Just push the blue button!

On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:45:48 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:08:06 GMT, Mike wrote:

At the time of the accident, John-John was training to get his instrument
ticket and he had flown in IMC with an instructor at night. Although he
wasn't ready for his checkride, he also wasn't completely ignorant of
IFR.
Clearly he was a victim of spatial disorientation, which certainly can
happen at night, but that particular night he had at least some
moonlight.
That's why I think he probably got into a bit of IMC and lost it before
the
crash. I think it would have taken more than just a bit of haze to trip
him
up.

He couldn't multi-task and was in MT overload adding spatial
disorientation, pitiful pre-flight and a bad foot. He screwed the pooch
when he failed to redirect his bank prior to pitch, spiral city.

His CFIs should have picked up on this MT thing..perhaps.

They did.

"The CFI stated that the pilot's basic instrument flying skills and
simulator work were excellent. However, the CFI stated that the pilot had
trouble managing multiple tasks while flying, which he felt was normal for
the pilot's level of experience."

Hmmmm, 300 hours dual and still having this problem. It was his
decision, probably thinking that he could auto pilot most of the way. So
many majorly bad decisions.

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
Mike wrote:
but the question I would have for you was
why do you feel the burning desire to ask questions in which you are
already convinced of the answer?

You are making an invalid assumption. I merely asked if you (or
anyone)
had seen wx reports that the conditions were IMC. I was seeking
information. Please don't attempt to read more into the question
than that.

No, that's not what you asked. Go back and read it again.

To the contrary. It is what I asked. quote "hmmm, all the wx reports
I saw were legal VMC (not smart VMC, but still legal). Do you have
reference to reports that the conditions were not VMC?"

Not quite, Bob. The question you originally asked was:

"John-John was VFR to IMC?"

After you received my answer, you proceeded to answer it yourself. So the
real reason you asked it was simply to be argumentative. In other words,
CS. If you don't agree with my assertion, then provide your own references
and we can discuss it like two rational people. If you want to go down the
road of CS, then expect such to be noted.

To answer your latest question, yes I do.

One report:
"Another pilot had flown from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Long Island, New York,
and crossed the Long Island Sound on the same evening, about 1930. This
pilot stated that during his preflight weather briefing from an FSS, the
specialist indicated VMC for his flight. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan
and conducted the flight at 6,000 feet. He stated that he encountered
visibilities of 2 to 3 miles throughout the flight because of haze. He also
stated that the lowest visibility was over water, between Cape Cod,
Massachusetts, and eastern Long Island."

So here we have a pilot reporting IMC in the exact area and he goes on to
say the worst of it was over water. I put a high degree of reliability on
his estimate for a couple of reasons. One, his report came when there was
still daylight and he could better judge visibility. Two, he was IFR and
had no reason to overstate the visibility as a pilot of a VFR flight might.

Another pilot:
The pilot stated that he departed TEB "...in daylight and good flight
conditions and reasonable visibility. The horizon was not obscured by haze.
I could easily pick our land marks at least five [miles] away." The pilot
also stated that he did not request or receive flight information after his
departure from TEB. Once clear of the New York Class B airspace, he stated
that he climbed his airplane to 17,500 feet and proceeded towards Nantucket.
He reported that above 14,000 feet, the visibility was unrestricted;
however, he also reported that during his descent to Nantucket, when his
global positioning system (GPS) receiver indicated that he was over Martha's
Vineyard, he looked down and "...there was nothing to see. There was no
horizon and no light....I turned left toward Martha's Vineyard to see if it
was visible but could see no lights of any kind nor any evidence of the
island...I thought the island might [have] suffered a power failure."

So here we have another pilot who was flying over Martha's Vinyard on his
approach to ACK. It doesn't mention altitude, but he did say that he was on
his descent. So he was somewhere between 17,500 and probably around 12,000.
That's 2-3 miles up and he can't see the lights. There were no low level
clouds that night. That indicates the haze was very thick and visibilities
would have been very low in the haze layer.

