Critique of: Crash Risk in General Aviation

Andrew Sarangan writes:

Well in that case their expertise should be in physiological aspects
of aviation. How did they get into the operational aspects?

I don't know. At least one of them is a pilot (Baker, I think), but that's
all I know.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Larry Dighera wrote:

What would it take to get you to shoulder that task?

....for me to finish my taxes and complete some stuff for work with
an April 16th deadline; then, I'll go through the thread and find the
references/email addresses, and find the references of the papers
in question.

--Sylvain

"swag" wrote in message
ups.com...
On Apr 14, 6:00 am, "Viperdoc" wrote:
" Apparently you must be a JAMA member to see it, which is a bit
odd, since it was apparently produced with public funds."

JAMA is a journal, you moron. The organization is the American Medical
association.

One of your early teachers must have taught you the fine art of using
invectives to make your statements stronger and diminish your
opponents. We all owe her an eternal debt of gratitude.

You must be new here.

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
In article ,
Larry Dighera wrote:

Below is a first draft of my critique of this report. Any
suggestions, error corrections, or other critique is welcome.

Discussion of these two points might allow for a more succint
reply than a point-by-point discussion of the numerous flaws
in the "research"

It is interesting to note that the very type of pilot and flying these
"researchers" are "studying" has been promoted by the FAA and
industry. Specifically, the Recreational Pilot.

Another problem with this "research" is that it doesn't address
what would be an acceptable level of risk. It paints GA as unsafe
because it's not as safe as airline flying, which is basically one
of the safest modes of transportation. What IS safe enough?

--
Bob Noel
(goodness, please trim replies!!!)

I have nothing to back this up, but I fail to see any special virtue in a
succinct reply; unless the objective is to have a "Letter To the Editor"
printed, and I doubt that is available.

Peter

:
: GA is a public safety concern only to those who exercise their right
: to risk their personal wellbeing of their own free volition, much as
: today's volunteer soldier does. If the good doctor is able to suggest
: _viable_ solutions to the fatal accident causes he cites, I fully
: support and applaud his contribution. But I am skeptical. It would
: seem, that if no further safety enhancements have been
: discovered/implemented to reduce the GA fatality rate in decades, it
: is unlikely that they can be found and implemented.
:

I just went through the FITS program intro yesterday (http://www.faa.gov/education_research/training/fits/). It
describes a scenario based flight instruction syllabus as opposed to a maneuver based syllabus. Most accidents in
aviation, especially GA, are the result of pilot error. This FITS approach attempts to modify decision making to steer
the pilot towards a less risky outcome. It was a good program, but the data are tentative,,,

On Sun, 15 Apr 2007 09:16:00 -0400, "Blueskies"
wrote in
:


I just went through the FITS program intro yesterday (http://www.faa.gov/education_research/training/fits/). It
describes a scenario based flight instruction syllabus as opposed to a maneuver based syllabus.

FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS)
All FITS products are non-regulatory and incentive driven. FITS is
focused on the redesign of general aviation training. Instead of
training pilots to pass practical test, FITS focuses on expertly
manage real-world challenges. Scenario based training is used to
enhance the GA pilots’ aeronautical decision making, risk
management, and single pilot resource management skills. We do
this without compromising basic stick and rudder skills.


Presenting maneuvers in context sounds like a step in the right
direction. I've often thought, that there needs to be more emphasis
on the pilot's role in various situations, particularly with regard to
social pressure's influence on the PIC's decision making process.

Most accidents in aviation, especially GA, are the result of pilot error.
This FITS approach attempts to modify decision making to steer
the pilot towards a less risky outcome. It was a good program, but the data are tentative,,,


It's always good to see improvement of age-old techniques.

Thanks for the information. I'll work it into my critique.

On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 14:29:16 -0700, Sylvain wrote in
:

Larry Dighera wrote:

What would it take to get you to shoulder that task?

...for me to finish my taxes and complete some stuff for work with
an April 16th deadline; then, I'll go through the thread and find the
references/email addresses, and find the references of the papers
in question.

--Sylvain

Many thanks.

Here are the JHU researchers' e-mail addresses:

Guohua Li, MD, DrPH:
Susan P. Baker, MPH:

On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 08:34:59 -0500, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

Below is a first draft of my critique of this report. Any
suggestions, error corrections, or other critique is welcome.
=====================================

While I understand the importance of a response to this kind of article, I
think that it can be attacked on a more basic level. In my opinion, it is
flawed in its purpose, as it poses a problem that is miniscule in
comparison to other activities of the general public. For example, an
annual average of 583 fatalities in GA doesn't approach the weekly
fatalities for driving an automobile. If reducing accidental death is the
issue that makes this study important, it is a total waste of resources to
focus on GA.

