asymetric warfare

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 12:24:56 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:

(Richard Bell) wrote:

:I do not know about anti-ship missiles, or anti-aircraft missiles, but an
:anti-vehicle (except tank) missile that combines a portable TV, a
en sized camera, two diode laser TXRX sets, an RC aircraft on steroids, and
:a six mile spool of optical fibre should be possible. While hardly a threat
:to tanks, if they were all available in Iraq, coalition casualties might have
:unpalatable numbers. The users lofts it over the hard cover that he is hiding
:behind and uses its camera to find a target and then dives the missile into
:it. Probably only a few thousand dollars worth of parts.

And you don't think after the first time that folks would start to
notice them and follow the cable back?


The Army FOGM used this-- I don't recall what happened to it, or if
its still an active program. But this design is also "slow", in that
if it's seen, people will have the time to follow it back to the
launching point.
Also, a "pen size" camera won't be very effective in guiding the
thing, unless you're talking perfectly ideal conditions. If you have
a clee or any of those dinky camera's that are currently being sold,
here's a little excercise.
Got to a park, hold the camera in front of you, and *run*-- try to
guide yourself with thecamera, with no cheeting by looking around it.
It won't be very easy at all.
Also, realize that the U.S., after the first few shots (and
probably before, because this kind of development effort WILL be known
about), will probably start using UAV's to pinpoint the launching
site, and kill them with artillery fire. Alternately, they'll send in
troops, which is generally the procedure for dealing with resistance
in built up areas, except when people try to solve the problem by
charging in with a tank force, as the Russians did in Grozny.

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 13:49:40 GMT, Fred J. McCall
wrote:

(phil hunt) wrote:

:On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks wrote:


:Sorm Shadow/Scalp are already enjoying export success because the
:rest of the world can't do a better job on their own--the only way they get
:any capability like what you refer to is by buying from those western
:industries you rather prematurely wrote off.
:
:This is true for now. How long will it be? I predict that within 10
:years, many countries will be producing missiles with roughly the
:same capabilities as Storm Shadow, but at much less cost.

I predict you're probably wrong.

You know, if it was as easy as you seem to think, my life would
certainly be a lot easier.

Phil misses the point, that most of the third world jsut doesn't
have the capabilities he's looking for. Even nations like China are
still importing weapons systems, not because they're stupid or mud
huts, but because the infrastructure to develop systems like this
takes a long, LONG time to develop.
You need to institutionalize an engineering and R&D capability, and
I don't mean hiring a few graduates from Cal-tech. I mean being able
to say: "We have an idea...let out some contracts and have Lockheed,
BAE, etc put together teams and offer bids".
That's the real obstacle-- not in coming up with a magic weapons
design, but in producing the people who can design it, and more
importantly, *build* it, which requires an educated and at least
reasonably prosperous nation to build it.
Again, China is probably one of the most capable of the 2-3rd
teir nations, and they needed foreign help for their orbital rocket
shot. I'm not mocking them-- it was a tremendous achievement,
especially when you consider everything they've had to overcome in the
20th century, but the fact of the matter was that they still needed
some outside knowledge/assistance for it. The same thing goes double
for any of these little countries, most of whom have smaller R&D
budgets any european nation.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:53:21 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"phil hunt" wrote in message
. ..
On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks
wrote:

I think there are two issues here. The first is when the sensor is
attached to the weapon, as it is in a sensor in a missile. Here,
there is no sensor/shooter cycle, unless you choose to have a human
involved in the decision to fire.

That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous
combat
systems.

Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
target.

"The programming for this isn't particularly hard"? Gee, one wonders why
only one nation has to date fielded a system that even verges on that kind
of capability. And as to it being "just a matter of aiming the missile
towards the target..." uhhhh...yeeeah, if you consider "just" including
developing a navigational system that also supports its own survivability
(i.e., is able to negotiate a route to the target down in the weeds),
knowing where the target is in the first place and getting that data to the
firing point realtime, and provided that you target just happens to match up
with what is loaded in the missiles brain (Missile: "I am looking for a
tank...tank..tank..." as it flies across twenty light skinned trucks loaded
with dismounts). You are REALLY lowballing the estimate of how much R&D is
required to field such a semi-autonomous weapon. Ever wonder why you are
just now seeing such technology emerging in the US military (and hint--it
ain't because of our "bloated" defense industry)?