The only other report comes from a pilot of a VFR flight (who almost
certainly isn't going to report visibilities of less than 3 miles) and even
he says he doesn't remember seeing the Gay Head lighthouse. Even his
estimation says it was "3-5 miles" which was right on the edge of IMC.

So what references do you have, Bob?

MVY might have been reporting VMC, but that was on the surface, over dry
land, and about 18 miles away from the crash site.

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:45:48 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:08:06 GMT, Mike wrote:

At the time of the accident, John-John was training to get his
instrument
ticket and he had flown in IMC with an instructor at night. Although
he
wasn't ready for his checkride, he also wasn't completely ignorant of
IFR.
Clearly he was a victim of spatial disorientation, which certainly can
happen at night, but that particular night he had at least some
moonlight.
That's why I think he probably got into a bit of IMC and lost it before
the
crash. I think it would have taken more than just a bit of haze to
trip
him
up.

He couldn't multi-task and was in MT overload adding spatial
disorientation, pitiful pre-flight and a bad foot. He screwed the pooch
when he failed to redirect his bank prior to pitch, spiral city.

His CFIs should have picked up on this MT thing..perhaps.

They did.

"The CFI stated that the pilot's basic instrument flying skills and
simulator work were excellent. However, the CFI stated that the pilot had
trouble managing multiple tasks while flying, which he felt was normal
for
the pilot's level of experience."

Hmmmm, 300 hours dual and still having this problem. It was his
decision, probably thinking that he could auto pilot most of the way. So
many majorly bad decisions.

1) He didn't have 300 hours of dual, but even if he did that would be mostly
irrelevant. You learn how to multitask better solo than you do with another
pilot on board.

2) What part of "...he felt was normal for the pilot's level of experience."
didn't you understand?

I've flown with plenty of 300 hour pilots who don't multitask well and some
of them had their instrument and commercial. I didn't multitask well at 300
hours. That's something you pick up with experience.

"Big John" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 19:53:05 GMT, "Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com
wrote:

"Tech Support" wrote in message
. ..
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 21:28:05 -0400, "Darkwing"
theducksmail"AT"yahoo.com wrote:

Cirrus has added a new auto level button on their latest planes. Will a
button on the stick that you push to automatically reset the plane to
straight and level make any difference on Cirrus accidents or is it just
a
gimmick? What say you?
************************************************** ***********

Darkwing

I'm told that some of the latest Fighters have a sensor that detects
if the pilot blacks out due to the high 'G's' the newest fighters can
pull and hold and that it returns the aircraft to level flight at
cruise power settings, automatically.

I know of several accidents that would have been prevented if that
system had been in plane as the performance of Fighters increased and
they could hold sustained high "G's" at structural limit.

The F-20, two of which were lost due to, "G" induced pilot
incapacitation.

First was at Goose Bay, Labrador. Bird was on way to Paris Air Show
and pilot went up to practice his show routine. After some maneuvers
bird flew into ground in a long shallow glide angle and accident
report cited pilot blackout as cause.

The second was in Korea when a Koran General was being given a demo
ride. Same thing and two more fatalities.

The last, of three built, was given to the Air and Space Gallery in
LA when Air Force and overseas sales did not materialize and F-16 was
bought instead. Politics was involved as the F-20 out classed F-16 in
many respects.

Big John

That's rather like comparing a formula one race car to the family sedan
and
saying what is a great idea for one is automatically a great idea for the
other.

It very well may be a great idea, but you certainly can't justify it using
a
military aircraft as an example. There's not too many Cirrus pilots who
are
likely to experience a G induced blackout, and even if they did they
probably will have bigger problems to worry about anyway.
************************************************** *****

Mike

Sorry. Didn't mean to advocate putting a military system in Ga but
original question was about a blue button that would recover Cirrus
aircraft. My post was to show that a system was in operation that
would do it in heavy iron (either automatically or pilot activated) so
technology is there.

