STOVL and CTOL from big decks - deconflicting ?

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Frijoles wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
John R Weiss wrote:

What are the comparative thrust and specific fuel consumptions of
the 2
airplanes' powerplants?

Fuel burn for F35 in landing configuration is said to be close to double
that of the AV-8.

About what I expected, given the difference in thrust and a/c weight.
Internal
fuel is roughly double as well.

snip

Over Bosnia, USN F-18s were originally operating with 5,000 lb.
landing
reserves,
subsequently cut to 3,500 lb. to increase weapons bringback. Even
being
really
generous, it's hard to see why an F-35B would need more than 2,000 lb.
landing
reserve. Night landings, even Case III, just aren't the same
white-knuckle affair
that they are when you have to trap.

I disagree with that last sentence Guy. Because Harriers use NVGs for
shipboard takeoffs and landings, STOVL Night Case I is dramatically
easier -- when conditions are conducive to NVG ops.

I take it the Marines finally cleared them for use in takeoffs and
landings?

Around the ship, since late 1998. Forgot when they became routine for shore
ops.

ISTR reading that the Marines were prohibited from using NVGs during
takeoff/landing initially, owing to the need to remove them in a hurry if
an
ejection was required (due to the moment arm on the head). IIRR the Brits
got
around this by designing some contraption that yanked the NVGs off the
helmet
when the ejection sequence started, while the USMC were limited (at the
time) to
unclipping them manually and tossing them on the floor out of the way.
Did the
USMC buy the same/similar device as the RAF?

No, they did not buy those devices, nor anything similar.

Night Case III around
any ship is a white knuckler regardless of what you're flying.

Poor choice of words on my part. I agree that it still can be tense, but
the
nagging worry that "I might not be able to get back on board at all"
doesn't
seem to be there, from the pilot accounts I've read. If they can see the
ship,
pilot attitude seems to be that they will land on (possibly with some
damage,
but it beats taking a swim in the dark).

That may be a matter of opinion. If you can get to the hover abeam the
ship, you're golden. Getting to that hover is the trick -- i.e.managing the
transition from wing-borne to engine-borne flight over water at night in IMC
or in VMC with no peripheral cues is a handful for even the most experienced
players.


It is no
different in the AV-8 -- in addition to all that wonderful glideslope
and
course control, you get to manually control a progressive deceleration
to a
hover. It is THE most difficult thing to do in the Harrier -- bar
nothing.

Along that line, here's an account of a Case III night landing during
Exercise
Alloy Express off Norway in January 1982, by Sharkey Ward, CO of 801 Sq.
during
the Falklands (and prior to that Sea Harrier project officer in the MoD,
and
then CO of the IFTU squadron and the HQ squadron), from his book "Sea
Harrier
over the Falklands":

"[He'd been asked by the Air Boss to fly in conditions that had long since
caused the Nimitz to shut down flight ops, early in the SHAR's career
while the
operational limits were still being expanded] . . . 'The problem, Sir,'
heavy
emphasis on the 'Sir' even though Dusty and I were on first-name terms
when off
duty, 'is as follows: the deck is pitching 7 degrees and our theoretical
Boscombe Down limit is 2 degrees; the ship is rolling like a pig; she is
heaving
up and down about 30 feet; the cloud base is reported to be 200 feet but
looks
worse to me; tops are reported to be in excess of 38,000 feet with no
gaps; and
last but not least we are talking about night flying! We have never
operated
before with such a combination of out of limit factors, and I don't wish
to push
our luck without good reason.' There would be no 'enemy' aircraft
launching
from shore to attack the fleet that night (the land-based RAF team who
were
playing at being 'orange forces' or Russians would never dream of taking
off in
such weather just to play with the navy) - so why bash your head against a
brick
wall if you don't need to. Night flying was fine when there was something
to
do. But sitting in a cramped cockpit on your tod, looking at a set of
flight
instruments and a blank radar screen for an hour and a half in thick clag
with
no one to play with, seemed pointless' . . . .

"As Dusty -- or 'Wings', as all Commanders (Air) are habitually known,
continued
to insist on 801 Squadron flying in spite of the conditions, I gave in
ungracefully and agreed that I and only I would fly. It was definitely
too
dicey for some of the more junior pilots, and although Ian Mortimer could
easily
handle it, one jet airborne on such a ****ty night was less risky than
two. . .
. [skip takeoff and cruise]

"I returned an hour and a half later to carry out the land-on in atrocious
conditions. There was no horizon at all. The rain on the windscreen
caused a
distracting deformation of the ship's usually welcoming lights, and I
could feel
the heavy buffeting from the gale force winds. Invincible was rolling,
weaving,
pitching and heaving and, as she was my only source of visual reference,
this
made the land-on task more onerous. At least it was a bit of a challenge
and
added spice to what had otherwise been a totally boring flight! Swearing
under
my breath at Wings and the world, I stabilised the aircraft over the deck
amidships as best I could. The superstructure of the ship's island was
only a
matter of feet to the right and, as the ship rolled heavily to port, the
huge
wall of grey metal seemed to approach ominously close to the wing tip.
Maintaining a steady hover was more like flying in formation on an
unwilling
leader, so eventually I took pot luck, selected a firm rate of descent and
waited for the heavier than usual touchdown as the deck came up to meet
me. A
jarring thud and I was there."

