Scared of mid-airs

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:08:14 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
:

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence.

Which factor is that?

If you draw the MTR with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to
create routes that would be meet training requirements and allow for
reasonably unhindered GA traffic.

That seemed obvious to me.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs.

Agreed. Are you saying there is a requirement for ATC to have radar
coverage of all R airspace? Or are you saying, that if the military
is going to shoulder responsibility for the hazard to air safety their
high-speed, low-level operations create, it would require ATC radar
coverage?

ATC had perfectly good radar coverage in Florida, but it didn't
prevent the MAC. And the Cessna pilot was found to have been
partially responsible as a result of being incapable of avoiding at
the speeds involved.

They won't be able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part
of the GA pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at
those altitudes.

First, I never indicated that GA should have 'no responsibility'; I
said the military should bear sole legal responsibility for the
hazards it poses to air safety as a result of operating under its
exemption to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' feet.

Next, There would be no necessity for the military to take sole
responsibility as mentioned above, if they were operating in Class R
airspace (unless they failed to schedule it with ATC/FSS).

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance [sic] maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

[Mitigate: to cause to become less harsh or hostile]

Not being familiar with those operations, I ask, would it be feasible
to conduct those operations above 10,000'? If not, why not?

I presume formation repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers,
simulated armed reconnaissance maneuvering and simulated weapons
delivery maneuvers and re-attacks may require larger lateral, and
perhaps vertical, boundaries than are currently provided by MTRs. Is
that correct?

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

We disagree about that. (And you have evaded the question.)


Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military)

The Flying Tigers were a civilian group. Anyone who thinks the Flying
Tigers were not fighter pilots is uninformed and/or delusional.

My skill level was generally above the majority.

Right. So using your own personal experiences as examples in this
discussion is atypical of most military pilots, by your own admission.

[...] therefore the exemption of the 250 knot restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

You'll find it impossible to locate a single instance in which I
advocated operating an aircraft below its safe minimum speed.

My issue is the operation in excess of the 250 knot speed limit in
joint use airspace, and the hazard it causes to civil aviation.


Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

I am able to hold my breath for 1.5 minutes. Other's have done so
recently for nearly 9 minutes.

Of course, fast-movers operate in excess of 250 knots, and the
equation does not consider head-on situations as occurred in Florida.
The closing speed was 480 knots in that instance, which works out to a
little over 19 seconds to visually identify the conflicting traffic at
3 statute miles, decide to take evasive action, and have the aircraft
clear of the path of impact.


These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

Okay. Four seconds to make the decision to take evasive action, and a
couple of seconds to input control commands and for the aircraft to
actually clear the path, that leaves 13 seconds to visually identify
the head-on traffic at 3 statute miles in minimum VMC.

Now, if you consider a fighter at 300 knots approaching a 250 knot
airliner head on, the closure rate would be 550 knots permitting only
17 seconds until impact. Subtracting six seconds for decision and
maneuvering, leaves 11 seconds to visually identify the threat. That's
precious little time to see-and-avoid in single pilot operations.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!


[Ah. Invective and deprecation: the last refuge of the unarmed. Are
you aware of how such loss of civility diminishes any respect you may
have had? I don't expect you capable of apologizing. Disappointing.]

Operators are not skilled in the disciplines of engineering. Operators
have a vested interest in the decisions. Engineers use objective
calculations to discover system limitations, not necessity nor emotion
to arrive at unrealistic conclusions.

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