Big John

The technology is certainly available. As I said previously, Diamond had it
years before Cirrus. I don't consider it a bad idea. The cost is low
because it's really not much more than an additional function added to the
autopilot. The question the OP asked is a hard one to answer. Even if it's
actually saved someone's bacon, I doubt too many are going to report back
with that information.

"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
Mike wrote:
but the question I would have for you was
why do you feel the burning desire to ask questions in which you
are already convinced of the answer?

You are making an invalid assumption. I merely asked if you (or
anyone)
had seen wx reports that the conditions were IMC. I was seeking
information. Please don't attempt to read more into the question
than that.

No, that's not what you asked. Go back and read it again.

To the contrary. It is what I asked. quote "hmmm, all the wx
reports I saw were legal VMC (not smart VMC, but still legal). Do
you have reference to reports that the conditions were not VMC?"

Not quite, Bob. The question you originally asked was:

"John-John was VFR to IMC?"

After you received my answer, you proceeded to answer it yourself. So
the real reason you asked it was simply to be argumentative. In other
words, CS. If you don't agree with my assertion, then provide your
own references and we can discuss it like two rational people. If you
want to go down the road of CS, then expect such to be noted.

To answer your latest question, yes I do.

One report:
"Another pilot had flown from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Long Island, New
York, and crossed the Long Island Sound on the same evening, about
1930. This pilot stated that during his preflight weather briefing
from an FSS, the specialist indicated VMC for his flight. The pilot
filed an IFR flight plan and conducted the flight at 6,000 feet. He
stated that he encountered visibilities of 2 to 3 miles throughout the
flight because of haze. He also stated that the lowest visibility was
over water, between Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and eastern Long Island."

So here we have a pilot reporting IMC in the exact area and he goes on
to say the worst of it was over water. I put a high degree of
reliability on his estimate for a couple of reasons. One, his report
came when there was still daylight and he could better judge
visibility. Two, he was IFR and had no reason to overstate the
visibility as a pilot of a VFR flight might.

Another pilot:
The pilot stated that he departed TEB "...in daylight and good flight
conditions and reasonable visibility. The horizon was not obscured by
haze. I could easily pick our land marks at least five [miles] away."
The pilot also stated that he did not request or receive flight
information after his departure from TEB. Once clear of the New York
Class B airspace, he stated that he climbed his airplane to 17,500
feet and proceeded towards Nantucket. He reported that above 14,000
feet, the visibility was unrestricted; however, he also reported that
during his descent to Nantucket, when his global positioning system
(GPS) receiver indicated that he was over Martha's Vineyard, he looked
down and "...there was nothing to see. There was no horizon and no
light....I turned left toward Martha's Vineyard to see if it was
visible but could see no lights of any kind nor any evidence of the
island...I thought the island might [have] suffered a power failure."

So here we have another pilot who was flying over Martha's Vinyard on
his approach to ACK. It doesn't mention altitude, but he did say that
he was on his descent. So he was somewhere between 17,500 and
probably around 12,000. That's 2-3 miles up and he can't see the
lights. There were no low level clouds that night. That indicates
the haze was very thick and visibilities would have been very low in
the haze layer.

The only other report comes from a pilot of a VFR flight (who almost
certainly isn't going to report visibilities of less than 3 miles) and
even he says he doesn't remember seeing the Gay Head lighthouse. Even
his estimation says it was "3-5 miles" which was right on the edge of
IMC.

So what references do you have, Bob?

MVY might have been reporting VMC, but that was on the surface, over
dry land, and about 18 miles away from the crash site.

The most likely problem was poor visibility, but the following suggests
that the haze might have been localized:

During an interview, the tower manager stated that no actions were taken
regarding the ASOS during his shift, which ended just after the accident
occurred. He also stated, "The visibility, present weather, and sky
condition at the approximate time of the accident was probably a little
better than what was being reported. I say this because I remember
aircraft on visual approaches saying they had the airport in sight
between 10 and 12 miles out. I do recall being able to see those aircraft
and I do remember seeing the stars out that night.... To the best of my
knowledge, the ASOS was working as advertised that day with no reported
problems or systems log errors."

