VX-4 phantom loads

On Sun, 13 Mar 2005 02:32:12 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Fri, 11 Mar 2005 23:48:34 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

We didn't have the luxury of configuring specific jets for specific
missions other than with regard to the mission expendables themselves.
By that I mean a H/K F-4E during Linebacker was loaded with 4xCBU-52
on the inboard TERs (two on each), three fuel tanks, three AIM-7E-2,
and ONE ECM pod in the (usually) left forward missile well.

Yes, I know, but we're talking about the majority of F-4s, not just your H/K birds.
Loads varied depending on the unit and the tasking.

My point is that aircraft scheduled for Hunter/Killer and aircraft
scheduled for A/A escort, and aircraft that were scheduled as bomb
droppers all came out of the basic 27 aircraft that were available to
the 34th TFS--24 UE plus 3 attrition spares.

Be that as it may, Coe's a/c wound up with a pair of pods, and it's not the only one. I've
got another shot of a 34th bird (68-0498) with a pure A/G load: Mk.84s on the O/Bs, 2 CBUs
on each I/B, a C/L, pods in both forward wells, and NO AIM-7s. Both of the 34th TFS birds
I've mentioned, Coe's 0493 and 0498, have the long gun blast fairing (given the serials it
had to be a retrofit, as they weren't installed on the production line until 69-7261) and
formation strip lights, so these photos almost certainly date to the latter half of 1972.
I once asked Dweezil when they got the long fairings and striplights, and IIRR he thought
not before 1972 for the fairings; I don't remember what he said about the strip lights, but
it's clear from photos that neither was a universal fit in 1972, as numerous a/c lack them,
especially some of the TDY units like the squadrons from the 4th TFW. Do you remember if
both features were present (on at least some a/c) when you arrived in July?

I arrived at Korat in June of '72. I'd gone through the quicky
check-out at Luke flying C-models in May-June. All the airplanes I
encountered had the strip lights. I didn't register the gun fairing
difference at the time, so couldn't comment. I don't know if it was a
local mod (Logan mentions it in a photo caption and since he was
downed in July of '72, it had to have been on at least some of the
birds by that time. We got TCTO-556, the new conventional weapons
switchology in July/Aug of '72.

As for that load on 0498, I never encountered a mix of -84s and CBU.
When I carried CBU and GP bombs, it was always 6xMK-82 on a C/L MER
and 4xCBU in pairs on the I/B TERs.

I just looked at my form 5 and found that I flew 498 one time in my
year at Korat--what are the odds of that, not hitting a tail number in
9 months of single-squadron operation?

Curiosity got the better of me, so I dug out Don Logan's excellent
photo anthology, "The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing" by Schiffer
Publishing. (As an aside, Don was shot down about three days before I
arrived at Korat in '72. I moved into his hootch room even before his
personal effects were packed up.)

What surprised me was the number of F-4E photos both ground and
in-flight in which aircraft had NO ECM pod. Even in photos indicating
that they were taken after the commencement of Linebacker operations
there is no evidence of a pod.

I've got a fair number of those too (always A/G birds, usually from the 1968-1971 period),
and I've always assumed that podless a/c were being sent to SVN or Laos. Presumably you had
a limited number of (working) pods, so a/c assignments and tasking would reflect that.
These a/c often have a KB-18 in the forward right AIM-7 well, and often no AIM-7s, which
again would indicate that they weren't being sent into areas with nothing but
manually-aimed AAA.

During the period between the end of Rolling Thunder (1968) and the
beginning of Linebacker (1972) there was virtually no SAM threat and
no MiG threat. Heaviest defenses were in Barrel Roll and the northern
half of Steel Tiger region of Laos.

Wear and tear on the AIM-7 from landing and take-off jolting wouldn't
be balanced against the probability of needing the weapon. Despite
this husbanding of resources, when Linebacker started, the mechanical
reliability of the AIM-7 was abysmal.

Well, sort of. Coe's account in "and kill MiGs" goes into a lot more detail. Coe says he
was at about M1.6 and estimates the MiGs were at about M1.1 when he shot, and Webb called a
break immediately after the shot, which caused another pair of MiG-21s to overshoot over
the top of him (these were probably the ones that had been called merged by Disco, and
which caused at least one of the strikers to jettison when the strike flight spotted
them). BTW, I believe this is the highest speed attained during a kill in Vietnam, and
very possibly the highest speed attained by a tactical a/c during a combat mission.

We all get taller, smarter, braver and better looking as the years
pass. I'm just a bit skeptical of the M1.6 estimate. Starting with
three tanks and wall-to-wall missiles from 420 KIAS in the escort role
and then being able to configure to clean, accelerate and hit that
kind so speed at the typical altitude would be very unlikely. To get
M1.6 with the missiles, the pods and the altitude under FL 400 just
doesn't seem within the realm of capability of the airplane.

Checking Jenkins book on the F-105 confirmed my memory that the -87 didn't have deception
capability; that was the -101. He writes "Besides laying down a continuous jamming barrage,
the ALQ-87 also had a sweep modulator that could introduce random bursts of reinforcing
noise in a so-called pulse power option. The pod could simultaneously perform any two of
three functions: denying range and azimuth data to Fire Can; depriving Fan Song of range,
altitude and azimuth; and jamming the position beacon installed in the sustainer section of
the Guideline missile." so carrying a pair of them would certainly add to the
jammingpowerandcapability, even if each pod was able to cover the entire threat frequency
spectrum (I don't know if they could). Re the -101, he writes "This pod could perform
either deception or noise-barrage jamming, and was specifically intended for activities
such as Iron Hand [Guy: Also used for MiGCAP by the 432nd in 1972, for the same reason]
where formation flying wasn't feasible."

Well, as much as I respect the considerable research that Jenkins did
on the F-105, as we've often discussed, the use of pods by Iron Hand
flights was much more the exception than the rule.





Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com