Seeking anecdotes about "instructor in command"

Michael wrote:


But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the
instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe
that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is
well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many
documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose
your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece
of paper doesn't mean he's qualified.

You're absolutely right about making the right instructor choice.

But I still think that there's a line here that can be drawn, if not easily.
Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at
least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with
the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope
due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm
thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other
occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility.


However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken
too far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was
bad, he'd say something".

Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be
deadly.

Yes. But I'm thinking that this - communication - is more a symptom than
cause in the "syndrome" I'm trying to define.

It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something
the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for
the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for
the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem
because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you
get another instructor.

But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn
this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because
he's paying less attention or (2) not tell the instructor. Either could
result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the
instructor would say something.

[...]

The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate
decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes,
somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable
because the captain is comfortable.

This is something on which I'm not yet clear. In my reading, some of the
accident descriptions include the captain overriding the copilot's
discomfort. In one example, the last words on the CVR were "I told you
so". I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.

However, an instructional flight is - as you note - obviously a different
situation. There's the expectation of discomfort, if you will. As long
as "envelope excursions" are made explicitly, this is "trust". It's the
unawared excursion that's the problem.

[...]
I think you need to separate the two.

Right. That's exactly what I'm doing grin.

[...]
When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk.

That is a good point. Justified, but there nevertheless.

[...]

This was a perfect example of poor communication.

Yes. Thanks for sharing it.

[...]
Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really
dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and
second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched
the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees.

Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly,
even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that
there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o
explicitly realizing/considering that fact.

Of course, failure to realize something will cause that non-realization to
not be communicated.

- Andrew