The first design of this sort that I read about was the WASP design
of the 1980's, where you would get a pod of 12 missiles with
millimetric gudience that would be launched to go after Russian tank
swarms. It was supposed to be low cost and hard to spoof.
I'm assuming that either A. low cost or B. hard to spoof or C.
worked at all, proved to be the stumbling block.

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 20:53:21 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


You are getting quite far off base with this if your objective is to find an
asymetric attack method; what you are postulating plays to the US strengths,
and that is the opposite of asymetric warfare. take the advice of the others
who have already suggested the low tech approach--when you try to out-tech
the US, you will lose.

Brooks

True-- here's MY way to to Asymetric warfare.

1. Make friends with lots of congress critters. Preferably have
back up pictures of them, their best friends wife, and the sheep
should the friends approach fail.

2. Multiple survivable sattalite uplinks to media outlets to make #3
more doable.

3. The Elbonian camcorder division-- one thousand brave Elbonian
soldiers with camcorders who will be on the scene for every misguided
missile or off target artillery round, to fill CNN with visions of
widders and orphans.

4. If the U.S. is gathering to attack, don't get cute hiding WMD's,
or being coy. Unless you can reveal that you have 20 SS-18's bought
war surplus and you can kill 50 major U.S. cities with them, WMD's
have proven to be less than useless.

Many people miss the fact that the U.S. is a lot like a big, dumb,
friendly, grizzly bear. You DON't want to fight it, but honestly, the
US generally doesn't get into major fights easily-- it took 9/11 and
actions by Hussein that deserve a "stupid hall of fame" building to
get us to invade Iraq. If at any point he'd taken a variety of
actions, he'd still be sitting his fundament on his solid gold toilet
bowl.
And Phil, that's another problem with your ideas-- they assume a
government that is reasonably non-corrupt, and I can tell you from
expereicne that most 3rd world nations are run in a fashion that would
make Boss Tweed blanch.

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 12:34:10 -0800, pervect wrote:
On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 18:15:56 +0000, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:

On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 13:43:49 -0500, Ray Drouillard wrote:

Also, since it's not encrypted, it can be spoofed using a local
transmitter

That doesn't logically follow; it's possible to make non-encrypted
data that can't be faked, you just use a digital signature.

If you don't go to spread-spectrum, your radio links will probably be
jammed. (Solution - go to spread spectrum).

Indeed.

I'd still rate a radio location system using spread spectrum
transmitters as rather vulnerable, because the transmitters have to
remain in a fixed location for the system to work, and would be prime
targets.

What if most of the transimtters are turned off most of the time? If
there are fake transmitters, there to soak up hits, and (hopefully)
entice enemy aircraft to put themselves in danger?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 21:45:56 GMT, Derek Lyons wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
The issue is the massive
amount of R&D needed to develop the algorithms the programmers will
implement to analyze the output of the sensor.

Do you know anything about programming? If you did, you'd know that
developing algorithms is what programmers do.

Do *you* know anything about programming?

I've already told you, it's my profession. Now, are you going to
anwser my question: have you every done any programming, and if so,
how much and in what languages?

Failure to answer will be considered as evidence of trolldom.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On 20 Dec 2003 14:25:46 -0800, George William Herbert wrote:
Derek Lyons wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote:
[...]
The issue isn't programmers Phil. The issue the massive amounts of
R&D to develop the information needed to specify the sensor that the
programmers will process the output of.

The sensors needed are visual and IR imaging. It doesn't require a
massive R&D program to determine that, or to decide which
combinations of number of pixels and widths of field of view are
appropriate.

Ah, another problem handwaved away. You not only lack a clue, you are
aggressive in avoiding obtaining one.

I've done several iterations of this problem,
though not with systems that went to full scale
development or production.

