Why is Stealth So Important?

"Gene Storey" wrote in message
news:tzwMb.10086$6l1.1052@okepread03...

snip

It was a war designed to be lost, by officers who were pretty much
derelict in everything they did.



Well, the comment about micromanagement from the White House was generally
accurate, so I guessed you are getting a *bit* better, but then you toss out
this unsubstantiated crap. Please provide some evidence that US military
officers intended to lose the war...no? That's right, you can't. No doubt
there were decisions made by some officers that were, in hindsight, wrong.
But "pretty much derelict in everything they did"? It is amazing that you
have recently spent so much time and effort defending the actions of folks
like Hitler and Saddam, and then come out with an indictement like the
above.

Brooks

On 12 Jan 2004 05:58:35 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

When I said:
Your comment that was refuted was that Boyd & Co. and Stealth were two
concepts gleaned from Vietnam that were proven erroneous or invalid.

Boyd's work on energy maneuverability and three

imensional maneuver
is still the basis for 1-v-1 BFM and led to the development of
supporting element maneuver in multi-plane engagement. Without Boyd,
we'd still have Eagles, Vipers and Raptors running around in fighting
wing.

Denyav responded:
Everything you said is correct and explains why the ideas of Boyd&Co were
"fundamentally" wrong.
They developed tactics for a world without situational and global awaraness
tools and designed warplanes to excel under such circumstances.

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA
still going to apply.

Lets put that way, during Vietnam war US had only rudimentary situational
awareness tools no global awareness tool at all.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav
gear, but a lot of SA was a personally learned and honed skill.

Boyd&Co identified wrong problem and tried to solve wrong problem with a step
in the wrong direction,the real reason for not so perfect performance of US
aircraft in Vietnam was not their inability to perform high energy maneuvers or
missing cannons,it was unavailability of situational and global awareness tools
that we have today.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

So,it would be much better if Boyd and others should have asked a couple of
questions to themselves before developing their concepts:
a)How it would be if US had total situational awareness in Vietnam?

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

b)Whats if such tools brcome available in next 10-15 years?

What if? What if we had AWACS? Not much difference. What if we had
PGMs? Ahhh, that might have made a difference. What if we had
stand-off weaponry? Ahhh, that would be good to.


Stealth, and the idea of denying the defenses accurate az/el/range
data through a variety of technologies is going to be a foundation for
aircraft (and defense) designs for a long time to come.

Thats even worse than Boyds ideas,"passive" stealth was already obsolete in
70s,(Might stay as a foundation for aircraft designs for a long time to come
though,specially if your adversaries are backward third world countries like
Panama,Iraq,Iran,NK,Somalia,Zambia etc)

I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but simply refuted
your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

As for what "combat vets should try to do", please acknowledge that
like all professions, military aviators are not one-dimensional
humans. We do a lot of things in a life time, and don't simply
disappear into the attic when the war is over.

I hope so,but Let me repeat the Battleship example,after Mitchell demonstration
it was obvious the the era of Battleships was over but Admirals all over the
world continued to order bigger better ,more capable and of course more
expensive Battleships (their showboats) till they learn the truth hard way
during WWII,

You might want to look into the Treaty of Washington 1922 to see the
status of battleship construction world wide. Mitchell's demontration
a couple of years later was relevant to aircraft vs ships and had
little to with battleships specifically.

You might apply your same incorrect logic substituting carrier for
battleship to see the error. Then check Battle of Midway.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On 12 Jan 2004 06:03:22 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

However, that was in part because the design of the F-117 and
the B-2 were willing to compromise very little stealth for
other characteristics. The F-22 and F-35 must involve an

Frontal RCSs of B2 and f22 are identical.

Which is:

1.) incorrect

and

2.) irrelevant.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Which is:

1.) incorrect


I hate to disappoint you,but correct

2.) irrelevant.

You are correct here,in the era of multistatic and UWB radars,classical RCS
values are IRRELEVANT.

In article ,
(Denyav) wrote:

You are correct here,in the era of multistatic and UWB
radars,classical RCS values are IRRELEVANT.

Lowered returns, no matter what buzzword you're using, are quite
relevant.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Denyav" wrote in message
...

I hate to disappoint you,but correct


Prove it.

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA

I think you are contradicting yourself here,you gave an excellent answer to
another poster and explained how things are done in the era of full situational
awareness,as you correctly implied there is no need to acquire target with your
Mk.I eyeballs,you dont even need to acquire target with your own
sensors,somebody else could do it for you,what you need is only to fire your
missiles.
Do you need high energy manouvers or jack knife type fights for that?
If we had current SA tools in 60s,the Missilleer project would be a great
success.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav

Fog of war will always be part of the business.
Let me give a simple example,
Is there any guarantee that your family will start every time when you turn the
ignition key? No
But no auto manufacturer nowadays offers cranking handle type starting option
in their cars.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

Factors you mentioned were obviously the main factors at the national decision
making level,but less relevant at air-air combat level.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

Unless you bombed production bases of NV,which were located inside USSR and
China,you would not risk a nuclear war.
Politically it does not matter much how you shoot down an enemy plane,with guns
or with BVR missiles.I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but
simply refuted

your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

Target success rate during DS I is more close to 1/10 th of what you are
quoting and during Balkan conflict more f117s damaged than convantionel
ones,even though f117s made up only small part of allied air fleet.
Regarding target success rate during whole Balkan war only 3 serbian air
defense radars were destroyed.
Even simple internetting of old serbian radars proved to be very effective
aganist stealth aircraft.
Did you ever wonder why US started destroying Chinese built Iraqi fiberoptic
network months before starting of Iraqi freedom using Special Forces and no fly
zone flights?
Chances of stealth aircraft aganist a sophisticated enemy using multistatics
and/or UKW radars?
Not any better than an old battleship without air cover.

