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"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
link.net... "John Mazor" wrote in message ... Up until tonight, no, but McNicoll's increasingly blatant attempts to do so now make it clear that that in fact is happening here. McNicoll made no attempt to cover any controller asses here, there's no controller's ass to cover because the controller made no error. I rest my case. Let's see... my repeated statements here, in clear, blunt, unmistakable language that "the crew screwed" up" are part of a clever attempt to deflect attention away from the crew. Wow, I never woulda known that if you hadn't pointed it out to me. I thought they were a clear, blunt, unmistakable admission that the principal initiating event was pilot error. No, it was your implication that the controller failed to prevent this accident that was a not-so-clever attempt to deflect attention away from the crew. The controller was otherwise occupied, and I never stated or implied that if he had not been otherwise occupied, the controller *would* have prevented the accident. Furthermore, I have made clear that even if there had been the two controllers there and the lone controller had not been responsible for working both positions, he would not have committed any error if he had failed to notice the pilot error and warn them. He *might* have, yes, but that goes to redundancy, one of the safety concepts that I have contributed to these discussions and which you have ignored in your determined but unneccesary obsession with ensuring that no one attributes any controller error to this accident. To the extent that other factors such as airport layout and markings, etc. are shown to have contributed a link in the accident chain, every one of those links is a failure point in the complex, interlocking array of safety protections that have been built into the system. Each and every one of them has to be identified and fixed if we want to avoid a repeat of a similar accident scenario. So if you think that my calling attention to this aspect of the investigation is some attempt to cover up or absolve any human error by the crew, you still don't understand how aviation safety works. Jon, do you have any background at all in aviation? What makes you think you have any understanding of how aviation safety works? My many explanations here of how the investigation process and safety system work, none of which you have acknowledged, let alone refuted. |
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