I believe that for suitably moderated operational
requirements, the problem can be much simpler than I
believe Derek thinks it is.

I belive that Phil is grossly underestimating the
real requirements, even for those suitably moderated
operational requirements.

Which requirements am I underestimating? (Bear in mind I'm
considering missiles for several different roles).

But few of those have progressed to production.
The new Marines/Navy Spike missile is one
exception,

This is the Israeli ATGM, isn't it?

and to some degree is the exception
that probably proves the rule. Their R&D budget
essentially was hidden in the slush funds at China Lake
for a couple of years, and the missile itself is estimated
to cost at most a few thousand dollars.

And uses visual and IIR homing.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

In message , George William Herbert
writes
Paul J. Adam wrote:
#1 sounds easy until the enemy starts deploying decoys and disguising
targets.

They have to deploy good-enough decoys forwards with the
advancing troops. Consider for a moment how hard it would
have been for the US to get significant quantities of good
decoys forwards of the Kuwaiti border by T+4 hrs.

As compared to deploying significant quantities of main battle tanks,
infantry fighting vehicles, and the _major_ logistics needed to support
them? If you can do that, adding decoys isn't that bad.

#2 still requires not only significant navigation, but some
noticeable amounts of real-time intelligence gathering and
communication.

A kill box from thirty kilometers north of the Iraqi border
with Kuwait, going twenty kilometers south of that border,
by T+4 hrs after the US Army breached the border, nine months
ago, would have worked quite well.

Hindsight is 20/20.

Again, are you assuming the enemy will be unresisted and your missiles
are the only defence?

Think back to Desert Sabre - if you'd launched your missiles at the
Kuwaiti border, you'd have inflicted casualties but completely missed
the main thrust.

The idea of "don't give the enemy easy DFs" is hardly new.

_Someone_ has to reliably determine whether the 'US tanks to our front!'
message is a feint, a hasty raid or the real invasion; work out where
those tanks will be by the time the missiles arrive: and reliably get a
message back to the launch unit. This has to be reasonably proof against
deception, EW, jamming, and blunt attack.

A massive invasion, and anything of regimental strength or more
is going to count, is hard to hide.

"US tanks overrunning our position, they're killing everyone, we can't
stop them!" is about all you'll get. Is that a raid on an outpost or the
main thrust smashing through your main line of resistance? (Given a
dependence on 'kill anything vehicle-like' missiles, do you even _have_
a MLR?) How long do you have to decide, given the time of flight of
these postulated missiles and how fast US forces can move when
unopposed? Killing some of their logistics will hurt, but having the
troops flying their flag over your palace be tired and hungry isn't much
of a victory.

The details of how far and
how fast the front line has moved may be more opaque, but any
serious attack has very real limitations on how fast it can
roll out.

True, but then missiles have flyout times too, and the further they are
from their target the longer that is.

One can easily posit kill box limits which are
very easy to justify and will suffer very little blue-on-blue
for the defender.

Equally, that will waste many munitions in fruitless combing of
target-devoid terrain.

And more to the point, will do far more
damage than any remaining defender forces in those boxes,
and the oncoming attack will presumably wipe those forces
out promptly.

The problem with this scenario is that it makes more conventional
resistance suicidal since the lethal drones will kill indiscriminately.
How do you intend to fix your foe for other arms to kill?

The timing and positioning of the box may require not targeting
your own FEBA of effective resistance, and not targeting the
leading invasion echelons. But that doesn't matter. It took
days for the US forces to finish crossing the border into Iraq.

The previous conflict was over in 96 hours, from first border breach to
ceasefire.

Kill boxes with the description I gave would have been valid
for much more time than is needed to set up and execute the
cruise missile attack starting.

They wouldn't be war-winners either.

More to the point, it rules out most resistance and makes life for
refugees short and nasty, since "general area of enemy forces" will
contain both own forces trying to fight (unless these missiles are your
only resistance) and civilians fleeing.

This depends on the geography. Not many Iraqi civilians were in
the kill boxes I specified above.