That seems a valid point to me. Many thanks for your input.

To address your response, I would suggest that your language in places
consitutes the kind of emotional response that you criticize in the
report. For example:

Crash Rates
Civilian aviation generally can be divided into 2 groups:
commercial and noncommercial flights.2 Commercial flights
transport individuals and goods to generate revenue; they include
operations of major airlines, commuter air carriers, and air
taxis. Noncommercial flights, usually called general aviation,
encompass a wide array of activities-emergency medical services
(EMS), sightseeing, flight training, traffic reporting, aerial
surveys, search and rescue, crop dusting, firefighting, logging,
recreation, and personal or business use. General aviation
aircraft range from small private airplanes and business jets to
helicopters, hot-air balloons, and gliders.

[This paragraph reveals the researchers' lack of understanding of the
definition of General Aviation. Air Taxi, pipe-line and power-line
patrol, crop dusting, and air charter flights all generate revenue,
are piloted by airmen holding FAA Commercial or Airline Transport
Pilot certificates, and they are all General Aviation operations. In
fact, other than military aviation operations and airline (Code of
Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 121) operations, all aviation
operations are classified under the General Aviation designation. To
assert that medical rescue helicopter ambulance services, flight
training, traffic reporting, aerial surveys, and crop dusting are
noncommercial is ridiculous.]

Perhaps it would be better to leave off the last sentence, thus the
paragraph would more strongly support your opening contention that the
researchers lack an understanding of the definition of GA.

I fail to discern the emotional aspect of my response that you cite.
Vehement perhaps, but factual none the less.

I also don't understand why you would want to contribute to the misguided
effort of this report by rationalizing the comparison between GA and
commercial activities.

I don't think I've done that. In the portions of my rebuttal you have
cited above, I've attempted to show that the JHU authors words reveal
their misunderstanding of the term General Aviation.

It is probably true that any comparison between
general public activities and commercial activities would show similar
results. I would expect that there are fewer annual fatalities from riding
buses than from driving cars, fewer deaths in chauferred limosines, fewer
commercial truck fatalities than personal truck fatalities, fewer
motorcycle racing deaths than personal motocycle deaths, fewer Navy Seal
deaths than recreational SCUBA deaths, etc. In short, the report's
conclusion is a no-brainer that didn't deserve the expenditure of public
monies, and doesn't enlighten the reader in any meaningful way. It is
purely alarmist, and IMO should be exposed as such.

As you stated in the opening of your follow up article, it's flawed in
its purpose due to it's concern with a low priority issue by
comparison to activities with higher fatality rates.

I suspect that the underlying issue is that bad decision making is
dangerous, regardless of the activity. IMO, shifting the focus from bad
decision making to mechanical or structural concerns misses the point.
And, again, let's not lose sight of the maginitude of this problem; 583
annual deaths is likely less than deaths from any other activity of the
general public. If the purpose is to save lives, GA should be pretty far
down the list of priorities.


Agreed. Thank you for your input.

On Sat, 14 Apr 2007 01:05:35 -0000, Jim Logajan
wrote in :

For what it is worth, my feedback on your proposed response:

Larry Dighera wrote:
For pilots without instrument training, flying from visual flight
rules into instrument meteorological conditions is a perilous
scenario.

[There are a miniscule number of airmen who hold FAA certificates,
that have not received any instrument training; instrument training is
not required to obtain a Glider certificate. The phrase the
researchers probably meant to use was 'instrument rating' not
'instrument training.'

Regardless, it is true that the average life expectancy of a pilot who
is not instrument rated and qualified (recent experience) is a bit
over a minute when unintentionally finding himself in a cloud that
totally obscures his outside reference.]

I think a more appropriate rebuttal here is that other sources, such as
the annual Nall Report, find that in 2005 weather related accidents
accounted for only about 11% of all fatal GA accidents. By comparison,
Nall claims 27% of fatal GA accidents in 2005 are due to pilot control
errors during what it calls "maneuvering flight." Therefore the emphasis
on VFR into VMC and lack of mention of "maneuvering flight" by the
researchers as a causal factor is an improper inversion of priorities.

Thank you for your insight and the source reference. I'll add your
point to my critique.

What is your feeling about my disclosing the hazard statistic for VFR
into IMC for un-rated/not-current pilots?