"James Robinson" wrote in message
.. .
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
Mike wrote:
but the question I would have for you was
why do you feel the burning desire to ask questions in which you
are already convinced of the answer?

You are making an invalid assumption. I merely asked if you (or
anyone)
had seen wx reports that the conditions were IMC. I was seeking
information. Please don't attempt to read more into the question
than that.

No, that's not what you asked. Go back and read it again.

To the contrary. It is what I asked. quote "hmmm, all the wx
reports I saw were legal VMC (not smart VMC, but still legal). Do
you have reference to reports that the conditions were not VMC?"

Not quite, Bob. The question you originally asked was:

"John-John was VFR to IMC?"

After you received my answer, you proceeded to answer it yourself. So
the real reason you asked it was simply to be argumentative. In other
words, CS. If you don't agree with my assertion, then provide your
own references and we can discuss it like two rational people. If you
want to go down the road of CS, then expect such to be noted.

To answer your latest question, yes I do.

One report:
"Another pilot had flown from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Long Island, New
York, and crossed the Long Island Sound on the same evening, about
1930. This pilot stated that during his preflight weather briefing
from an FSS, the specialist indicated VMC for his flight. The pilot
filed an IFR flight plan and conducted the flight at 6,000 feet. He
stated that he encountered visibilities of 2 to 3 miles throughout the
flight because of haze. He also stated that the lowest visibility was
over water, between Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and eastern Long Island."

So here we have a pilot reporting IMC in the exact area and he goes on
to say the worst of it was over water. I put a high degree of
reliability on his estimate for a couple of reasons. One, his report
came when there was still daylight and he could better judge
visibility. Two, he was IFR and had no reason to overstate the
visibility as a pilot of a VFR flight might.

Another pilot:
The pilot stated that he departed TEB "...in daylight and good flight
conditions and reasonable visibility. The horizon was not obscured by
haze. I could easily pick our land marks at least five [miles] away."
The pilot also stated that he did not request or receive flight
information after his departure from TEB. Once clear of the New York
Class B airspace, he stated that he climbed his airplane to 17,500
feet and proceeded towards Nantucket. He reported that above 14,000
feet, the visibility was unrestricted; however, he also reported that
during his descent to Nantucket, when his global positioning system
(GPS) receiver indicated that he was over Martha's Vineyard, he looked
down and "...there was nothing to see. There was no horizon and no
light....I turned left toward Martha's Vineyard to see if it was
visible but could see no lights of any kind nor any evidence of the
island...I thought the island might [have] suffered a power failure."

So here we have another pilot who was flying over Martha's Vinyard on
his approach to ACK. It doesn't mention altitude, but he did say that
he was on his descent. So he was somewhere between 17,500 and
probably around 12,000. That's 2-3 miles up and he can't see the
lights. There were no low level clouds that night. That indicates
the haze was very thick and visibilities would have been very low in
the haze layer.

The only other report comes from a pilot of a VFR flight (who almost
certainly isn't going to report visibilities of less than 3 miles) and
even he says he doesn't remember seeing the Gay Head lighthouse. Even
his estimation says it was "3-5 miles" which was right on the edge of
IMC.

So what references do you have, Bob?

MVY might have been reporting VMC, but that was on the surface, over
dry land, and about 18 miles away from the crash site.

The most likely problem was poor visibility, but the following suggests
that the haze might have been localized:

During an interview, the tower manager stated that no actions were taken
regarding the ASOS during his shift, which ended just after the accident
occurred. He also stated, "The visibility, present weather, and sky
condition at the approximate time of the accident was probably a little
better than what was being reported. I say this because I remember
aircraft on visual approaches saying they had the airport in sight
between 10 and 12 miles out. I do recall being able to see those aircraft
and I do remember seeing the stars out that night.... To the best of my
knowledge, the ASOS was working as advertised that day with no reported
problems or systems log errors."

