then returns to small error less than Calibrated.

True airspeed is Equivalent airspeed corrected for air density.
Temperature and pressure reduce air density meaning fewer molecules
per cubic unit of atmosphere to register on the pneumatic instrument.
So, an indication is always lower than actual speed through the air.
Rule of thumb for standard day is 2% per thousand feet of altitude.
So, true airspeed is always higher than indicated and at high
altitudes is considerably higher.

This technical data should leave Larry calculating and seeking
further charts and documentation for weeks. When he returns I am sure
the speed of convergence will not be translated into TAS so that the
differentials are the maximum.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

True. Wouldn't you presume, that any denial of access into R airspace
would be predicated on the fact that there is training activity
occurring with in that R airspace (it's hot)? If so, it probably
wouldn't be a good idea to enter that MTR at that time even if it
remained joint use. Right?


Right. Given that one does not need permission to enter when it isn't hot,
what was your point?

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:42:07 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:02:22 GMT, Jose
wrote in :

then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC.

I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the
charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't
know whether it's hot or not.

That is true. Why do you suppose that occurs?

Do you think ATC is so disorganized, that they can't find the military
activity information, or do you think the military has provided
ambiguous information, what? It would seem, that given the system in
place for activating and deactivating Restricted airspace, there
should be a concrete answer available at all times.

Could it be a level of operational intensity that makes
minute-by-minute update impractical?

Example:

Holloman AFB operating four squadrons (32 airplanes each) conducting
Fighter Lead-In Training for recent graduates of Undergraduate Pilot
Training enroute to fighter assignments. Average of 120 sorties per
day ranging from single ship to two, three and four ship flights. Also
second fighter wing with three more squadrons of 18 aircraft each
conducting complex operations coordinated with ground radar
environments and often requiring supersonic airspace.

Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace
activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of
thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather
allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to
keep training flow and meet required completions dates.

Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but
A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or
should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of
flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of
properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available
aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again.

Afternoon weather builds up in Talon N, so unscheduled Beak C takes
additional sorties from Talon N.

And on and on.

Conversely, Saturday and Sunday no scheduled training, so airspace is
released. Maintenance requires a block for a functional check flight
on a repaired airplane. Flexibility to allow delay waiting for ATC to
clear GA aircraft out of the block is no problem. Life goes on.

Isn't that different than your innuendo laden language above?
"ATC is so disorganized..." "military information is so ambiguous..."


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:37:43 GMT, Jose
wrote:

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

It's a lot of sky to scan. And if nose to nose, you only have 19 seconds.

Jose

Great, you've got 19 seconds and I've got 19 seconds. Head-on, unless
we are perfectly aligned with miss each other ("Big Sky theory"), but
if either of us see the other, then we do what? Do you know which way
to turn? It IS spelled out in regs. If both of us see each other, we
both do what is required. Still no problem.

Now, you're driving down the Interstate--look at the car in front of
you, watch it pass a marker and count the interval in seconds that you
are maintaining. There's where the danger lies. Back off to 19 seconds
and think how much safer you'll be.

Look out the window. See and avoid. Don't depend upon someone else to
do it for you. There are no guarantees in life. Buy low, sell high.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 17:01:59 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in
. net:


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .

True. Wouldn't you presume, that any denial of access into R airspace
would be predicated on the fact that there is training activity
occurring with in that R airspace (it's hot)? If so, it probably
wouldn't be a good idea to enter that MTR at that time even if it
remained joint use. Right?


Right. Given that one does not need permission to enter when it isn't hot,
what was your point?


So you're saying ATC doesn't grant permission to enter R airspace, and
it is up to the pilot to enter or not based on ATC's information
regarding scheduled activity within it? There's no _clearance_
involved then?

Given:

http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/Chap3/aim0304.html#3-4-3
Section 4. Special Use Airspace
3-4-3. Restricted Areas
Penetration of restricted areas without authorization from the
using or controlling agency may be extremely hazardous to the
aircraft and its occupants.

It would seem that a pilot would require authorization from the
controlling agency (usually ATC) if not a clearance.

Unfortunately, I don't find 'authorization' contained in the
Pilot/Controller Glossary: http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/PCG/A.HTM

What form would that authorization take?