Not many countries are as blessed in their geography and politics as
Iraq was in OIF. Iraq was nowhere near as fortunate in Desert Sabre.

Landline telephone need landlines and exchanges, easily targeted.
Cellular telephone needs masts and repeaters, ditto. Broadcast radio is
vulnerable to jamming, eavesdropping and spoofing (or simply "bomb the
emitter".

A comms infrastructure that is robust, secure, and prompt is not easy
even for the UK or US to guarantee, let alone a Third World nation under
attack by opponent(s) with air superiority.

We have two types of communications that have to happen successfully,
plus a decision loop.

The reports of the invasion have to make it back to the designated
authority over the missile firings. As stated earlier, it's very
hard to credit any scenario under which it takes even twelve hours
for a country to know the US has invaded.

Sure. Now, _where_ have they invaded? Where's the focus of effort and
what's a diversion? "Enemy troops overrunning us!" is not a great guide
as to where the key point is, to say nothing of where it will be.

Desert Sabre is a good example. So is Overlord, with the Wehrmacht
dismissing Normandy as a diversion because Patton is going to lead a
huge army across the Dover Strait Really Soon Now.

And this is before feints are used to find out what gets broadcast on
what frequencies, and deception is used to put false messages out.

Can the US reliably, completely and reliably deny this link? No. Can it
make it too risky to stake the defence of the People's Republic on? Yes.

Then the leader has to make up his mind to fire some or all of the
cruise missiles.

Then the word has to make it back out to the missile sites.

Even without good landlines, the word getting out to the missile
sites doesn't have to be any more sophisticated than an emergency
action message. A single code word, which shifts over time, may be
enough.

Provided you have a clear and unambiguous target. If you don't, you need
_lots_ of codewords because you'll have a lot of "4th, 7th and 12th
Regiments, launch one unit of fire each at a 50 x 50km box centred on
Grid 123456; 1st, 2nd, 9th and 14th make ready one unit of fire, other
regiments disperse and camouflage" type codes. Which all need to be
promulgated and must not be compromised. Not impossible, but not immune
to espionage either.

To suggest that the US can reliably disrupt significant
two way communications is no leap. To suggest that we can reliably
prevent *any* communications, even a broadcast one way message
which can be very brief, is unrealistic.

True, but that suggests that there's no intelligence and no warning. And
the US doesn't have to completely block that link... just make it
unreliable in combat. The defenders need it to work perfectly: the more
doubt that can be injected as to the utility of the comms, the less use
this system is.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

On 20 Dec 2003 14:28:48 -0800, Jake McGuire wrote:
(phil hunt) wrote in message ...
for
potentially 500-1000+ missiles, all cooridinated with each other to hit the
same small targets *simultaneously*?

co-ordination = radio

Against the US?

They've spent billions of dollars on the ability to listen in to what
you're saying on the radio,

This is difficult against a competent opponent becasue the signal
will be encrypted.

prevent you from talking on the radio,

Spread spectrum radios help here...

finding out where you're talking from on the radio the better to drop
a bomb on your head,

....and here

and pretending to be your boss telling you what
to do over the radio.

Again, this is fixible by standard cryptographic techniques.

They're reasonably good at it.

I find it hard to take your post seriously since you are apparently
unaware of very well-known cryptographic techniques.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 20:29:53 +1000, Damo wrote:
only 10% hit targets. For supporting evidence of how far image recognition
has come use some OCR software - it does a pretty good job of handwriting
now, not bad for a computer. Also look to facial recognition software - the
computer has to find faces in large, moving crowds and then find a match in
a quick manner. Admittingly it doesnt work very good

This is true. However, consider that telling a tank or truck from an
empty road is easier than telling a face from another face.

Another problem raised was flight control for the missile. I dont think this
will be an issue since we already have UAVs for less then 20,000k that can
fly themselves and CPU power keeps getting higher. Today I saw that yamaha
has a fully autonomous helicopter, I am no expert but a helicopter would be
more difficult for a computer to fly then a missile no?

They are reputedly more difficult for a human, at any rate.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: , but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).