In 1990, the FAA amended regulations regarding background checks
on pilots for alcohol-related motor vehicle convictions, requiring
pilots to provide a written report of each alcohol-related traffic
offense within 60 days of the conviction. Flying privileges can be
suspended or revoked if a pilot has had 2 or more convictions for
driving under the influence in the past 3 years. A recent cohort
study indicated that a history of driving while intoxicated is a
valid risk marker for general aviation pilots. After adjusting for
age, sex, and flight experience, the study showed that a history
of driving while intoxicated was associated with a 43% increased
risk of aviation crash involvement.12 Following intensive research
and interventions, the proportion of alcohol involvement in fatal
general aviation crashes has decreased progressively from more
than 30% in the early 1960s to about 8% today.13

I think a rebuttal may be approprihere might be:
[The 2006 Nall Report found that alcohol and drugs account for only about
1.1% of all accidents in the past few years. This is again an inversion
of causal priorities and places an improper emphasis on a minor causative
factor. Further efforts and analysis on reducing alcohol and drug related
aviation accidents is misguided effort that is better spent elsewhere.]


Another good point. Thank you.

[A pilot who flies without the use of shoulder restraint belts is a
fool.

It is curious that the researchers failed to mention ballistic
parachute recovery systems like those currently mandated for the
recently FAA certified Cirrus aircraft.]

I don't think you can properly claim the FAA mandated the Cirrus BRS.


You may be correct. It is my understanding that Cirrus chose the BRS
to comply with spin recovery certification. I suppose that was
Cirrus's choice of an alternate compliance method, not an FAA mandate.
I'll try to rephrase it.


The general aviation crash fatality rate has remained at about 19%
for the past 20 years while the overall airline crash fatality
rate has declined from 16% from 1986 through 1995 to 6% from 1996
through 2005.4,24

[Due to the reduction in airline operations due to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, increased airport security, and general
decline in airline ticket sales, that statistic may be misleading.]

Their statistics look okay to me, though I'm not sure where they get the
6%. From their two NTSB references, out of 34 accidents listed for CFR
121 carriers, 3 had fatalities (~9%) and out of 1669 GA accidents, 321
had fatalities (~19%). Averaging over the last several N years may yield
~6%. Maybe they did that.

The point I was attempting to make, was that during the sample period
cited airline travel was diminished by the 9/11 influence, and that as
a result, it is reasonable to expect the number of airline fatalities
to be less than it was during a period of higher airline travel rates.
Am I mission your point?


The higher fatality rate for general aviation crashes may be
because such aircraft are not as able to withstand impact forces
and protect occupants from death and severe injury as commercial
aircraft are.

[A more robust airframe requires increased weight. There is a
tradeoff of safety for performance.]

Another objection would be that the difference in rates may be due to the
nature of the accidents the two classes of flights encounter. Having two
experienced pilots on board would almost certainly skew where and when
accidents take place such that the impacts on the airframes are not
comparable.


True.


In recent decades, while major airlines have improved seat
strength, revised exit row configurations, and used more fire
retardant materials, few improvements have been made in general
aviation aircraft, in part, because federal regulations only
require safety improvements for entirely new aircraft models. A
corresponding policy for automobiles would have meant that
Volkswagen Beetles could have been sold without seatbelts for
decades after federal regulation required them in all new cars.

[The Volkswagen analogy is flawed. The ubiquitous Cessna 172 aircraft
have had should restraints for decades despite their first being FAA
certified in the 1950s.]

Typo: "shoulder restraints" not "should restraints".


Thank you. I'm sure there are others too.

To improve the safety of general aviation, interventions are
needed to improve fuel system integrity and restraint systems,
enhance general crashworthiness of small aircraft,

Those are only viable measures if their added weight and cost do not
so negatively impact aircraft performance and affordability so as to
render General Aviation operations impractical.]

Furthermore, restraints systems in many small aircraft are already
superior to those found on airlines.

Ummm. I don't recall seeing any shoulder restraints on airline
seating.

Thank you for your input. It really helps to have other points of
view.

Recently, Larry Dighera asked:

What is your feeling about my disclosing the hazard statistic for VFR
into IMC for un-rated/not-current pilots?

As a response to the JAMA article, I would think it is of limited value.
As mentioned in my other reply, the underlying issue is bad decision
making. Truly accidental VFR into IMC should be a rarity, and there few
valid excuses for continuing into IMC while under VFR (I can't think of
one, but allowing for the possibility that someone else can).

If one sets out in weather that is so marginal, good decision making would
dictate having an "out" should the weather degenerate into IMC. The "out"
that VFR pilots are taught for accidental entry into IMC is the standard
180° turn to exit the IMC. Of course, that presumes that such a turn will
get you out of the IMC, which may not be the case if the IMC pops up all
around you. However, such a circumstance should be extremely rare, and the
conditions that could lead to that event is typically knowable prior to
takeoff. I'm sure you can see my bent... most of the fatal GA accidents
are the result of bad decisions, and the statistics clearly support that
notion.

Neil