[Clearance is contained in the Pilot/Controller Glossary:

AIR TRAFFIC CLEARANCE- An authorization by air traffic control for
the purpose of preventing collision between known aircraft, for an
aircraft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within
controlled airspace. The pilot-in-command of an aircraft may not
deviate from the provisions of a visual flight rules (VFR) or
instrument flight rules (IFR) air traffic clearance except in an
emergency or unless an amended clearance has been obtained.
Additionally, the pilot may request a different clearance from
that which has been issued by air traffic control (ATC) if
information available to the pilot makes another course of action
more practicable or if aircraft equipment limitations or company
procedures forbid compliance with the clearance issued. Pilots may
also request clarification or amendment, as appropriate, any time
a clearance is not fully understood, or considered unacceptable
because of safety of flight. Controllers should, in such instances
and to the extent of operational practicality and safety, honor
the pilot's request. 14 CFR Part 91.3(a) states: "The pilot in
command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the
final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." THE PILOT
IS RESPONSIBLE TO REQUEST AN AMENDED CLEARANCE if ATC issues a
clearance that would cause a pilot to deviate from a rule or
regulation, or in the pilot's opinion, would place the aircraft in
jeopardy.

It would seem, that a clearance is only applicable in within
controlled airspace, of which R airspace may or may not be, right?]

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 17:51:37 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:42:07 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:02:22 GMT, Jose
wrote in :

then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC.

I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the
charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't
know whether it's hot or not.

That is true. Why do you suppose that occurs?

Do you think ATC is so disorganized, that they can't find the military
activity information, or do you think the military has provided
ambiguous information, what? It would seem, that given the system in
place for activating and deactivating Restricted airspace, there
should be a concrete answer available at all times.

Could it be a level of operational intensity that makes
minute-by-minute update impractical?

Example:

Holloman AFB operating four squadrons (32 airplanes each) conducting
Fighter Lead-In Training for recent graduates of Undergraduate Pilot
Training enroute to fighter assignments. Average of 120 sorties per
day ranging from single ship to two, three and four ship flights. Also
second fighter wing with three more squadrons of 18 aircraft each
conducting complex operations coordinated with ground radar
environments and often requiring supersonic airspace.

Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace
activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of
thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather
allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to
keep training flow and meet required completions dates.

Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but
A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or
should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of
flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of
properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available
aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again.

Afternoon weather builds up in Talon N, so unscheduled Beak C takes
additional sorties from Talon N.

And on and on.

Conversely, Saturday and Sunday no scheduled training, so airspace is
released. Maintenance requires a block for a functional check flight
on a repaired airplane. Flexibility to allow delay waiting for ATC to
clear GA aircraft out of the block is no problem. Life goes on.

Isn't that different than your innuendo laden language above?
"ATC is so disorganized..." "military information is so ambiguous..."

Sir, the information you provided does not explain how ATC would not
be aware if the R airspace were hot or not. If the military scheduled
the airspace, ATC should assume it is hot, right?

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 18:37:24 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:


Sir, the information you provided does not explain how ATC would not
be aware if the R airspace were hot or not. If the military scheduled
the airspace, ATC should assume it is hot, right?

Yes, if the military scheduled the airspace, ATC should assume it is
hot. If they wish to make sure, they should check their controllers
and see if anybody was coming or going. IOW, if scheduled it is "Hot"
and even if not active at this minute, one should assume that it will
be active momentarily. You won't get clearance through the airspace
under those conditions.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus wrote:

[stuff snipped]

Schedule published twelve hours before operations commence. Airspace
activated as scheduled, but morning fog precludes launches. Delays of
thirty minutes--should airspace be turned back? Launch when weather
allows and airspace is hot. Schedule is both slipped and compressed to
keep training flow and meet required completions dates.

Flight aborts because of maintenance problems. Beak B is now empty but
A and C remain "hot". Should GA aircraft be cleared through B or
should airspace remain blocked for fifteen minute late launch of
flight? Scheduled A/G mission cancelled because of unavailability of
properly configured aircraft. Add-on to schedule with available
aircraft to fly A/A sortie. Schedule flexes again.


In your experience in the USAF who did the actual coordination with the
FAA? In my experience it was a group at a numbered AF HQ, and the time
it took for unit-level schedule changes to make it up to the HQ and hit
the FAA caused a long delay,
with the flying unit assuming that the airspace coordination had been
done when it may or may not have actually occurred, which resulted in
aircraft on MTRs that supposedly were cold, unanticipated arrivals on
ranges, multiple units using the same MTR, etc.
We kept track of specific flight schedules via the frag orders, which
sometimes matched reality and sometimes not. We had a continual
problem with weekend use of MTRs when schedules changed but the USAF
had nobody on duty on Saturday/Sunday coordinating with the FAA in the
region where I worked.


