VX-4 phantom loads

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
almost twice as long.

The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe.

I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
pictures.

It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the
years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time.

While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.

I'll try and find a copy.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.

If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't
available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to
pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star
of the show.

By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72?

'72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in
there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the
'68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not.

Coming in under
the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
etc.

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.


Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was

definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.


Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had
been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air.

Guy