On 12 Jan 2004 17:47:59 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

You garble apples and oranges here. While situational awareness is
critical, it's not the same issue as developing the principles of
three dimensional maneuver between two aircraft. The analytical tools
of P-sub-s diagramming to compare aircraft and optimize your own
performance are important and whether or not you possess total SA

I think you are contradicting yourself here,you gave an excellent answer to
another poster and explained how things are done in the era of full situational
awareness,as you correctly implied there is no need to acquire target with your
Mk.I eyeballs,you dont even need to acquire target with your own
sensors,somebody else could do it for you,what you need is only to fire your
missiles.
Do you need high energy manouvers or jack knife type fights for that?
If we had current SA tools in 60s,the Missilleer project would be a great
success.

If I am going to enter the air/air arena, I need SA, but I'd better
also have a good understanding of three dimensional maneuver and the
relative performance envelope of both my own aircraft and my potential
adversary's. While the BVR war is the ideal, reality often has a way
of screwing up the perfect world and then you wind up turning and
burning.

And, we still don't have total SA. AWACS and data-fusion/sharing are
great advances, but the "fog of war" will remain. We did have Disco,
Red Crown, T-Ball and Combat Tree as well as our own sensors and nav

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

Factors you mentioned were obviously the main factors at the national decision
making level,but less relevant at air-air combat level.

Air-to-air combat was a minor component of the Vietnam air war. There
was none, absolutely none in S. Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia and little
in the panhandle of NVN. There were only A/A engagements in Route
Package V and VI and from late '68 to spring of '72, we weren't going
there. In 250 combat missions, 150 of which were into N. Vietnam, I
encountered enemy aircraft only a half dozen times.

Given the alternative of better SA tools or better A/A training, I
would have chosen the training.

You really should read a bit more history. While F-4s without guns got
a lot of notice, there were a lot more gun-equipped aircraft than
non-gun. The failures didn't relate to lack of SA as much as to
political gradualism and lack of will to win.

The answer is easy. It would be great. But, if you are running the war
for political purposes and trying to avoid major power nuclear
confrontation, it doesn't matter what your SA is.

Unless you bombed production bases of NV,which were located inside USSR and
China,you would not risk a nuclear war.

You better get a few more books. There was serious concern over the
possibility of any conflict during those years escalating. The
political posture of both the US/NATO and the USSR/WP was that an
"attack on one is an attack on all" and the umbrella of coverage was
repeatedly asserted as covering client states as well.

Politically it does not matter much how you shoot down an enemy plane,with guns
or with BVR missiles.I did not distinguish active or passive stealth, but
simply refuted

your contention that stealth is a failure. Loss rates for stealth
aircraft are statistically zero and target success rates are very
close to 100%. It makes little difference whether the opposition is
first or third world.

Target success rate during DS I is more close to 1/10 th of what you are
quoting and during Balkan conflict more f117s damaged than convantionel
ones,even though f117s made up only small part of allied air fleet.

Really? My statement on losses and target service are referring to
stealth aircraft performance, not the total air effort. To date there
has been only 1 F-117 lost in combat. During DS and IF, there were no
stealth aircraft -117s or B-2s lost or damaged.

Regarding target success rate during whole Balkan war only 3 serbian air
defense radars were destroyed.

Really?

Even simple internetting of old serbian radars proved to be very effective
aganist stealth aircraft.

Networking, not "internetting", but Serbian air defense radars, if we
discount one clueless F-16 "scared rabbit", were ineffective even
against non-stealthy aircraft.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
"Gene Storey" wrote

Please provide some evidence that US military officers intended to lose the war

The war was lost, and officers are in charge of war.

It was lost in 1946 when we allowed the French to decolonize.

http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/2...ietnamMACV.asp

Basically, if you fly a B-52 down the same route as the previous three B-52, and do
it at the same altitude, and with the same waypoints, you and whoever drew-up the
operation are derelict. The fact that anyone survived is pure luck, and those that
died were very brave, but very wasted (much as going over the top in the great war
in the face of machine guns). The way to lose a war is to suffer casualties so great,
with such waste, the people back home won't want to go, and either burn their draft
cards, or joined the Reserves.

On 12 Jan 2004 06:03:22 GMT, (Denyav) wrote:

However, that was in part because the design of the F-117 and
the B-2 were willing to compromise very little stealth for
other characteristics. The F-22 and F-35 must involve an

Frontal RCSs of B2 and f22 are identical.

Since you do not know the RCS of either (can you say
"classified"?, there, I knew you could) that is an utterly
unsupportable claim.

Al Minyard