And here's what would be a waveoff and into the drink from fuel exhaustion
(if
no tanker was available) in a CTOL a/c, same source:

"It was a lovely night but black as the ace of spades, with no horizon.
Although I had plenty of fuel to allow for a second approach, my weight on
this
first approach was marginal . . . . [Note, they were just past Ascension
Island
on their way south to the Falklands, and it was very hot. On his first
approach
the a/c wouldn't maintain height in the hover despite full throttle and
water
injection, so he went around and made a second approach] My fuel was
fine, but
not really enough to take it round a further time. I turned in towards
the
glide slope from downwind and was in good voice contact with the Air
Direction
Officer, Tony Walker. On my first approach I had switched off my radar
when
close to the ship and was now relying on ranges to go to the deck being
given by
my controller. My Number Two that night was Alan Curtis, and I could see
his
aircraft coming down behind a third aircraft. I suggested feeding in
behind
Alan.

"As can very easily happen, a slight misunderstanding then occurred. In
the
ship, Tony assumed, with good reason, that I had elected to feed myself in
visually for approach and touchdown. In the air, I was of the same mind
but was
expecting some ranges to go to be passed to me (judging the distance to a
deck
by night is not easy when the deck lights are the only references you have
.. . .
Tony must have presumed that my radar was still on line and so he switched
frequency to talk to the next a/c coming down the slope. This left me on
the
same frequency as Alan, who was now approaching the hover ahead of me.
Robin
Kent was in Flyco talking Alan down, so I couldn't get a word in edgewise.

"Not having a clue how far it was to the ship, I did realise that I was
high on
the prescribed glideslope, adjusted for that, and felt a little uneasy.
Suddenly I realized that I could see the spray being kicked up from the
surface
by Alan's jet, and I then knew I was too close and too fast. I was still
doing
130 knots with 60 deg. of nozzle and, as Alan's a/c suddenly loomed large
before
me I had to take evasive and corrective action. I jinked left to miss
Alan's
jet and slammed the nozzles to the full braking stop position. My fuel
state
was about 700 lb. -- not enough to go round again if there were any more
****-ups!

"I cruised on past the ship decelerating as I went and ended up in the
hover
very wide and very high and with no visual references at all. It was a
black
night with no horizon, the ship was back over my right shoulder and the
velocity
vector symbol in my HUD had disappeared from view. I was completely in
limbo,
not knowing whether I was going up or down, fighting harder than ever
before to
control the a/c and expecting to crash at any moment. For what seemed
about 30
seconds I was in serious trouble and on the point of ejecting from the
a/c. But
then the ship cottoned on to the fact that something was wrong and took
action.

"Brian Prendergast acted before speaking. He switched on the flight-deck
floodlighting, then called 'You're high!' At last I could see the ship
and gain
some perspective. Robin Kent then transmitted: 'You are very high.' In
the a/c
I immediately felt more comfortable. I kept my eyes on the floodlit deck
by
craning my head around to the right and throttled back to bring the jet
down to
a realistic hover height. Now I had to get back to the deck from my
position
ahead of the ship, and used a little braking stop nozzle to start me
moving
backards. Nothing seemed to happen. I was making no progress and fuel
was
running low. I selected full braking stop and, as I started to move
backwards
alongside the ship, I suddenly got heavy rudder tramping. The rudder
peddles
were trying to thrash left and right against my feet. That meant I was
doing
about 40 knots backwards! It was a most unnerving experience and I
couldn't
really understand what was going on. Soon, however, I was in a position
to
return the nozzles to the hover stop, stabilize alongside and carry out a
normal
deck landing. I then found out that there was a wind over deck of more
than 10
knots from the stern. No one had passed this critical information to me,
which
is why I had found it so difficult reversing to the correct hover
position.

"After a safe touchdown and whilst still in the cockpit, unstrapping, I
was
cursing Wings and the world in general. I was definitely going to have
someone's guts for garters, blah, blah, blah! But by the time I had
cooled off
walking down the flight-deck my sense of humour had returned. I said
nothing to
Wings beyond pleasantries, amd told Tony that none of it was his fault.
Then I
went down to the bar, where the ever-present and understanding Senior
Pilot
[Squadron XO in the USN. Robin Kent] listened to my story over a couple
of
pints."

Note, the SHAR pilots didn't have NVGs at the time, and by all accounts
I've
read the first gen. Harriers were much more of a handfull in the hover and
transition than the second generation Harrier IIs.

IMO, the handling differences between the two jets are sometimes
mischaracterized. Both aircraft are very honest. Workloads in the hover
are very similar, except the first Harriers have neutral static stability in
yaw below about 60kts -- a not-so-insignificant difference for transition
flight. The first Harriers also have a much "lighter" control feel. Due
to the stronger stability augmentation on the H II, it is slightly more
forgiving of inattention to sideslip generation in transition flight, and
protects the less experienced pilot as he (or she) ventures near the edges
of the envelope. However, due to the different wing and its associated
high-lift devices, at higher winds over the deck and while using the
aft-most spots on the ship, you have to pay more attention to roll
excursions.


The F35 should change that due to automated systems that shift some of
the
cockpit tasking to the machine.

I expect that will be the case. I assume they plan to use the FLIR for
approach
and landing?

Don't know, but pilots usually find a way to use whatever works best.


Guy