That's my point exactly. I have little doubt that visibilities were good at
the airport, but that doesn't mean they were good over the water. Kennedy
crashed about 18 miles away from the airport and there's little doubt his
problems started well before that. Judith point was actually about the same
distance to the crash site and Kennedy flew right over it on the way to MVY.

Point Judith, Rhode Island
2000...Cloudy, 3 miles visibility in haze, winds south-southwest at 10
knots.
2300...Cloudy, 2 miles visibility, winds southwest at 10 knots.

On Sun, 05 Oct 2008 18:32:59 GMT, "Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com
wrote:

"Big John" wrote in message
.. .
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 19:53:05 GMT, "Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com
wrote:

"Tech Support" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 21:28:05 -0400, "Darkwing"
theducksmail"AT"yahoo.com wrote:

Cirrus has added a new auto level button on their latest planes. Will a
button on the stick that you push to automatically reset the plane to
straight and level make any difference on Cirrus accidents or is it just
a
gimmick? What say you?
************************************************** ***********

Darkwing

I'm told that some of the latest Fighters have a sensor that detects
if the pilot blacks out due to the high 'G's' the newest fighters can
pull and hold and that it returns the aircraft to level flight at
cruise power settings, automatically.

I know of several accidents that would have been prevented if that
system had been in plane as the performance of Fighters increased and
they could hold sustained high "G's" at structural limit.

The F-20, two of which were lost due to, "G" induced pilot
incapacitation.

First was at Goose Bay, Labrador. Bird was on way to Paris Air Show
and pilot went up to practice his show routine. After some maneuvers
bird flew into ground in a long shallow glide angle and accident
report cited pilot blackout as cause.

The second was in Korea when a Koran General was being given a demo
ride. Same thing and two more fatalities.

The last, of three built, was given to the Air and Space Gallery in
LA when Air Force and overseas sales did not materialize and F-16 was
bought instead. Politics was involved as the F-20 out classed F-16 in
many respects.

Big John

That's rather like comparing a formula one race car to the family sedan
and
saying what is a great idea for one is automatically a great idea for the
other.

It very well may be a great idea, but you certainly can't justify it using
a
military aircraft as an example. There's not too many Cirrus pilots who
are
likely to experience a G induced blackout, and even if they did they
probably will have bigger problems to worry about anyway.
************************************************** *****

Mike

Sorry. Didn't mean to advocate putting a military system in Ga but
original question was about a blue button that would recover Cirrus
aircraft. My post was to show that a system was in operation that
would do it in heavy iron (either automatically or pilot activated) so
technology is there.

Big John

The technology is certainly available. As I said previously, Diamond had it
years before Cirrus. I don't consider it a bad idea. The cost is low
because it's really not much more than an additional function added to the
autopilot. The question the OP asked is a hard one to answer. Even if it's
actually saved someone's bacon, I doubt too many are going to report back
with that information.
************************************************** *******

Mike

U are probably correct. Many people would not report use of system.

Alternative would be to make system record use and need a shop with
key to reset. They could report use to give some stats which could
help sell system as life saver.

Big John

"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote in
:

"James Robinson" wrote in message
.. .
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Mike" nospam@ microsoft.com wrote:

"Bob Noel" wrote in message
...
Mike wrote:
but the question I would have for you was
why do you feel the burning desire to ask questions in which
you are already convinced of the answer?

You are making an invalid assumption. I merely asked if you (or
anyone)
had seen wx reports that the conditions were IMC. I was seeking
information. Please don't attempt to read more into the
question than that.

No, that's not what you asked. Go back and read it again.

To the contrary. It is what I asked. quote "hmmm, all the wx
reports I saw were legal VMC (not smart VMC, but still legal). Do
you have reference to reports that the conditions were not VMC?"