John Hairell )

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:08:14 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence.

Which factor is that?

If you draw the MTR with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to
create routes that would be meet training requirements and allow for
reasonably unhindered GA traffic.

That seemed obvious to me.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs.

Agreed. Are you saying there is a requirement for ATC to have radar
coverage of all R airspace? Or are you saying, that if the military
is going to shoulder responsibility for the hazard to air safety their
high-speed, low-level operations create, it would require ATC radar
coverage?

ATC had perfectly good radar coverage in Florida, but it didn't
prevent the MAC. And the Cessna pilot was found to have been
partially responsible as a result of being incapable of avoiding at
the speeds involved.

They won't be able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part
of the GA pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at
those altitudes.

First, I never indicated that GA should have 'no responsibility'; I
said the military should bear sole legal responsibility for the
hazards it poses to air safety as a result of operating under its
exemption to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' feet.

Next, There would be no necessity for the military to take sole
responsibility as mentioned above, if they were operating in Class R
airspace (unless they failed to schedule it with ATC/FSS).

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance [sic] maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

[Mitigate: to cause to become less harsh or hostile]

Not being familiar with those operations, I ask, would it be feasible
to conduct those operations above 10,000'? If not, why not?

I presume formation repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers,
simulated armed reconnaissance maneuvering and simulated weapons
delivery maneuvers and re-attacks may require larger lateral, and
perhaps vertical, boundaries than are currently provided by MTRs. Is
that correct?

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

We disagree about that. (And you have evaded the question.)


Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military)

The Flying Tigers were a civilian group. Anyone who thinks the Flying
Tigers were not fighter pilots is uninformed and/or delusional.

My skill level was generally above the majority.

Right. So using your own personal experiences as examples in this
discussion is atypical of most military pilots, by your own admission.

[...] therefore the exemption of the 250 knot restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

You'll find it impossible to locate a single instance in which I
advocated operating an aircraft below its safe minimum speed.

My issue is the operation in excess of the 250 knot speed limit in
joint use airspace, and the hazard it causes to civil aviation.


Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

I am able to hold my breath for 1.5 minutes. Other's have done so
recently for nearly 9 minutes.

Of course, fast-movers operate in excess of 250 knots, and the
equation does not consider head-on situations as occurred in Florida.
The closing speed was 480 knots in that instance, which works out to a
little over 19 seconds to visually identify the conflicting traffic at
3 statute miles, decide to take evasive action, and have the aircraft
clear of the path of impact.


These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

Okay. Four seconds to make the decision to take evasive action, and a
couple of seconds to input control commands and for the aircraft to
actually clear the path, that leaves 13 seconds to visually identify
the head-on traffic at 3 statute miles in minimum VMC.

Now, if you consider a fighter at 300 knots approaching a 250 knot
airliner head on, the closure rate would be 550 knots permitting only
17 seconds until impact. Subtracting six seconds for decision and
maneuvering, leaves 11 seconds to visually identify the threat. That's
precious little time to see-and-avoid in single pilot operations.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!


[Ah. Invective and deprecation: the last refuge of the unarmed. Are
you aware of how such loss of civility diminishes any respect you may
have had? I don't expect you capable of apologizing. Disappointing.]

Operators are not skilled in the disciplines of engineering. Operators
have a vested interest in the decisions. Engineers use objective
calculations to discover system limitations, not necessity nor emotion
to arrive at unrealistic conclusions.

--

DISCLAIMER If you find a posting or message from me
offensive, inappropriate, or disruptive, please ignore it.
If you don't know how to ignore a posting, complain to
me and I will be only too happy to demonstrate... ;-)
--

Larry Dighera wrote:

So you're saying ATC doesn't grant permission to enter R airspace, and
it is up to the pilot to enter or not based on ATC's information
regarding scheduled activity within it? There's no _clearance_
involved then?


I'm saying ATC doesn't grant permission to enter Restricted Areas when
they're not hot. Have you ever asked ATC for permission to enter a
Restricred Area you knew to be inactive? If so, why?



Given:

http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/Chap3/aim0304.html#3-4-3
Section 4. Special Use Airspace
3-4-3. Restricted Areas
Penetration of restricted areas without authorization from the
using or controlling agency may be extremely hazardous to the
aircraft and its occupants.

It would seem that a pilot would require authorization from the
controlling agency (usually ATC) if not a clearance.


It would seem that paragraph refers to a Restricted Area that is hot.