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#11
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Greg Farris writes:
Most importantly, the fly-by-wire did not "lock up" - and the plane did not "think" it was landing and prevent the application of TOGA power. The accident was classic pilot error, no fault was found with the FBW system... Since the flight recorders were tampered with, all conclusions concerning that flight are suspect. Furthermore, if the FBW system were truly as reliable as Airbus claims, the aircraft would never have crashed--the computers would have prevented it. Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the computers, which means that this crash must have been a computer-generated crash no matter how you look at it. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#12
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In article . com,
says... The relevant section is at the end. The "relevant section" is not in this article - or in much of anything published by this Seattle-based newspaper aviation authority. I wouldn't question his objectivity, even though he is the author of this article : Aggressive sales style helps Boeing soar past Airbus in new orders http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/busine...ecovery13.html in 1995 - the third consecutive year in which Airbus sales surpassed Boeing, and notwithstanding the fact that a Google serach on his name reveals a litany of strident Airbus-bashing... And I wouldn't question his knowledge of the subject - I' sure it is simply time and space constraints which prevent him from revealing any of the vast technical references he surely holds which would support his claims... Things get a little stickier though when he claims that that version of A320 had a "landing mode" which completely precluded the pilot from making a recovery - when newspaper reporters publish demonstrably false statements it just takes some of the shine off - for me anyway... Planes equipped for CATIIIc approaches have a "land" mode, which when engaged is 'expected' to terminate in an autoland prodecure. Aside the fact that this was not the case (or anything close to it) for the Airbus in question, does anyone here really believe that Airbus or Boeing would make a plane that "decides" to land and "cannot" be over-ridden by pilot action? Kev, please be clear - is this what you're asking us to believe? In sum - the reality is clear. The thing has NSA written all over it! It's clear the plane was being controlled from OUTSIDE (possibly from as far away as Washington) and was deliberately crashed to discredit Airbus. The only failure was that the pilot was not expected to survive - since he did, they had to get to work fast on the flight recorders so they could diecredit him as well. |
#13
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In article ,
says... Anyone remember the details??? FROM AIRLINERS.NET : The Air France A320 that was written off at Habsheim was being operated on a public transport flight by Air France at the time of the crash. The aircraft had been used in flight testing, but had been delivered to Air France several days before the accident, and was involved in a promotional flight when it crashed. The A320 was in service operating revenue flights at the time of the accident, F-CFKC was in fact Air France's 3rd A320. Most importantly, the fly-by-wire did not "lock up" - and the plane did not "think" it was landing and prevent the application of TOGA power. The accident was classic pilot error, no fault was found with the FBW system... Some findings of the accident investigation: • The captain had participated as Air France's technical pilot in developmental test flying on the A320, during which manoeuvres were carried out beyond the normal operational limitations. This could have lead to overconfidence in the systems of the new aircraft. • The flight had only been briefly prepared, without real consultation between the departments (of Air France) concerned, or with the crew. • Descent was started 5.5nm from the aerodrome. Throughout the descent, the engines were throttled back to flight idle with the airspeed reducing. • At 1000ft AGL the rate of descent was still ~600fpm. • The captain levelled off at a height of ~30ft, engines at flight idle, pitch attitude increasing. He did not have time to stabilise the angle of attack at the maximum value he had selected. • Full-power was rapidly applied when the angle of attack was 15° and the airspeed 122kt. • The response of the engines was normal, and in compliance with their certification. The cause: • The accident resulted from a combination of the following; • Flyover height lower than surrounding obstacles (Flown at 30ft against the planned 100ft) • Slow speed, reducing to reach maximum angle of attack • Engines at flight idle • Late application of go-around power In summary the crew flew the aircraft onto the wrong side of the drag curve in a critical situation overflying a very small grass strip with trees above the height of the aircraft off the end of the runway, the aircraft was low, slow and at a high angle of attack - there was no residual energy to get them out of trouble. It's a basic lesson in flying, and the A320 was found to have actually exceeded it's certified performance once TOGA power was selected. The crew had been briefed to overfly the concrerte runway 02/20 at 100ft, but unknown to them the airshow was alligned along grass strip runway 16/34. The crew were unaware of this until descending through 200ft, 24 seconds before the accident, at which time they had to chose to reposition the aircraft to conduct an overflight they had not briefed for over runway 16/34 as the height decayed to 30ft and the airspeed to 122kt... If you want some information on some of the conflicting theories, you can find it here : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_theory |