Not quite, Bob. The question you originally asked was:

"John-John was VFR to IMC?"

After you received my answer, you proceeded to answer it yourself.
So the real reason you asked it was simply to be argumentative. In
other words, CS. If you don't agree with my assertion, then provide
your own references and we can discuss it like two rational people.
If you want to go down the road of CS, then expect such to be noted.

To answer your latest question, yes I do.

One report:
"Another pilot had flown from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Long Island, New
York, and crossed the Long Island Sound on the same evening, about
1930. This pilot stated that during his preflight weather briefing
from an FSS, the specialist indicated VMC for his flight. The pilot
filed an IFR flight plan and conducted the flight at 6,000 feet. He
stated that he encountered visibilities of 2 to 3 miles throughout
the flight because of haze. He also stated that the lowest
visibility was over water, between Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and
eastern Long Island."

So here we have a pilot reporting IMC in the exact area and he goes
on to say the worst of it was over water. I put a high degree of
reliability on his estimate for a couple of reasons. One, his
report came when there was still daylight and he could better judge
visibility. Two, he was IFR and had no reason to overstate the
visibility as a pilot of a VFR flight might.

Another pilot:
The pilot stated that he departed TEB "...in daylight and good
flight conditions and reasonable visibility. The horizon was not
obscured by haze. I could easily pick our land marks at least five
[miles] away." The pilot also stated that he did not request or
receive flight information after his departure from TEB. Once clear
of the New York Class B airspace, he stated that he climbed his
airplane to 17,500 feet and proceeded towards Nantucket. He reported
that above 14,000 feet, the visibility was unrestricted; however, he
also reported that during his descent to Nantucket, when his global
positioning system (GPS) receiver indicated that he was over
Martha's Vineyard, he looked down and "...there was nothing to see.
There was no horizon and no light....I turned left toward Martha's
Vineyard to see if it was visible but could see no lights of any
kind nor any evidence of the island...I thought the island might
[have] suffered a power failure."

So here we have another pilot who was flying over Martha's Vinyard
on his approach to ACK. It doesn't mention altitude, but he did say
that he was on his descent. So he was somewhere between 17,500 and
probably around 12,000. That's 2-3 miles up and he can't see the
lights. There were no low level clouds that night. That indicates
the haze was very thick and visibilities would have been very low in
the haze layer.

The only other report comes from a pilot of a VFR flight (who almost
certainly isn't going to report visibilities of less than 3 miles)
and even he says he doesn't remember seeing the Gay Head lighthouse.
Even his estimation says it was "3-5 miles" which was right on the
edge of IMC.

So what references do you have, Bob?

MVY might have been reporting VMC, but that was on the surface, over
dry land, and about 18 miles away from the crash site.

The most likely problem was poor visibility, but the following
suggests that the haze might have been localized:

During an interview, the tower manager stated that no actions were
taken regarding the ASOS during his shift, which ended just after the
accident occurred. He also stated, "The visibility, present weather,
and sky condition at the approximate time of the accident was
probably a little better than what was being reported. I say this
because I remember aircraft on visual approaches saying they had the
airport in sight between 10 and 12 miles out. I do recall being able
to see those aircraft and I do remember seeing the stars out that
night.... To the best of my knowledge, the ASOS was working as
advertised that day with no reported problems or systems log errors."

That's my point exactly. I have little doubt that visibilities were
good at the airport, but that doesn't mean they were good over the
water.


Even if they were good, that doesn't mean there was a clear horizon..


Bertie

On Sun, 05 Oct 2008 18:28:40 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:45:48 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:08:06 GMT, Mike wrote:

At the time of the accident, John-John was training to get his
instrument
ticket and he had flown in IMC with an instructor at night. Although
he
wasn't ready for his checkride, he also wasn't completely ignorant of
IFR.
Clearly he was a victim of spatial disorientation, which certainly can
happen at night, but that particular night he had at least some
moonlight.
That's why I think he probably got into a bit of IMC and lost it before
the
crash. I think it would have taken more than just a bit of haze to
trip
him
up.

