Why is Stealth So Important?

Ed Rasimus wrote:

: In 1966, while I was flying the F-105 over N. Vietnam, we lost one
: every 65 missions. In 1991, during Desert Storm we lost one fixed wing
: aircraft every 3500 mission. In 2003 in Iraqi Freedom we lost one
: fixed wing aircraft in 16,500 mission.

However, the last two operations were characterized by
an almost total lack of opposition in the air. The
biggest threat to US combat aircraft these days seems
to come from small and IR-guided, portable missiles;
or even from machine guns. Very expensive anti-radar
stealth seems to offer little protection against these.
Reducing the IR signature seems to be more useful, but
only really effective against a primitive seeker. (But
MANPADS tend to be much smaller than AIM-9 and I suppose
that it will be difficult to equip them with an all-aspect
or imaging IR seeker.)

: Stealth aircraft are more survivable. We don't have many, because the
: military competes for $$$ against the welfare princesses and
: redistribution of wealth candidates who run for election on a platform
: of taking from "them" and giving to the masses.

AFAIK the US social security system runs with a positive balance,
i.e. money is flowing from it into other departments, not the
other way around. But that aside, the US military budget is huge,
it vastly outspends every other nation, and if it has few stealth
aircraft that is in part because until now, these have really
been prohibitively expensive both to buy and to operate in large
numbers. Besides, the numbers were not needed anyway: The B-2
and even more so the F-117 were ver^y specialized designs, and
aircraft that require special maintenance procedures and
climate-controlled hangars are of limited operational usefulness.
For stealth to be really useful, it must be made compatible
with dirt strips and pierced metal planking.

However, that was in part because the design of the F-117 and
the B-2 were willing to compromise very little stealth for
other characteristics. The F-22 and F-35 must involve an
increase in RCS as a penalty for lower cost and easier
maintenance, while relying on new materials and manufacturing
procedures to get good results.

Part of the attractiveness of a new design is that it may
actually be cheaper to buy and operate than its precedessor.
Manufacturers and officials seem to have promised this for
every weapons program since the late 1960s; I don't actually
know of a program that also achieved this goal.

For the F-22 a high degree of stealth may be worth the investment.
For the F-35 I am not so su I expect that 80% of the time,
these aircraft will be flying with large non-stealthy external
ordnance.

--
Emmanuel Gustin

"Emmanuel.Gustin" wrote in message
...
Ed Rasimus wrote:


snip

The B-2
and even more so the F-117 were ver^y specialized designs, and
aircraft that require special maintenance procedures and
climate-controlled hangars are of limited operational usefulness.

They have already proven their operational usefullness. In view of that
fact, the above is an unsupportable assertion.

For stealth to be really useful, it must be made compatible
with dirt strips and pierced metal planking.

It already is "really useful". The loss of one stealth aircraft against how
many hundreds of sorties into environments that were rich with radar
directed threats in Iraq and former Yugoslavia. Again, your statement is
not supported by the facts.

snip

Emmanuel Gustin

"fudog50" wrote in message
...
Yes, in addition to a 60,000 (?) lb rated holdback chain.

The F-105 had to be chained down for trim.

On Fri, 09 Jan 2004 18:19:16 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004 09:50:55 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


I think we can pretty well know the iris on the J-75 was taking out 1%
of
the F-105s.

Are you referring to the turbine Christmas tree? Failures of the
Christmas tree which held the three stages of turbine blades caused a
number of unexplained losses. I mention the bailout of Joe Vojir on
takeoff at Korat as well as the loss of Buzz Bullock and Dain Milliman
in takeoff accidents caused by turbine failure in When Thunder Rolled.

The AB nozzle (iris) didn't cause any accidents that I know about.
And, the nozzle is not synonymous with the speed brake petals or
pizzas (which were removed in '65).

When Ed posted here that the F-105's brakes could not hold the
airplane in AB, I could see that iris stuck open/closed/half way
between.

No afterburner equipped aircraft that I know about can be held by
wheel brakes in AB. Carrier aircraft get into AB for launch by
employing a "hold back". The F-4, for example, couldn't be held in
military power by the wheel brakes. Engines were checked at 100% one
at a time. Takeoffs were done with a runup to 85% prior to brake
release, then to mil and finally to AB.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Kevin Brooks wrote:

: The B-2
: and even more so the F-117 were very specialized designs, and
: aircraft that require special maintenance procedures and
: climate-controlled hangars are of limited operational usefulness.

: They have already proven their operational usefullness. In view of that
: fact, the above is an unsupportable assertion.

I wrote "limited operation usefulness", not "no operational
usefulness". Penalties such as these are acceptable for a
small number of aircraft with specialized roles. They are
not acceptable for the main body of an air force. If the
F-16 had had the maintenance requirements of the B-2,
the Gulf Wars would simply not have been fought. In some ways
stealth has been a backward step; since the 1960s engineers
have aimed to reduce maintenance requirements and turn-around
time, and to make aircraft less dependable on well-equipped
bases. The need for this was obvious in Korea and Vietnam,
as well as from the budget... The first generation of stealth
aircraft reversed this trend, a most unwelcome limitation on
their use.