#14
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Greg,
It's clear the plane was being controlled from OUTSIDE It must have been an early test of the 9/11 system. -- Thomas Borchert (EDDH) |
#15
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Mxsmanic,
Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the computers, Once again, you haven't the slightest clue what you are talking about. -- Thomas Borchert (EDDH) |
#16
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Thomas Borchert writes:
Once again, you haven't the slightest clue what you are talking about. I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#17
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Mxsmanic,
I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft. And the quote is where in Airbus literature? Point me to it. It's the fifth or so time I ask you to back a statement up with facts. Come on, surprise me. -- Thomas Borchert (EDDH) |
#18
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![]() Danny Dot wrote: In about 1990 Airbus did low pass at the Paris airshow and lost the plane. I recall it had something to do with the throttle software thinking the pilots were in landing mode and "refused" to go to high power for the go-around. Yes, the computers did think the pilot was landing, but the crash was caused by his being too low and slow. (See other posts for more info on the latter.) The Airbus software has modes where its flight control computer laws are quite different. Some of those computer laws are divided into Ground, Flight and Landing (Flare) phases. One claim is that he was trying to demonstrate that the airplane was unstallable. He had reportedly done this demonstration several times before at a slightly higher altitude, and it had always worked. Why? Because the Airbus has what's known as Alpha Protection (pitch related) and Alpha Floor (thrust related). Too little thrust, at too high an angle of attack (AOA), and its computers automatically kick in and override the pilot. The reason the automatic protection didn't work this time was because he went below 100', so the computers switched to Landing Mode. That doesn't mean they do an autoland. It means they think the pilot is landing the plane and their rules change. The Alpha Floor is disabled so that a landing is possible at all. By the time the pilot advanced the throttles himself, it was too late. In addition, another Landing Mode kicks in when the Bus passes below 50' going down to 30', as he did. The computer starts changing the stick reference for landing, so that if you have the stick pulled back', that position soon becomes the neutral spot. This is supposed to force the pilot to pull back more for flaring. Regards, Kev Easy Reading Version of Airbus Flight Control Laws (for Pitch Mostly) http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm Airbus Training Details with couple of pages on Laws http://www.chipsplace.com/helpful/Ai...320TOC.htm#TOC FAA Special Regs Example for Laws Feedback http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/do...r01jy02-3.html Interesting incidents: .... AOA protect problem (caused constant pitch up with resultant TCAS alert) http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...pdf_501275.pdf .... AOA protect system stopped nose-up for go-around and allowed aircraft to hit runway .... Afterwards, the rate-of-AOA-change logic was removed from the software http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=20010207-0 |
#19
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Thomas Borchert wrote:
Mxsmanic, [Airbus software can't be overridden by pilots] I'm going by what Airbus says about their own aircraft. And the quote is where in Airbus literature? Point me to it. It's the fifth or so time I ask you to back a statement up with facts. Come on, surprise me. Woof. You both make statements but neither of you give evidence to support your comments. You're both right and you're both wrong. In most cases the pilot cannot override the Airbus software. For example, a pilot is _not_ allowed to roll the aircraft, nor exceed certain AOAs (up or down). In some cases however the pilot can hold the stick or hold down a disconnect button and request the computers to give up some of their authority (but never all). See my other posting in this thread for links that you're both obviously too lazy to find on your own. (Come on people, do a little research before spouting off ;-) Kev |
#20
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Kev,
You both make statements but neither of you give evidence to support your comments. Which of my statements would that be? Come on. Your well-informed posts show that you know better. MX's statement read: "Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the computers". That's utter BS, as your posts and the links you provide nicely show. All I did was ask for a source where Airbus says: "Airbus aircraft don't allow pilots to override the computers", as he claimed there is. He couldn't provide it. -- Thomas Borchert (EDDH) |
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