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#171
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![]() "Mxsmanic" wrote Yes. As a general rule, automation systems greatly reduce situational awareness. That is EXACTLY opposite from what is the truth. Automation in the cockpits allows the pilot to MONITOR the systems, and reduce the workload to a point where MONITORING the systems may be done accurately. Pleas notice the word MONITOR. That is what the pilot does, while automation is running. How does he monitor the FADEC? (that is the subject, remember) He looks at instruments such as fuel flow, cylinder head temperature, and whatever the particular FADEC system has, that indicates it its healthy, and running properly. Once again, you have shown the group that you do not understand the subject of real airplane systems, post un-truths, and are a troll. -- Jim in NC |
#172
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![]() Morgans wrote: How about this one? MX: As an autopilot moves the ailerons of an aircraft to maintain heading and attitude, Humm. Ailerons control altitude? Must be a delta wing plane. You may want to read both sentences again. |
#173
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Greg Farris writes:
You wouldn't believe the mechanical complexity of gerbils. Unless one interacts with them in unusual ways, their complexity is not of great importance. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#174
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Newps writes:
You may want to read both sentences again. Too late. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#175
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![]() "B A R R Y" wrote Of course, folks arguing about trolling is exactly what many trolls seek. True. It is unfortunate to have to do as I am, but necessary to show everyone his true colors. I ignore what I see as trolling and answer what may be useful to others. That is the behavior that enables him to continue his presence here. While you are answering him, even if it is information that others find useful, he will continue to post. Surely you can see that is undesireable. -- Jim in NC |
#176
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Greg Farris wrote:
In article om, says... The most famous of all, the Airbus "low pass" at the French air show, when the FADEC throttles refused to power up (thinking the plane was landing) and the plane settled into the trees. It is anything but demonstrated that the aircraft systems did anything unexpected in this accident. The pilot tried to make this claim at the outset, but ended up being saddled with responsibility for his show-off manoeuver. The official result of the investigation is that it was the pilot's fault, and the aircraft has been exonerated of any failure. LOL. If you believe official investigations all the time, then I've got a bridge for you. Of course the pilot was blamed. But they changed the software afterwards, and Airbus officials had this to say: "Until the crash, there was a genuine psychology around Airbus that it had designed a crash-proof airplane because of the hard protections. The repercussions from that accident continue to reverberate," Not a bug per se, but certainly poor software planning and it resulted in changes in fly by wire thinking. Much more to change thinking on matters of pilot training. the claim of "poor software planning" is unsubstantiated. Hardly wry grin. The pilot did what he was told to do, but had two hits against him. First, he was told to fly by at 100'. He did so, not knowing that Airbus had a bug in the Atlimeter software, and he was really at 30'. This screwed him, since he also didn't know that Airbus had issued an bulletin the month before the crash, stating that the engines sometimes didn't respond to throttles at low altitudes. The pilots had not gotten the notice yet. The engine software was modified after the crash. Kev |
#177
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Morgans writes:
That is EXACTLY opposite from what is the truth. Unfortunately, no, it is not. Each automation system removes some aspect of the pilot workload. An unavoidable consequence of this is that the pilot is also allowed to lose awareness of the aspect that has been removed (if he were not, there'd be no point in the automation). Automation in the cockpits allows the pilot to MONITOR the systems ... He could do that already, when he was flying the plane himself. And automation does not require monitoring; that's why it is called automation. And if it did require monitoring, it would serve no purpose. The purpose of automation is to make things automatic--that is, to remove the need for monitoring and intervention. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#178
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![]() "Mxsmanic" wrote Both are forms of automation that can reduce situational awareness. False. Situational awarness is increased, by the use of automation. But there doesn't have to be a problem with the systems. You can lose situational awareness when they are operating perfectly. Indeed, that's the situation in which you are most likely to lose situational awareness. Where are you getting this nonsense? Cite, please? Without that, utter bull. -- Jim in NC |
#179
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Morgans writes:
How about this one? MX: As an autopilot moves the ailerons of an aircraft to maintain heading and attitude, Humm. Ailerons control altitude? Must be a delta wing plane. g If you'll look more carefully at the text you just quoted yourself, you'll see that I said "attitude," not "altitude." Ailerons are among the control surfaces that control aircraft attitude. Altitude is controlled mainly by propulsive thrust, but autopilots can maintain it within a more limited range through the adjustment of elevator control surfaces. Amazing. It is indeed ... but not in the way that you think. It certainly makes me smile. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#180
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Of course, neither setup can prevent a sudden cylinder failure, or oil
pump, or fuel pump, or vacuum pump, or other such mechanical commonality. Note, however, that digital systems are _far_ more likely to react to unexpected events in a very extreme way. An oil-pump failure can cause a catastrophic system failure almost instantly if the digital system isn't designed to take into account the possibility of an oil-pump failure. Utter nonsense. Tell us, how a oil pump failure is made worse, with FADEC? Explain how FADEC could be made to take into account a oil pump failure, or how not having FADEC makes the oil pump failure any better of a situation. You are making things up as you go, now. But that is what a troll does. -- Jim in NC |
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