Scared of mid-airs

Just a question for a fighter pilot, what amount of fuel in
minutes is normally on board when you begin a terminal
penetration? If you have good position and radio contact,
how long does it take to get a tanker hook-up?

Since 9/11, how much fighter cover traffic is in civil
airspace that wasn't there before?[general terms, nothing
classified]

If ATC is slow with a clearance, are you expected to punch
out?



"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
| On Mon, 31 Jul 2006 07:59:18 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
| wrote in
::
|
| Larry Dighera wrote:
| I would have to see examples of hyperbole to be able to
find facts
| that support those statements.
|
| also Larry Dighera:
| You've got to agree, that rocketing through congested
| terminal airspace at 500 knots without the required
ATC clearance,
|
| If you speak here of the Florida mishap, there's your
example--
| the CLOSURE rate was near 500 knots, but not the speed of
| the USAF aircraft.
|
| Just to assure that we are all both aware, the definition
of
| 'hyperbole' is: extravagant exaggeration.
|
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| 1. "Based on their closure rate of approximately 480
knots," ...
|
| 2. "Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the
| descent."
|
| Based on 1 above, you are the one who has exaggerated the
closing
| speed by 20 knots, but we are both human after all.
|
| Based on 2 above, I am guilty of exaggerating the top
speed the Ninja
| flight reached by 50 knots. I don't classify ~11% as
_extravagant_
| exaggeration; rather it is my poor recollection of an
event that
| occurred nearly six years ago. In any event, I apologize
for my
| error, but I do not see how it may have affected the
conclusions I
| reached.
|
| And since he was not aware that he was in terminal
airspace
| (per a cite you named), there's a deliberate misstatement
| to boot.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "Ninja flight's mistake was in transitioning to the
tactical
| portion of their flight too early, unaware that they
were in
| controlled airspace."
|
| That was President, Accident Investigation Board Robin E.
Scott's
| opinion. It is not fact.
|
| Despite the fact that Parker failed to brief terminal
airspace prior
| to the flight as regulations require, I personally find it
difficult,
| if not impossible, to believe Parker was unaware, that the
60 mile
| diameter Tampa Class B terminal airspace lay below him at
the time he
| chose to descend below 10,000' into it.
|
| Immediately prior to that descent, he was attempting to
contact ATC
| for clearance to enter Tampa Class B airspace, but failed
to make
| contact, so he continued his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace. If
| he were unaware he was over the 60 mile diameter terminal
airspace,
| what reason would he have had to contact Tampa Approach?
Surely
| Parker could see the busy international airport below him.
So, while
| my statement is at odds with the AIB report, I believe it
is more
| accurate.
|
| If you disagree, I welcome your explanation of how a
competent pilot
| can possibly be unaware of a 60 mile wide swath of
congested terminal
| airspace (and that doesn't even include the Class C to the
south of
| the Class B) that is located immediately north of the MTR
start point.
|
|
| I am unable to find any reasonable excuse for what
Parker did. It was
| a clear day. He was descending into Class B airspace,
canceled IFR,
| and dove his flight of two into the terminal airspace
at twice the
| speed limit imposed on all other aircraft in that
airspace without ATC
| clearance. He may have lost situational awareness, but
I find it
| impossible to believe he didn't know that continuing
his descent would
| put him within Class B airspace without a clearance and
without
| communications with ATC. That's against regulations.
|
| His nav system position error was sufficient that he was
not
| aware he was entering terminal airspace.
|
| The USAF Accident Investigation Board's report:
|
| "The error was such that following INS steering to a
selected
| point would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the
desired
| location"
|
| In other words, Parker's INS steering erroneously lead him
to believe
| he was located 9-11 miles north of his true position,
because his
| flight was southbound at the time. That means, that
Parker could not
| have thought he had past terminal airspace, and the AIB
report
| indicates that he believed he was approaching the MTR
start point
| prior to his descent below 10,000'. The error works
against the
| theory that it excuses Parker's decisions.
|
| What about that do you not understand?
|
| You need to re-read that portion of the AIB report dealing
with the
| INS error that miraculously occurred immediately before
his descent.
| There was no error earlier in his flight. Read the
report, and cite
| the portion that contradicts my analysis, if you don't
concur.
|
| Or do you simply refuse to believe it because it isn't
convenient?
|
| I refuse to believe your analysis of the effect Parker's
INS error
| had, because it isn't logical. You need to take the time
to
| OBJECTIVELY re-analyze that portion of the AIB report.
|
| Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
| that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at
the time
| of the collision. What about that statement (from the
| accident investigation) do you not understand?
|
| Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested
terminal airspace
| is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit
you state
| above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is
_significantly_
| faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB
report at the
| beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can
provide the
| reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.
|
| Incidentally, what is the 'F-16 Dash 1'? Is it the
aircraft operation
| manual, that provides information regarding minimum speeds
for various
| flight regimes?
|