He couldn't multi-task and was in MT overload adding spatial
disorientation, pitiful pre-flight and a bad foot. He screwed the pooch
when he failed to redirect his bank prior to pitch, spiral city.

His CFIs should have picked up on this MT thing..perhaps.

They did.

"The CFI stated that the pilot's basic instrument flying skills and
simulator work were excellent. However, the CFI stated that the pilot had
trouble managing multiple tasks while flying, which he felt was normal
for
the pilot's level of experience."

Hmmmm, 300 hours dual and still having this problem. It was his
decision, probably thinking that he could auto pilot most of the way. So
many majorly bad decisions.

1) He didn't have 300 hours of dual, but even if he did that would be mostly
irrelevant. You learn how to multitask better solo than you do with another
pilot on board.

That concept worked real good for Kennedy, didn't it? Multi-tasking is
both a learned and an ingrained art. Some are best taught with co-pilot
guidance. Which do you think Kennedy was considering his fate?

2) What part of "...he felt was normal for the pilot's level of experience."
didn't you understand?

None.

I've flown with plenty of 300 hour pilots who don't multitask well and some
of them had their instrument and commercial. I didn't multitask well at 300
hours. That's something you pick up with experience.

I've flown with many that have picked up MT skills well under 300. It's
not a black-white consideration.

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 05 Oct 2008 18:28:40 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:45:48 GMT, Mike wrote:

"Gezellig" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 04 Oct 2008 16:08:06 GMT, Mike wrote:

At the time of the accident, John-John was training to get his
instrument
ticket and he had flown in IMC with an instructor at night. Although
he
wasn't ready for his checkride, he also wasn't completely ignorant of
IFR.
Clearly he was a victim of spatial disorientation, which certainly
can
happen at night, but that particular night he had at least some
moonlight.
That's why I think he probably got into a bit of IMC and lost it
before
the
crash. I think it would have taken more than just a bit of haze to
trip
him
up.

He couldn't multi-task and was in MT overload adding spatial
disorientation, pitiful pre-flight and a bad foot. He screwed the
pooch
when he failed to redirect his bank prior to pitch, spiral city.

His CFIs should have picked up on this MT thing..perhaps.

They did.

"The CFI stated that the pilot's basic instrument flying skills and
simulator work were excellent. However, the CFI stated that the pilot
had
trouble managing multiple tasks while flying, which he felt was normal
for
the pilot's level of experience."

Hmmmm, 300 hours dual and still having this problem. It was his
decision, probably thinking that he could auto pilot most of the way. So
many majorly bad decisions.

1) He didn't have 300 hours of dual, but even if he did that would be
mostly
irrelevant. You learn how to multitask better solo than you do with
another
pilot on board.

That concept worked real good for Kennedy, didn't it? Multi-tasking is
both a learned and an ingrained art. Some are best taught with co-pilot
guidance. Which do you think Kennedy was considering his fate?

2) What part of "...he felt was normal for the pilot's level of
experience."
didn't you understand?

None.

I've flown with plenty of 300 hour pilots who don't multitask well and
some
of them had their instrument and commercial. I didn't multitask well at
300
hours. That's something you pick up with experience.

I've flown with many that have picked up MT skills well under 300. It's
not a black-white consideration.

Some do, but it's certainly not out of line that he didn't. As far as his
decision making goes, the actual conditions turned out worse than anyone had
forecast. Flying at night can always turn into a hazardous situation, but
Kennedy had flown a considerable amount of time with an instructor at night,
and he was working on his instrument ticket. So he was genuinely interested
in improving his flying skills and there's nothing to indicate he made any
bad decisions. My guess is he probably attempted too steep of a turn and
had no idea he was in any danger of spacial disorientation because he didn't
recognize that he was in instrument conditions. Unfortunately it's a common
mistake for low time pilots and lots of them kill themselves that way.