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On Tue, 29 Mar 2005 06:17:42 -0600, "John Carrier"
wrote: of the center of pressure, that kind of thing. Maybe a Phantom driver could explain it better. The aerodynamic center shifted forward abruptly as you were decelerating through about .95 IMN. As the aero center shifts forward, the stabs downward trim force becomes greater and a pitch up occurs. (This is rather typical transonic behavior, although it varies from jet to jet.) In the F-4's case, if you were pulling 6 G or so, you'd suddenly find yourself around 9 G during this transient. At medium/high altitudes, the airframe would give a hint that this was about to happen with a subtle buffet cue. You could reduce your back stick just as the aircraft dug in and maintain your G without exceeding it. If you were low (say 5,000', higher IAS for .95) the buffet cue wasn't there and it could sneak up on you. I experienced the low altitude manifestation once and use the incident as an illustration of the effects (big time overstress) of transonic pitch up for my aero lecture. R / John Walt used the term "G-dig", but I always heard it called "Mach tuck"--(coincidentally we had a guy in the squadron with last name Tuck, so his call sign became Mach -- rather than the more conventional "Friar".) Most jets of the period really couldn't command a lot of G when supersonic--the slab simply didn't have enough authority. So, if a fight was engaged in the supersonic speed range, guys trying to get as much turn rate as possible would have a yard of stick pulled into their gut. When the airplane decelerated through the Mach, that slab prepositioning when it went sub-sonic would then command a whole lot more AOA and G. Overshoot of the allowable G limit was damn near inevitable. One solution was to ask the back-seater to keep on eye on the mach for you and call when it looked like you were going to transition. Good situational awareness also helped--you knew your altitude, your entry airspeed, your attitude and your tactical position relative to the adversary. Predicting when you were going to go sub-sonic was then a function of art rather than science for the experienced guys. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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