: For stealth to be really useful, it must be made compatible
: with dirt strips and pierced metal planking.

: It already is "really useful". The loss of one stealth aircraft against how
: many hundreds of sorties into environments that were rich with radar
: directed threats in Iraq and former Yugoslavia.

Allow me to point out that the USAF has bought only 59 F-117s
and equipped only two operational squadrons with them. To me
this reflects a rather sober view of the operational usefulness
of the type: An useful accessory to the arsenal, but not able
to replace more conventional types. Before Stealth can be
incorporated in the backbone of the air frce, serious technical
problems need to be solved, and compromises must be made.

It is true that the loss rate of the F-117 has been low: The
low rate of other USAF aircraft has also been low, to the
point of making a comparison statistically insignificant.

--
Emmanuel Gustin

incorporated in the backbone of the air frce, serious technical
problems need to be solved, and compromises must be made.

It is true that the loss rate of the F-117 has been low: The
low rate of other USAF aircraft has also been low, to the
point of making a comparison statistically insignificant.

--
Emmanuel Gustin

Sort of a narrow view of air operations, I would say. Having particiapted in a
number of 100 plane raids in SEA against a single point target that a single
B-2 cold take out now I'd say the tradeoffs with Stealth is no brainer. The
high maintenance requirements for stealth and the controlled hangar
environments are mainly a matter of materiels used in maintaining stealth
coatings and those materials have been much inproved in the past decade.

Your comment that was refuted was that Boyd & Co. and Stealth were two
concepts gleaned from Vietnam that were proven erroneous or invalid.

Boyd's work on energy maneuverability and three

imensional maneuver
is still the basis for 1-v-1 BFM and led to the development of
supporting element maneuver in multi-plane engagement. Without Boyd,
we'd still have Eagles, Vipers and Raptors running around in fighting
wing.

Everything you said is correct and explains why the ideas of Boyd&Co were
"fundamentally" wrong.
They developed tactics for a world without situational and global awaraness
tools and designed warplanes to excel under such circumstances.
Lets put that way, during Vietnam war US had only rudimentary situational
awareness tools no global awareness tool at all.
Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,the real reason for not so perfect performance of US
aircraft in Vietnam was not their inability to perform high energy maneuvers or
missing cannons,it was unavailability of situational and global awareness tools
that we have today.
So,it would be much better if Boyd and others should have asked a couple of
questions to themselves before developing their concepts:
a)How it would be if US had total situational awareness in Vietnam?
b)Whats if such tools brcome available in next 10-15 years?
Unfortunately they developed their concepts without answering such questions
and also without fully understanding the direction of technological
development,so we have now full situational and global awareness but also 100 M
$ fighters that are not only capable of destroying MIG17s in dogfights also
capable of doing jack knife type fighting with Red Barons Fokker.
But thanks to such wonderful capabilities that they never ever need under full
situational awareness conditions,their ranges will never meet the criterias.

Stealth, and the idea of denying the defenses accurate az/el/range
data through a variety of technologies is going to be a foundation for
aircraft (and defense) designs for a long time to come.

Thats even worse than Boyds ideas,"passive" stealth was already obsolete in
70s,(Might stay as a foundation for aircraft designs for a long time to come
though,specially if your adversaries are backward third world countries like
Panama,Iraq,Iran,NK,Somalia,Zambia etc)

As for what "combat vets should try to do", please acknowledge that
like all professions, military aviators are not one-dimensional
humans. We do a lot of things in a life time, and don't simply
disappear into the attic when the war is over.

I hope so,but Let me repeat the Battleship example,after Mitchell demonstration
it was obvious the the era of Battleships was over but Admirals all over the
world continued to order bigger better ,more capable and of course more
expensive Battleships (their showboats) till they learn the truth hard way
during WWII,
I am pretty sure,without WWII we,and probably everbody else, would still be
building bigger and better battleships.As for the relevance of the lessons of
Vietnam to F-16, F-22 or SU-37,
let me point you to Santyana---"those who will not learn the lessons
of history are condemned to repeat them."


Thats true but only if learn correct lessons.

Lots of science and technology, but it is directed by the experiences
gathered along the way.

You gotta problem wid dat?

Historically wars,unfortunately,were one of the driving forces behind the
scientific&technological development but calling Boyds ideas and passive
stealth a development would be strecth

However, that was in part because the design of the F-117 and
the B-2 were willing to compromise very little stealth for
other characteristics. The F-22 and F-35 must involve an

Frontal RCSs of B2 and f22 are identical.

I don't understand why such emphasis is put on that stealth stuff when
we use the same old planes from previously.

We have less tolerance today than we did in 1970 for losing our pilots
in combat against enemy air defenses.

I'll bet there were days when Ed Rasimus wished that his F-105 had
stealthy characteristics.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,

Would you share with us your combat flight experience?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

"Cub Driver" wrote

I'll bet there were days when Ed Rasimus wished that his F-105 had
stealthy characteristics.

It wouldn't have mattered, as the white house was building the ATO, and
most of them flew the same waypoints year after year. It was a war designed
to be lost, by officers who were pretty much derelict in everything they did.